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Abstract 
The following thesis is an examination of the professionalization of the British line 
infantry officer corps from 1870 to 1902. Beginning with a discussion of the extant 
theories of professionalization, it then looks at civil military relations and its relationship 
to the international situation in generaL The deployment of the line infantry at home 
and abroad is then analysed. Finally, the organisational changes made to produce 
professional structures for education, remuneration and promotion are discussed. 
This work contains 92,045 words, including footnotes, introduction and bibliography. 
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Introduction 
Compared to the ranks, the Victorian officer corps has been an enigmatic group. 
Little work has been done on the officer class; of what exists, most looks at their social 
antecedents or mentions them in passing, or with respect to other issues. Though 
histories do exist, no organisational study has been done, nor has the process of 
professionalization been looked into. This thesis attempts to rectify this, at least for the 
case of the line army officer corps. It will be argued that professionalization was a 
process of dialogue, and sometimes dictation, between the officer corps and the state. 
Officers disagreed among themselves over what professional reform was and what it 
was supposed to accomplish. This dialogue tended to result in efforts to solve the 
immediate problem, and to solve further problems as they appeared, rather than in any 
thinking further ahead for a more broad or integrated solution. This process produced 
and refined professional structures such as an educational system and a standard 
curriculum, and systems of remuneration and education-linked promotion. This thesis 
will also look at the deployment of the regiments so as to more clearly define the 
professional world within which they lived. 
I would like to take the opportunity to thank the following individuals and institutions for their assistance 
in making this work possible. Dr Jeremy Crang, Dr. Omissi, and the members of the Scottish Centre for 
War Studies, for their helpful comments; Bill Leeson and friends, for introducing me to the Kriegsspiel; 
the staffs of the Public Record Office, the Mitchell Library in Glasgow, the Library at the University of 
Glasgow, and the Library at the University of Calgary, Canada; the staff, both academic and clerical, at 
the Department of Modem History, University of Glasgow; the very patient staff of Graduate Studies; 
William Buckingham, who assisted me with last-minute research; my family, and especially my husband, 
for their unconditional support, and last, but certainly not least, my academic supervisor, Professor Hew 
Strachan, whose guidance, patience and advice were incalculable. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Professionalism, Professionals, and Professional 
Theory 
The contemporary standard of military professionalism was the German, and 
particularly the Prussian, army. There was general agreement among the European 
armies, including the British army, that the Prussian army was highly professional. 
That given, there was no agreement on either what aspects of the Prussian army to 
emulate, or how to incorporate those aspects into the British army. Was a general 
staff useful to Britain? Could it be grafted onto Britain's very different 
administrative structure without bringing other, unwanted, elements of the Prussian 
system with it? How relevant was German officer education, geared to the 
expectation that the German army would be a principal in a future major European 
war, to an army that was currently fighting in small formations against non-European 
opponents? It was by no means clear to the British how, or even what, elements of 
German professionalism were applicable to the British context. 
In the British context, the strategic question was whether the army should 
direct its efforts to the possibility of a continental war, in which Britain might send 
an expeditionary force and risked invasion, or the myriad small colonial wars the 
army faced every year. This is a professional issue in that the former implied that 
the army required a general staff and to emphasize mobilization plans and the 
administration and control of large formations in the field. The latter implied an 
emphasis on small unit tactics, and strategic logistics. 
Thus strategic questions became in tum issues of training. There was general 
agreement among British officers that they should be trained in their profession, and 
there was no question that they alone held the legal and constitutional right to act as 
military officers serving the crown. However, exactly what they should learn was a 
matter of debate. Should their education should include elements of a broader, 
liberal education, or be more narrowly focused on topics of direct relevance? How 
they should be trained was also an issue of debate. Was formal classroom training 
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(itself under debate) sufficient, or was direct experience of battle the only true 
teacher? They generally agreed that leadership was to some degree intrinsic, and 
therefore not entirely teachable. To the degree that it was teachable, it was taught in 
the public schools, which were increasingly the source of officers, and whose 
students were the sons of the upper middle class - the professionals, the 
businessmen, and the civil servants. This innate leadership ability was initially 
presumed inherent to the nobility, but as the nineteenth century progressed, allowed 
to be an assumed aptitude ofthe upper middle classes as well. 
When government fiat ended the purchase of commissions, there was no 
question but that the state should provide a salary and pension to replace purchase. 
Since both pay and pensions were directly related to rank, and rank, at the regimental 
levels, was deliberately linked by government refonns to education, pay and 
pensions in tum related back to training. The British debated the issue of pay and 
pensions through the minutiae of fair and appropriate levels of compensation for 
officers who joined under the purchase system or under other various systems of 
compensation. Since this compensation was never even moderately generous in the 
regimental ranks, it also served to support a financial, and hence social, barrier to 
entry into the officer corps. 
Pay was also linked to promotion. Promotion could occur through purchase, 
merit, or seniority. Edward Cardwell eliminated the option of purchase in 1870, but 
there was no agreement over the proper balance between merit and seniority, and no 
real agreement as to how to define merit. In the absence of a clear definition, and 
therefore clear standards by which to compare officers, the cliques headed by Lords 
Roberts and Wolseley sought to advance officers that drew their positive attention. 
The period between the end of purchase in 1870 and the South African war of 
1899-1902 was one of shifting ground. There was no consensus as to what it meant 
to be a professional officer. However, a consensus was slowly building through a 
process of debate, argument, and individual and government action. The argument 
was not explicitly over the definitions of professionalism, and less so over the 
desirability of professionalism: there was general agreement that an officer should be 
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trained in his profession, but not over what "professional" actually meant in practice. 
The reforms during and after South African war marked how far that consensus had 
been made since the end of purchase. The war showed the limits of the officer 
corps' education and experience, and brought to a head many issues that had been 
under long debate. This thesis describes the often-halting process by which the 
British army officer corps attempted to build a consensus on the meaning of the word 
professional between 1870 and 1902. 
Ever hovering in the wings of the British debates, the British saw the 
Prussian army as the standard by which professionalism should be judged. While the 
British tended to hold an idealized picture of the Prussian army, this thesis presents a 
more nuanced and less idealised picture. The details of the Prussian system were 
known to the British, while its flaws were often overlooked because they were 
similar to the flaws in the British system. It is important, nonetheless, to understand 
the implicit standard of comparison the British held themselves to. 
A young man applying to the German army had one of two routes open. He 
could either apply to a regimental commander for a direct appointment as an aspirant 
officer, or graduate from a cadet school. After 1861 he was required to produce a 
certificate of fitness for the Prima class of a gymnasium or from a Realschule to 
apply for a direct appointment. This had been the object of serious opposition from 
Field Marshall Count von Moltke and others, on the grounds that it would screen out 
the aristocracy that made up the corps of officers, so this requirement could be 
bypassed by an appeal to the emperor for dispensation.! At the same time, the 
number of men who applied with a leaving certificate from a secondary school, that 
is, a higher level of education than that demonstrated by a Prima certificate, was 
increasing? As a result, the intake of upper middle class officers rose, while the 
access of nobles into the officer corps was protected, the latter being of great 
importance to both British and German officers who believed that nobles were 
inherent leaders. 
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A quarter to a third of officer candidates came from the cadet schools, whose 
diplomas were treated as equivalent to a Prima certificate. The academic work was 
not demanding, but they were by most accounts a very unpleasant experience: 
physical discomfort, unquestioned discipline and mild to serious hazing.3 Much of 
the point of this was to create "character" and what Showalter describes as an 
"emotional toughness", and to foster a sense ofloyalty to the crown and an ethic of 
self-sacrifice.4 The curriculum favoured physical fitness, mathematics, modem 
languages, and military history, over a more liberal education. Excepting the 
emphasis on physical fitness, this curriculum was very unlike that of the British 
public school system from which most British officers came. The academic exams 
proved difficult to fail. 5 
Appointment as an officer required the unanimous approval of all the officers 
of the regiment. As Kitchen pointed out, "the prejudices ofthe Officers Corps were 
given ample opportunity for expression in the selection of officers".6 A candidate 
was well advised to find a commanding officer willing to support his candidacy. 
The commanding officers, in tum, wanted candidates of acceptable political leanings 
and of suitable social status.7 The army was large enough that there was likely to be 
some regiment that the candidate fit in with, though it was easier for an applicant 
from a cadet school to meet the unofficial social criteria. 8 
About ninety regiments were open only to the nobility or the sons of families 
with a history of service, including the guards and many cavalry units.9 The nobility 
were also disproportionately represented in the higher ranks, though the middle 
classes slowly increased their presence. 10 Even so, the nobility retained a solid grip 
on the higher ranks, maintaining an absolute majority. I I By contrast, in the British 
army the nobility failed to do this. Though they retained a disproportionate presence 
in the higher ranks, they slowly lost their possession of the majority of the higher 
ranks during the later 19th century.I2 
A Prussian officer candidate had two further requirements before joining a 
regiment. He had to spend some months as a ranker in the unit he wished to join, to 
give the officers a chance to see what he was like and whether he would fit in. This 
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time slowly slipped from 6 months to 3 months between the 1870s and the 1890s.13 
Secondly, he had to, at some point, pass the ensign's exam, though until 1880 
passing was not officially required before joining his regiment. 14 Along with his 
application to take the exam, the candidate had to provide a report detailing his age, 
physical fitness, educational background and ancestry. The ensign's exam was very 
fonnal - the candidate was expected to attend in evening dress - and taken very 
seriously. The exams extended over several days.IS It is generally agreed, 
nonetheless, that it took serious effort on the part of the candidate to actually fail 
these exams. 16 As with the British, candidates had already passed the critical social 
barriers before facing the exam. 17 Also, because the Gennan anny was being 
expanded, the need for more officers was well known, and this may have helped to 
enforce tolerance for officers from other than noble backgrounds. In the case of 
Britain, the increasing shortage of officers became apparent only slowly, as the anny 
expanded out of the need to police colonies rather than due to official expansion 
policies. As result, the shortage of officers in the British anny did not become a 
crisis until the Boer War, so the British anny did not change its recruitment 
procedures and standards. 
The last step prior to Prussian commissioning was attendance at a War 
School and passing the officer's examination. These War Schools were a result of 
educational refonns made in 1859, and were specifically intended to prepare students 
for the officers' examination. Three schools opened initially, followed by several 
more in the 1860s, 1870s and two in the 1890s throughout Gennany, excepting 
Bavaria, which maintained a separate War School in Munich. 18 A candidate who 
held an Abitur (high school certificate) and a year of university, or who had taken the 
Selekta course (the advanced class at cadet school) could take the officers exam 
without going to a War School. However, a candidate who went to university was 
commissioned a year later, thereby losing a year of seniority. It was not until 1900 
that holders of the Abitur were granted two years of automatic seniority. 19 
The War School curriculum was composed of entirely military subjects, 
including tactics, fortification, military administration, topography, surveying and 
map drawing. There were also lessons in riding, fencing, gymnastics, parade drill, 
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servicing field guns, and on the duties of other branches of the military. Through the 
1880s the course was divided into eight and a half months of class work and one and 
a half of field exercises. 2o These latter included not only field exercises per se, but 
also visits to artillery ranges, industrial establishments and local fortresses. The 
students were expected to write a report, which was graded. In 1887 four hours per 
week of French and Gennan language instruction were added. 21 The students were 
also expected to demonstrate obedience, loyalty to the crown, and awareness of their 
position as both a member of a profession, and as possessing a social status 
outranked only by the nobility. 22 
A student could avoid the final exams ifhis subject grades were high enough, 
but a certain amount of leeway was granted to students whose grades were slightly 
below that mark, ifhe had shown competence in non-classroom subjects and his 
conduct had been acceptable. Like the ensigns exam, the officers' exam was in no 
way challenging - though this was not seen to be the case by those facing it.23 
Successful students returned to their regiments and their commander applied for a 
certificate of fitness for commission, and also sent a statement to the effect that the 
officers of the regiment felt that the candidate for commission had the necessary 
knowledge to be an officer.24 
The Gennan anny was expanding throughout the 1880s and 1890s, creating a 
corresponding shortage of officers. This had two results for the war schools. First, 
in 1890, classroom instruction at the War Schools was shortened to just over five 
months, but no reduction was made in visitations or field exercises. It was raised to 
a total of eight months in 1893, leaving the course two months shorter than it was in 
the 1880s. Second, the percentage of middle class applicants without any military 
background rose after 1880, though by the tum of the century the number of civilian 
applicants had dropped again, aggravating the shortage of officers. Despite the 
increasing numbers of applicants with Abiturs, the authorities nonetheless claimed 
that the shortage of officers meant that the admission standards could not be raised 
because the increase was insufficient to meet demand?5 In Britain, the length of the 
course at Sandhurst changed intennittently, dropping for set periods to produce 
surges of officers in response to shortages due to colonial wars. 
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Prussian officers joined at around nineteen or twenty, and, if they did not 
have connections or attend the War Academy, could expect to become a first 
lieutenant in about eight years and a captain in about fifteen years. An officer would 
remain a captain for about ten years. The bottleneck for German officers, as for 
British regimental officers, was the rank of major and most officers retired in their 
mid-forties having failed to get this promotion. No one appears to have mentioned 
whether Prussian officers left with a pension. Those who did attain the rank of major 
could expect to become a lieutenant colonel in five to eight years, and full colonel in 
another year to year and a half.26 
Marrying well improved the likelihood of gaining the rank of major. Officers 
placed advertisements in the newspapers, or hired the services of matrimonial 
agencies, hoping to obtain a suitable wife: one with a good reputation and social 
status, who would come with a large private income, and the officer's new father-in-
law often covered his outstanding debts in exchange for the social status gained by 
having a daughter marry an officer. The commanding officer had to give consent to 
marry, and only did so if the prospective wife was found to be socially acceptable, 
and if the officer could demonstrate a private income of 2500 RM, if a lieutenant, 
and 1000 RM if a captain. 27 
Most Prussian officers were posted to the German frontier in regiments 
without much prestige. In the opinion of German officers, such frontier garrisons 
were considered to be "the last place vacated by the Evil One." The only worse 
option was to be sent to the colonies.28 British officers might, perhaps, have held 
scant sympathy for the privations of a Prussian officer's life on the German border. 
A junior Prussian officer was expected to train recruits, including the supervision of 
drill and lectures on geography, military history, and the different elements ofthe 
army. He himself received further training in fencing, gymnastics, and riding, which 
he in tum taught his men. He also attended courses on cavalry and musketry, played 
war games, submitted essays on tactics, fortifications and military history, and 
participated in field manoeuvres. The packed, but unexciting, routine of drill and 
training occupied the entirety of most careers?9 
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Large-scale manoeuvres, known as the Kaiser manoeuvres, were an annual 
event, unlike the British, who held no large-scale exercises between the early 1870s 
and the late 1890s. The exercises became, under Moltke, a continuous campaign in 
which combat formations and means of attack were tested against an enemy using 
French formations and tactics. At the end of the manoeuvres, the General staff 
issued a detailed critique of the operations.3o After the ascension of Wilhelm II, 
however, their educational value declined. While very enthusiastic about these 
manoeuvres in the sense that it displayed the army to foreign powers, Wilhelm II did 
not understand their value as a training exercise. Because the Kaiser was not 
particularly competent as a commanding officer, the manoeuvres became an exercise 
for general staffto make sure that the Kaiser won.3! Eventually, General Moltke II 
convinced him to cease to be directly involved, and the manoeuvres became more 
realistic.32 
Those officers fortunate enough to attend the War Academy had a very 
different career. Graduates got promoted faster and received better assignments.33 
The best students joined the General Staff. General Staff officers, in tum, were 
significantly more likely to reach field rank than other officers, and to hold corps and 
army commands. Their po stings alternated line and staff positions. 34 As its 
reputation grew after 1860, competition to enter the War Academy became more 
serious, and its importance as a key to joining the General Staff grew. By 1900 it 
was an unwritten requirement that officers in the General Staff and field staffbe 
graduates. However, as the need for staff grew, commensurate with the expansion of 
the army, enrolment rose from 148 in the 1870s to 400 by 1895.35 The reputation of 
the Staff College in Britain also rose, and graduation assisted promotion, but because 
Britain lacked a formal General Staff, passing Staff College did not guarantee 
accelerated promotion. 
A candidate attempting to enter the Prussian War Academy had to have three 
to five years of time in service, and still be five years from promotion to captain. 
This is a window of about five years. He also had to have the support of his 
commander, who nominated him and submitted a document stating the applicants' 
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preparations for the entrance exam, and that the candidate demonstrated competence 
in his duties as an officer, that he had an interest in further training, that he displayed 
the proper character for higher command, and that he was healthy and financially 
secure.
36 
From the early 1870's, Field Marshall Count von Moltke (the elder) used his 
influence to give the General Staff control of the Prussian War Academy, and the 
curriculum became more specialised.37 Over the later part of the nineteenth century, 
as was the case in Britain's Staff College, the emphasis was increasingly towards 
military subjects over more general ones, and towards tactical and practical lessons 
over strategy, towards specialisation and away from a broader education.38 Only 
history, and mathematics or foreign languages (French or Russian), were required 
studies aside from military subjects at the War Academy. Military subjects included 
administration, arms and ordinance, communications, field fortifications, general 
staff service, military administration, military geography, military histOry, military 
hygiene, military justice, military surveying, siege warfare, military law and tactics. 
As of 1871, optional subjects included chemistry, geodesy, geography, history, 
history ofliterature, history of philosophy, international law, mathematics, physics, 
and surveying. 39 By 1882, philosophy had been dropped, and classroom time was 
increasingly dedicated to military subjects over options. In 1888, Moltke supported 
curriculum revisions that were implemented for the 1890 class. Time for 
compulsory subjects rose by 30%, and military subjects were almost 60% of all 
instruction time. The optional subjects were reduced to history, math, physics, 
chemistry, Russian, and French.40 Education increasingly centred on tactics. 
Students studied the battles of Frederick the Great, the French Revolution, Napoleon, 
and Wilhelm I, while general history became the history of Germany. Foreign 
military practices, strategy and the impact of politics or economics on war were not 
explored.4! That said, the comparatively tiny Bavarian War Academy operated 
independently, and had a wider curriculum that included liberal arts courses taught 
by university faculty, and the study of foreign tactics. The Prussian War Academy 
students were also given practical training outside the classroom: they solved 
surveying problems, visited gun foundries, powder mills, fortifications, local 
technical institutes, observed the exercises of the Railway Brigade, and rode a troop 
14 
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train. During summer breaks the students spent time with other branches of army. 
Before 1874 this was a reward for superior academic performance and in 1874 
became an option for all students. These summers of attached duty became 
requirements in 1888 with infantry officers attached to the field artillery and the 
cavalry in subsequent summers.42 
Assuming a Prussian officer passed the entrance exam high enough to gain a 
position at the academy - that is, in the top 20% of the year's candidates - continued 
attendance depended on passing each year. The entrance exam tended to favour the 
old elites because officers from such backgrounds were able to join the more 
prestigious regiments, which could afford tutoring for their junior officers and also 
tended to be near Berlin and thus had better access to study materials. A 
disproportionate number of the War Academy students came from the nobility, and 
the social network assured that a noble would get a place over a commoner. 43 Given 
that the nobility retained possession of the upper ranks, social screening obviously 
existed not only in the entrance to the War Academy, but within the General Staff as 
well. By contrast, the British system was less successful at retaining the highest 
ranks as the preserve of the nobility. 
The War Academy final exam was difficult compared to the end of term 
exams - and extraordinary exacting compared to officer's entrance examinations -
and grades were critical for an officer's future career. Military history and siege 
warfare exams were composed of problems handed out ahead oftime, while the rest 
of the exam was done under supervision. Officers also evaluated on personality, 
character, personal behaviour and general education. The final part of exam was a 
three-week exercise in which the students were graded for their performance under 
stress and expected to solve problems at a division level.44 The students with the 
best final grades went on to two years of probationary training with the general staff. 
Of those, about one in nine of those were accepted as permanent members of the 
staff, and access to the highest levels of command. The other grades, in descending 
order, were "qualified for higher level adjutant duty", "qualified for instructor at 
military schools" and "qualified for line duty", which last was considered to be 
failure.45 However, simply having been to the War Academy was advantageous to 
IS 
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an officers' career. Interestingly, while Prussianjunior officer education was 
perhaps less stringent than the British, its was somewhat easier to pass Staff College 
than to pass the War Academy. Equally, however, passing the War Academy was a 
guaranteed ticket to high promotion, while passing Staff College conferred no such 
guarantee. 
The Civilian Professions 
Also present in the background of British thinking about military 
professionalism were the examples of the civilian professions in Britain. Many 
officer's fathers were likely to be engaged in one ofthese professions. While rarely 
mentioned in the British debates on military professionalism, these professions none 
the less provide some of the backdrop on British comparative expectations about the 
meaning of professionalism, an issue which came to the fore at the tum of the 
century because the British government discovered that potential officers were 
increasingly choosing one of these professions instead of a military career (see 
chapter 5). 
Medicine 
Of the liberal professions, the medical profession was by far the most 
conscious in its efforts to gain respectability and raise its social status. The first 
element among the groups that dabbled in medicine to expect minimum standards of 
knowledge were the apothecaries, who got an act passed to regulate their profession 
in 1815. It gave the society of apothecaries the right to supervise apprenticeship, 
examine apothecaries and licence practice, though they did not gain the right to 
exclude anyone from practising without the society'S approval.46 It was not for 
another forty years that the medical profession as a whole gained an act that placed 
all practitioners under one umbrella. 
The medical act of 1858 recognised all licensing and educational bodies, and 
placed them under the supervision of the new General Medical Council. It was the 
16 
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result of two select committees convened during the previous decade. They were 
platforms for reformers to attack the current state of medical education and expose 
the prevalence of unlicensed and unqualified practitioners.47 The act was a major 
step towards creating a sense of corporate unity and self-awareness. It erased the 
distinctions among physicians, surgeons and apothecaries and encompassed them 
within a professional boundary between those who offered the service of medicine 
and the lay public. It also opened the way to distinguish between general 
practitioners and more specialised consultants, which was eventually resolved by 
instituting a referral system.48 
Another piece oflegislative reform earlier in the century was the Poor Law 
reform. There were proposals for a national and publicly paid medical service, 
wherein parliaments' duty was to provide income, but not restrict individual clinical 
freedom. But these hopes to create a relationship between state and medicine, on the 
medical profession's terms, died with Chadwick's new Poor Law of 1834. By the 
1860s the general practitioners were sufficiently secure in private practices they 
wanted no part of state medicine.49 
The other major organisational element in the continuing professionalization 
of medicine in the nineteenth century was the creation of the British Medical 
Association in 1836, which represented much of the profession. One of its 
professionalising acts was to begin to discipline and punish its own members. In the 
mid-century, the BMA established a court-medical to handle unprofessional conduct 
and keep unsavoury occurrences out of the courts and newspapers. Unfortunately, it 
lacked authority and it was often difficult to convince the parties of a dispute to 
accept its judgements. This court did, however, create precedents for later General 
Medical Council tribunal. The court-medical refused to hear charges of 
'incompetence', and 'incompetence' was not incorporated into 'infamous conduct'. 
The court-medical also tried to rule that a patient was not permitted to summon a 
consultant, and permitted separate fee structures for general practitioners and 
consultants. It was not until the 1880s that the latter two precedents became 
. 50 
common practIce. 
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There were a number of tactics, activities and behaviours that were intended 
to increase the professions' autonomy and establish their professional status and 
credentials. The most important group of innovations changed the image and practice 
ofthe general practitioner. They often tended to be exclusionary, barrier-raising 
changes. There were also a number of changes in societal expectations of doctors 
that also helped. 
Perhaps most importantly, the doctors became able to regulate their own 
numbers in the market. This was partly due to making the exams more difficult, but 
much of it was due to the 1858 act, which required registration, and due to the 
doctors' continuing and deliberate efforts to exclude foreign practitioners from 
practice.51 Another change was to regularise the fee structure, which minimised 
intra-service competition between doctors and projected the image of a more unified 
professional body.52 The Lancet began printing in 1824, and became the leading 
journal of the profession, likewise promoting a sense of community among doctors.53 
Advertising was condemned by the BMA because it promoted competition 
among doctors. 54 By the 1860s, it was noticeable that the more respectable of 
physicians began charging for prescriptions rather than actual medicine because 
charging for goods smacked of 'trade'. It was probably no coincidence that the 
fashion had changed towards less excessive dosages of medicine which resulted in a 
loss of income from that source. 55 
Families who could pay for lengthy vigils awaiting crisis or death also 
supported respectability. Doctors could develop a personal relationship with the 
family, though in practical terms they could do relatively little. One author 
speculates that as the importance of the doctor's presence rose, the vicar's dropped. 56 
In fact, the demand for physicians rose many years before any real advances in 
medical practice should have justified it. 57 Sliding fee schedules made it exorbitant, 
but not prohibitive, for the middle classes to retain a general practitioner. 58 Medical 
incomes correspondingly rose from the 1860s, as the Victorian economy expanded. 59 
As well, the relative status of doctor and patient shifted; patients' status grew 
relatively lower as the doctor's increased, thereby increasing the doctor's authority. 60 
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Interestingly, the drive for status narrowed clinical practice. The increasing 
presence of trained nurses let general practitioners shun as unprofessional some of 
the less pleasant jobs in the service of their patients they had previously performed. 
It also led them to shun as irrelevant, or beneath their professional interest, the 
diseases of children and much of obstetrics. Infectious diseases were not of clinical 
interest until at least the 1880s, as they were regarded as dangerous and socially 
degrading because the majority of such patients were ofthe lower social classes.61 
Changes in the hospital system also supported the increasing professionalism 
and status of doctors. Over the later decades of the century, the hospitals changed 
their mandates from refuges (for those who could get in) to curative institutions as 
they widened their entry and tightening the requirements and arrangements for 
nurses. This was partly as a result of the declining power of the governors and the 
increasing power of hospital doctors.62 The importance for the doctors of a hospital 
appointment was the associated prestige. It gave access to the patrons of the hospital 
and enhanced the doctor's reputation among his own private patients. The related 
honorarium was of relatively little monetary importance, but the appointment 
attracted students and their associated fees. 63 Over time, the hospital doctors would 
have significant control over the profession through the control of education.64 It 
also had the effect of increasing the sense of professional community, as doctors 
began to have similar experiences in the process of becoming professionals. They 
began to have about the same education, influenced by relatively few teachers who 
could preach professional values.65 
Still, a number of things militated against the medical professional's social 
status. As a profession, it was relatively inexpensive to enter. A minimum budget 
for a year's study in London in 1884 was around £331 to £411, over a total course of 
study of five to six years.66 Compared to the cost of studying at the Inns of Court (a 
minimum of £600 per annum for 4 years), meant that the higher end of costs for 
medicine were around the lower end of costs for law, Neither could the technical 
education that medicine required compete with the prestige of the classical liberal 
education, As a result, it tended to attract the younger sons of the other professional 
and merchant classes, and the elder sons of artisans and non-professionals.67 A 
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breakdown of the social origins of physicians in the nineteenth century (though 
limited by not breaking it down by years) shows, that excepting some 42.5% whose 
fathers occupation was not reported, 22.4% were the sons of doctors, 9.2% came 
from the clergy (8.9% of which was Church of England), and 3.3% were gentlemen 
or landowners. Revealingly, military officers are not listed as a separate group.68 
The standard for professional respect for the doctors was probably the legal 
profession. Though they, too, had been subject to reforming interests in the mid-
nineteenth century, the legal profession had not directed its efforts to upward 
mobility, but to successfully maintain and defend their considerable professional 
independence and social prestige. 
The two mid century royal commissions concerned themselves with the 
inadequacies oflegal education for barristers and solicitors. They recommended a 
more systematic and thorough education. Relevant lectures at the universities were 
few, and the Inns of Court expected little more than the students presence for a 
certain period. They recommended examinations (for barristers, solicitors and 
attorneys already had them) and that the Inns set up some form of university for the 
study of law. Little was done to implement these recommendations, in part because 
many members of the bar did not care for the implication that the bar and solicitors 
would have some degree of overlap in their educations, arguing that the barrister 
required a much higher degree oflearning, and it favoured the public interest in that 
the bar was a check on the bench. However, the Inns did establish some teaching 
positions and voluntary examinations.69 
There were further debates in 1872 over compulsory university legal 
education. The more radical reformers favoured a school oflaw established "by 
public authority" (i.e. outside the influence of the Inns of Court) and examinations, 
that were to be the necessary qualification to be admitted to the legal professions. 
Students should "lay the foundation of their legal knowledge in principles, and ... 
study the law upon a large, wide, liberal, and scientific basis.,,7o "Scientific" was 
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presumably used in the sense of an organised or systematised information or 
knowledge. The hitherto voluntary exams did in fact become compulsory for 
aspiring barristers at this time, as a reforming measure.71 
In general, however, opposition to reform was successful. It was based on the 
asserting the importance of practical knowledge gained through a practical 
apprenticeship over academic knowledge. Education was not going to be permitted 
to transform the profession. The anti-reformers considered English law to be too 
unorganised to be effectively taught, making the only effective way to learn was 
through practice. A. V. Dicey, well known writer on law in the later nineteenth 
century, stated the argument this way: "If men were to live by rules, and these rules 
were to work properly, soundness of judgement based on a long apprenticeship in 
practical affairs was essential. Only in this way could men develop appropriate 
understandings - only in this way could they reinterpret old values in novel 
circumstances. Suitable recipes for change could not be tom out oftextbooks."n 
This is an argument in favour of the traditional mode of educating a law student on 
the grounds that it was the best way to pass on professional traditions and values and 
to maintain a sense of community. 
As a result, through the rest of the nineteenth century students of the bar 
learned from a mentor, supplemented by some months of study to pass the exams. 
They could also buy the additional help/advice of one of a number of published 
guides to lead them through the intricacies of the sub-culture ofthe Inns. These 
guides give a reasonably good idea of the expectations of the bar. The leading 
student guide, Walter Rouse Ball's Student Guide to the Bar estimated that a capital 
sum of £ 2433 (at 4% interest) was about minimum, over 4 years of study, a cost that 
also included the first few briefless years. It was up front about the criticality of 
'influence' in advancement, given that the profession was attracting talented and 
educated students. A university degree (a general degree, not a law degree) was 
recommended to ameliorate (though far from negate) these effects, although this in 
tum inflicted its own further expenses.73 
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Many of those called to the bar did not intend to practice. They had gained 
the education because it was useful to administer one's own property and to gain 
access to appointments and patronage that required legal knowledge.74 Though the 
available data on parentage is limited, the law was a preferred profession for the sons 
of the gentry. It was also a career for the children of professions such as medicine, 
the military and the civil service and of course, law itself. Another indication of 
law's high status in relation to medicine and the clergy is that it tended to be the 
choice of elder, not younger, sons. 75 A sample taken in 1885 shows that almost 
three quarters of the fathers of members of the bar were from the urban middle and 
upper middle classes, including members of the legal, medical and other professions, 
the civil service, businessmen and urban gentry. Barristers and solicitors made up 
19% of all careers, and 40% of the professionals. Of the barristers 96% were sons of 
barristers, clergy, officers, civil servants, physicians and teachers.76 
Throughout the century, the legal profession was able to maintain, and even 
expand its autonomy. Not only did they manage to maintain their preferred 
educational system in the face of reformers, they were also able to increase the level 
of their own self-regulation. The Solicitors Act granted the Law Society (formed in 
1825) the right to strike a solicitor off the roll.77 The barristers were policed by the 
benches at the Inns of Court who could disbar a member for dishonourable conduct, 
a category that included incompetence for neither attorneys nor solicitors.78 By end 
of century the 'tradition' of independence (that is, lack of public accountability) was 
viewed as a necessary part of the administration of justice; a protection from the 
appointed judiciary, rather than a privilege in need of justification 79. 
A lawyer's income was, very roughly, comparable to that of the clergy or 
doctors, but the range was substantial. Estimates of the average, or representative 
income range from £ 500 to £ 1000. 80 A minimum fee in Poor Law cases was 3s. 
4d., as compared to a doctor's 1d.81 The manner in which fees were paid expressed 
awareness of how it would reflect in social standing: a virtue was made ofthe fact 
that etiquette forbade them to sue for fees due. This is possibly because it was not 
considered fitting for one gentleman to pay another for services rendered. 82 
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3. Clergy 
Like the other liberal professions, the establishment clergy came under attack 
by the reform movement. However, unlike medicine and the law, by the end ofthe 
century it was several decades into a period of genteel decline. 
The church came under attack during the period of utilitarian reform in the 
1830-40s when membership in the church was still a prerequisite for many social 
positions. The reformers questioned the value of a church whose ministers often had 
no theological training. In reaction, movements like the evangelicals and the Oxford 
movement (also known as the Tractarians) were established. These groups 
attempted to redefine the churches, and implicitly, the clergy's role in society. 83 The 
Oxford movement emphasised priestly powers and religious autonomy emphasis on 
authority of the church whereas evangelicalism emphasised the centrality ofthe 
salvation of souls. These two movements combined with a move toward 
organisational and financial reforms.84 
By mid-nineteenth century the clergy's duties had narrowed to a more strictly 
ecclesiastical role rather than the many secular functions (politician, Poor Law 
administrator, land tax administrator, provider of medicine and social welfare, 
teacher, magistrate) he once took on in his parish that were gradually being taken up 
by civil servants, teachers and police. Greater emphasis was being placed on priestly 
role, where he had monopoly of legitimacy. 85 One author has suggested that the 
clergy had little choice but to emphasise and specialise in their central role, as other 
roles available to them were being taken away. 86 
As their role became defined on strictly spiritual grounds, rather than a wider 
social utility, there were noticeable changes in the clergy. There was a growing 
tendency, both within the church and among the laity, to treat the clergyman as a 
man apart. Both the Evangelicals and the Tractarians emphasised the independence 
and autonomy of the clergy, set apart and consecrated for a particular and sacred 
duty. By last quarter of nineteenth century the clergy began to develop a distinctive 
professional sub-culture. The mid-century had already seen an increase in meetings, 
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which had started with the evangelicals (aided by the spread of better transport), the 
creation of professional publications, and the establishment of theological colleges.87 
The clergy made its greatest advances towards professionalization when it 
gained control over training. As with other forms of professional education, the 
colleges helped develop a professional ideology and ethos.88 However, passing a 
classical course at an older university was a still better qualification and had greater 
status than success at strictly theological studies. By end of century there were 
effectively two groups of clergymen: one still linked to rural aristocracy and the 
other more evangelically oriented. The latter, partly because of their ideological 
stance and relative lack of wealth, did not have the formers' social standing.89 
The period from the later nineteenth century to the First World War are 
spoken of in some texts as a golden era for clergy in rural areas. If the income from 
the parish was sufficient, the clergy could maintain a standard ofliving comparable 
to that of the local gentry, and place his sons into professional careers in the army, 
empire and church. However, it was also a period of decay, as incomes declined 
with agricultural revenues. This effect also showed up in the numbers of clergy. 
While overall numbers of clergy rose through the century, the numbers relative to the 
population declined, except in the 1870's and 1880's. There was also a decline in the 
number of university graduates who chose a clerical vocation. A number of things 
contributed to this problem. The clergy remained relatively expensive to enter, 
particularly when set against their prospects of income. The career prospects were 
very uncertain, except for the well connected, since the church retained a patronage 
as part of the system. 90 
Again, using the honours sample from Cambridge of 1871 to 1873, 
recruitment to the clergy shows considerable self-recruitment (52%), but also a fairly 
even level of recruitment among the established professions (37%) and non-
professional groups (36%), and somewhat lower levels among the gentry (27%), 
business (31 %), newer professional groups (25%). This is a much flatter distribution 
that that oflaw, suggesting its lower relative social status.91 
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Though they gained significant control over their own training, the clergy had 
barriers to gaining the autonomy of the other professions that proved beyond their 
control. First, they could not claim monopoly of spiritual services in the face of 
dissenting churches. Neither were they in a position to control their own income. 
The state was not about to enforce a monopoly and it was state-supported reform that 
returned the clergy to the parishes. Neither could they control their own professional 
structure, which remained in the hands of the church.92 
Among all these professions are some similarities. They have consistent and 
overlapping patterns of recruitment: physicians' sons become physicians, barristers, 
clergy or officers, barristers' sons become clergy, officers or physicians, and so on. 
Most of the pressure for reform was in the early and mid-century, and the impetus to 
reform and died down by the early 1870's. There was also an increasing use of 
educational standards and requirements to define the professions. Moreover, there 
was a high initial financial cost for entry into both these professions, and into a 
career as an officer, while the potential monetary rewards of a military career were 
far more limited than those of a civilian career. 
Conclusion 
All of these professions, civilian and military, have a number of 
consistencies. All have a high initial financial cost, both to pay for the public school 
education that was prerequisite, to pay for the professional education, and to support 
the new professional in the first years of his career. All had some form of school at 
which those subjects considered necessary to master to be admitted to the profession 
were taught. All had some form of state sanction for the monopoly of practice by 
members of the profession, though the clergy suffered since their monopoly was 
restricted to practicing in the established church. However, the military profession 
was distinct from the private professions in that the government directly controlled 
its education, pay, promotion and pension. 
While the Prussian army was the contemporary standard of a professional 
army, this standard did not necessarily apply. Reforming officers desired a general 
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staff and a regularised staff system, but the government distrusted the increased 
political power that appeared to be attendant on this. The function of the Prussian 
army was directed towards controlling their own borders and preparing for a 
hypothetical continental war. The British army was necessarily aimed at controlling 
Britain's colonies and fighting colonial wars, while at the same time casting a wary 
eye at possible continental commitment. The British army was significantly smaller 
than the Prussian army, but costly for its size because the ranks were not conscripted. 
The former were imperial police, the latter the imperial arm of a European policy. 
Thus while numerous standards were available to apply, none actually fit the 
situation faced by British officers. As a result, while the other professional examples 
served as models, none could be adopted directly, but instead provided samples of 
tested policies on which the British, often implicitly, based their own debate. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Colonial Defence or Home Defence? 
The main strategic issue for the army in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century was whether it should organise itself to face the colonial wars that were 
occurring, or the continental war that might occur. How was it to balance between 
garrisoning the empire and maintaining enough battalions for home defence? The 
various European powers could be allies or enemies in the event of war in Europe, 
and, by the tum of the century, those alliances and rivalries had shifted from what 
they had been 20 or even 10 years earlier. The issues of mobilization, and the 
division of defensive responsibilities, were left adrift until inter-service rivalry 
forced the issue. The army was left poorly placed to argue its comer because 
recruiting problems limited its actual strength, the linked battalion system was less 
flexible than expected, and therefore it could not easily support any claim to be able 
to hold off an invasion while maintaining its overseas commitments. The inter-
service argument that occurred in the 1880s concerned the need to commit to a 
European standard of mobilisation, to be prepared to thwart an invasion from 
Europe, while also supporting the burden of overseas commitments and colonial 
wars. The financial means to support these goals was limited. The government used 
the battle between the army and the navy to choose military policy that favoured the 
navy and curbed army aspirations for a general staff, and thus curbed the Army's 
attempts to gain an institution it saw as important to its standing as a professionally 
body_ 
Civilian Control 
"Linkage" was one of a number of reforms the new Liberal Secretary of 
State, Edward T. Cardwell, began to introduce in 1869. Over his tenure from 1868 
to 1874, the Secretary of State made significant changes to the army. He began by 
reducing the Army Estimates, which had greatly expanded due to a fortifications 
building program in the 1860s.1 Over 25,000 men were taken out of colonial 
service, and the size of battalions at home was decreased, excepting those that were 
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slated for overseas service; and the stores vote was cut. He reorganised the War 
Office so as to subordinate the entire administration, including the Commander in 
Chief, to the Secretary of State. The Commander in Chief, who was at that time the 
Duke of Cambridge, retained control over patronage, appointment and promotion. 
The Medical, Educational, Chaplain-General and Topographical departments were 
added to his responsibilities. Short service was introduced for the ranks, that is, six 
years in the regular forces and six years in the reserves. The Reserves were not 
available for small wars, as they could not be called up except in a national 
emergency. 2 Active service was extended to seven, then eight years after the 
Afghanistan war of 1878-1879, when Lord Roberts, the Commander in Chief in 
India, complained that the short service troops had insufficient experience.3 The 
purchase of officers' commissions was ended by royal warrant, and the Localisation 
Act linked two single battalion line regiments and two militia regiments and some 
volunteer units to a regional recruiting pool. Each battalion was to have two 
companies at the recruiting depot, which would train recruits and send them to the 
home based battalion. That battalion would then send drafts overseas to the battalion 
to which it was linked. This solved the problem that battalions overseas had had, 
which was to maintain recruitment.4 
Linked battalion system and deployment 
The linked battalion system was quickly found to be less flexible than 
desired. The policy was to maintain one battalion, of the two in a regiment, abroad 
in India or the colonies, and to maintain the other at home against a national 
emergency. Except in a national emergency, in which event the army could call out 
the whole strength of the militia and regular services, battalions for a colonial war 
had to be drawn from battalions already committed to home defence, or battalions 
already in garrison abroad and from soldiers drawn from other battalions to fill out 
the troop complement.s The Adjutant-General, C. H. Ellice, complained repeatedly 
that the linked battalion system, as it stood, was not able to accommodate even a 
local war.6 He further stated in an 1879 memo that it also damaged the quality of the 
battalions sent to a colonial war: 
Corinne L 1\'1ahaiTcy, 2003 Chapter 2 31 
... when a battalion is sent out to take part in a European war, it will almost 
invariably have to fight in division, with regiments as good as itself on both 
flanks and rear. But when it is sent on an Indian or Colonial campaign, it is 
constantly exposed to the risk of being engaged alone and unsupported in the 
midst of surging masses of a brave and vastly outnumbering enemy. The 
fonner case does not require nearly the same amount of individual 
confidence and cohesion among the men as the latter. In the latter, 
everything depends upon the thorough knowledge of, and trust in, on another 
of officers, non-commissioned officers and men; and yet at present the 
battalions that we send out to discharge this, the most difficult duty a soldier 
can be called upon to perfonn, are in great part an aggregate of recruits, 
combined with volunteers from half a dozen different corps under strange 
officers! 7 
It was recommended that, should both battalions be serving abroad, that the brigade 
depot should be expanded to a provisional battalion, and that, should a war overseas 
be considered sufficiently dangerous that either the reserves be given to the Secretary 
of State, or volunteers called from reserve, should be sent to the battalions abroad. 
The Adjutant-General added that if these ideas were accepted, that the system should 
be workable with in a few years, and if not, "that the short service system must be 
regarded as a failure".8 An 1879 committee on short service also recommended that 
the requirement for national emergency be relaxed.9 
According to the table the Adjutant-General presented (Table A), the drop in 
the number of battalions was a phenomenon of the past 4 years. However, 
infonnation taken from the Anny List and Hart's Anny List indicates that the 
number of battalions at home had been falling since 1872. (see Chart 9 -
Deployment of all Regiments by Region) Ellice did not specify, but his numbers 
were probably taken from planning documents, as they do not show the movement of 
three battalions out of Britain to the Gold Coast for the Ashanti war of 1873. Neither 
does his table match his own statement that as of25 February 1879, 88 battalions 
were abroad. 1o 
Table 1. Statement of battalions ofInfantry serving at home and abroad from 1872-
1879. 11 
Year. At home. Abroad. 
1872 June 70 71 
1873 " 70 71 
CorinnC' L IVIahaffey, 2003 Chapter 2 
1874 " 69 72 
1875 " 70 71 
1876 " 69 72 
1877 " 68 and 4 Coys. 72 and 4 Coys. 
1878 " 64 77 
1879 February 59 81 
The Adjutant General advised making reserves available whenever trained 
reinforcements were needed, and criticised the "inexpediency of retaining them for 
the infrequent emergency of a European war only.,,]2 
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Two colonial wars in 1878-1880, the Zulu war and the Afghanistan war, the 
latter linked to Russian conciliation of the Amir in Afghanistan, only underlined the 
problem, as the army at home was seen to be weaker due to these wars, which were 
conducted based on estimates made for peacetime. 13 It was considered possible to 
send six further battalions to India, if necessary, "but if, as Lord Northbrook 
suggests, it should be necessary to have 12 (i.e., 6 in addition to the above) 
Battalions ready for Indian service, the transfer of so many more men as volunteers 
from other regiments would dislocate the service, and leave us very weak at home. 
This, however, would be a state of things so widely differing from our normal 
military condition, as fully to justify the description of a national emergency.,,]4 
Ellice suggested completely reorganising the linked battalions so that there be 34 
regiments of 4 battalions, and 1 of 5. 15 In each regiment, 2 battalions would be 
abroad, one would be being built up for foreign service and the fourth and the depot 
would be supporting the battalions abroad. 16 This would restore flexibility because 8 
battalions would always be close enough to effective strength to be sent abroad at 
need without damaging the regiment's ability to support battalions abroad.17 
The Duke of Cambridge, the Commander in Chief, completely condemned 
the linked battalion system for destroying regimental morale, and because it "has 
hurried battalions into the field not in a fit state to endure the trials of active service" 
and for being too inflexible to cope with small colonial wars. The price of sending 
battalions to a war was to send home battalions at the price of supporting their sister 
battalion abroad. ls "It is true that the Localization Committee provided for this by 
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proposing that, in such a crisis, the brigade depot should be raised to the strength of a 
battalion, and one of its affiliated Militia battalions called out, but no Ministry, 
however strong, has ever ventured to put this expensive machinery into operation -
not even when our military organization was reeling under the double shock of an 
Afghan and a Zulu war.,,19 His solution was to unlink the battalions. Each battalion 
overseas would leave two companies at home to supply recruits.2o In his opinion, the 
army was an imperial one, dedicated to fighting colonial wars. Localised basing was 
suited to European war, not to imperial needs?) 
The Airey commission supported his position. The Horse Guards asked that 
a commission look into army organisation. Headed by Lord Airey, the former 
Adjutant General (1870-76), and this 1880 commission agreed, not surprisingly, with 
the Commander in Chief to unlink the battalions. The men who made up this 
committee belonged to Cambridge's generation. Future senior military men chose to 
stand by the principle of linkage in their disagreements with the War Office. 
However, the Conservative government fell, and the new Liberal government, with 
Hugh Childers as the new Secretary of State for War, chose to finish the 
implementation of the Cardwell reforms. The linked battalions were amalgamated 
with two militia battalions into territorial regiments?2 (See Table 1 - Index ofthe 
Line Regiments) 
The problem with all these schemes is that they all presupposed that half of 
the battalions abroad and half at home was the norm, from which they had to account 
for occasional deviations due to colonial wars, when more than half of the battalions 
were abroad. The truth is that deviation was the norm; even without a colonial war 
in progress, more than half of the battalions were abroad, and years without a war 
were much less common than those with. Eventually the War Office learned to 
move units around to the more critical colonies, while sending battalions from home 
to a war, or between colonies. The problem was not necessarily the linked battalion 
system, but the lack of men, which was directly connected to the estimates. It was 
this that made the linked battalion system less operable than it might have been. Yet 
the number ofline infantry troops was steadily, if slowly, rising: from 67,000 in 
1875, to 88,500 in 1897. This was part ofa general rise in the non-commissioned 
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ranks of the anny from 118,000 to 144,000. (See Chart 5 - Home and Colonies 
Establishment 1871-1902) In fact, 2,000 men of the establishment existed only on 
paper, as it was illegal to have more soldiers than was voted for by parliament, so it 
was policy to compensate in this fashion for fluctuations in manning.23 However the 
number ofline officers to lead and administer these troops was not rising; after rising 
slightly in the early 1870's, it dropped in 1881 and 1882 to remain stable at around 
2,800 officers, until it began to rise again in 1898. (See Chart 6 - Home and Colonies 
Establishment: Officers) 
The linked battalion system was supposed to allow for two anny corps to be 
assembled from the 70 battalions that were to be at home, without reducing the 
number of line battalions at home below 20 to 23 - which latter were, with the 
assistance of the militia and volunteers, to garrison dockyards, arsenals, coastal 
defences and other strategic locations, and to garrison Ireland. The two anny corps 
were to include, according to Wolse1ey's confidential memorandum, 3 battalions of 
guards, 39 line battalions, with 8 further line battalions to secure bases and line of 
communications.24 "Our military establishments at Home were discussed and 
carefully considered when the refonns effected by Lord Cardwell were being 
introduced; and they were fixed at a minimum that most military men believed to be 
a dangerously low figure. I shared in that belief.,,25 However, Wolseley also warned 
that the government should not make changes without a clear public explanation of 
its policy.26 
Topographical Branch was renamed the Intelligence Department in 1873 and 
placed under the Quartennaster General, himself under the Adjutant General's 
department as of 1870, the following year. It was returned to the direct control of the 
Adjutant General in 1882. It had no mandate to make policy, or even to explore 
policy options. Its mandate was to collect and organise topographical and statistical 
data for use during war, or as needed by those planning for conflict in peacetime.27 
Colonel Robert Home, one of the department officers, drew up a mobilisation 
scheme for eight army corps for the defence of Britain in 1875?8 In 1879 the 
Commander in Chief ordered that a modified scheme for six corps to be made, but it 
appears that this was never done.29 The year after Lord Wolseley became Adjutant 
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General in 1885, he appointed Major General Sir Henry Brackenbury as the head of 
the intelligence department. 30 
Invasion Scares and policy planning 
In the 1880s, a combination of alarmist novels, rivalries over overseas 
colonies, Russian advances into central Asia, and France into northern Africa, 
invasion scares in 1882 and again in 1888, and the growing size of the French, 
Italian, Russian and American navies, caused increasing public alarm and, in 1886, a 
request by the War Office to the Director of Military Intelligence, Henry 
Brackenbury, to inquire into the state of mobilization planning.3 J The invasion 
scares added urgency to the need for clear, executable mobilisation plans. Hence 
Brackenbury was set to create new series of mobilisation schemes and to report on 
the available resources to implement them.32 The schemes were to include the 
options to mobilise either one or two army corps for war outside Britain, or mobilise 
all but the volunteers and send two army corps to war, with the rest under arms to 
support the expeditionary army and strengthen foreign garrisons with militia. Other 
options he was to consider were to mobilise all troops at home, to completely 
mobilise one or two army corps at home in addition to an expeditionary force, a 
partial mobilisation to face an uprising in Ireland, a total mobilisation to face an 
invasion, or an invasion and an expeditionary force. 33 He discovered that the plans 
then in place were utterly umealistic; while there was enough cavalry and infantry to 
put two army corps in the field, they lacked sufficient support services to keep them 
there.34 The Admiralty had yet to be co-ordinated with for efficient embarkation.35 
The line infantry set aside for the two army corps were short of officers, but, these, 
like all shortages of officers excepting those needed for the medical and veterinary 
staff, could be filled out by promotions, transfers and appointments.36 The 18 
battalions ofline infantry in the first army corps were short 111 officers of 424, as 
well as 26 of 94 officers in the 4 infantry battalions dedicated to lines of 
communications. The second army corps was short 147 of 483 in the 21 line 
battalions of the second army corps, and 26 officers in the 4 battalions set aside to 
garrison lines of communications.37 Worse, even allowing for, 
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the military and financial disadvantages under which our voluntary system of 
recruiting place us, as compared with nations recruiting by conscription, 
recognizing (sic) also the difficulties we have to contend with in consequence 
of having t garrison India and our numerous colonies, and on the other hand 
the enormous advantage given by our insular position, it must yet be 
conceded that when our national honour or our national interests compel us to 
go to war with a great continental power, or when an enemy lands on our 
shores, our honour and our interests will not be protected, our country will 
not be defended by saying that reliance was placed on our fleet, or by 
recapitulating the causes which have made our Army impotent to strike in 
defence of our honour and our interests, or to repel the invader from our 
hearths and homes.38 
In another memorandum, Brackenbury noted that nine battalions would be needed to 
bring all the colonial garrisons up to war strength, not including local forces, from 
the 18.5 battalions then assigned to Aden, Bermuda, Ceylon, Gibraltar, Halifax, 
Hong Kong, Jamaica, Malta, Mauritius, St Helena, St. Lucia & Barbados, Sierra 
Leone, Singapore, and South Africa. These would have to be found from the army 
reserve, home battalions and militia battalions.39 A committee of Brackenbury and 
Sir Ralph Thompson developed Brackenbury's ideas. They recommended that after 
42 battalions (2 army corps) and 4 battalions for lines of communications (1 army 
corps worth) there would be 4 guards and 15 line battalions in Britain. Three line 
battalions and six militia battalions would be needed to reinforce the Colonial 
garrisons, and 8 line as well as militia and volunteer battalions would garrison 
Britain. This would leave 4 guards, 4 line, and further militia and volunteer 
battalions free. The report concluded that there was no need to raise more infantry 
battalions.4o That same year, a committee on colonial garrisons generally supported 
Brackenbury's assessment. The committee was composed of the Inspector General 
of Fortifications, Major General Andrew Clarke, General Sir Arthur Herbert, the 
Quartermaster General, Major General Sir Redvers Buller, Deputy Adjutant General, 
R. J. Hay, Deputy Adjutant General for the Royal Artillery, and Ralph Knox, the 
Accountant Genera1.41 The 1876 mobilisation scheme allowed for 13 regular 
battalions to home garrisons, whereas the number now allowed was 8, and would 
also have to be expanded in wartime.42 
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Two anny corps was a trivial mobilisation compared to the number of anny 
corps the continental powers could immediately raise, not only in absolute tenns, but 
also in proportion to Britain's population. 
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Population Number of Army Corps Population per Corps* 
Austro-Hungary 38,000,000 13 2,923,077 
Belgium 6,000,000 2 3,000,000 
France 38,000,000 19 2,000,000 
Gennany 45,000,000 18 2,500,000 
Italy 29,000,000 12 2,416,667 
Russia in 87,000,000 17 Yz 4,971,429 
Europe 
Great Britain 36,000,000 Less than 2 Over 18,000,000 
*My calculatIOn. 
The Colonial Defence Committee supported the Colonial Garrisons 
Committee report. Writing in December, 1887, the secretary wrote, "the Colonial 
Defence Committee desire to emphasize strongly the remark of the Garrisons 
Committee "that it is impossible to calculate upon being able to increase the 
garrisons of these stations on the outbreak of war, at a moment when all available 
troops are sure to be required for other purposes.,,44 The Colonial Defence 
committee did not think that the colonial garrisons could be reinforced in the event 
of war; "to reinforce them in anticipation of war might precipitate hostilities, and 
there would be an inevitable reluctance to take the step till it might be too late. The 
Committee, therefore, desire to urge most strongly that the necessary decisions 
should be taken without delay, and that the security of the coaling stations, on which 
the existence of the Empire depends, should be placed beyond question.,,45 
Between the issue of mobilisation and the invasion scare of May 1888, anny 
refonn had become a public issue. 46 Given the criticism from both civil and military 
sources, the Secretary of State for War, Lord Stanhope, chose to reorganise. He 
planned to slightly cut the size of each battalion and to convert or reduce some anny 
battalions and put the savings into support services so as to achieve the two anny 
corps standard. 47 The result shows as a slight dip in the number of troops in the 
1887 estimates (see Chart 5 - Home and Colonies Establishment 1871-1902). He 
also reorganised the War Office, moving all the major departments, apart from 
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finance and manufacturing, under the commander in chief. However, the 
government stated, both publicly and privately, that the military department, under 
the commander in chief, "is charged with, and is responsible for, the direction and 
supervision of all the executive duties of the Army. It submits estimates for all the 
services it directs, and is responsible for the expenditure it incurs.,,48 The civil 
department controlled the audit. The commander in chiefwas charged with the 
"command, discipline, and distribution" of all forces, military education and training, 
enlistment and discharge, collection of information, the selection of men for 
commissions and other appointments, stores, buildings, troop transport, preparing the 
estimates, and "with the duty of rendering such advice and assistance on military 
affairs as may be required of him by the Secretary ofState.,,49 Neither Wolseley or 
the Duke of Cambridge were pleased. They saw the army squeezed between what 
the army was expected to do, and the lack of control over the money to do it. What 
the army was expected to do, and in what order of priority, was not made clear until 
Stanhope laid it out in a memorandum later that year, essentially copying Wolseley's 
recommendations, excepting that the mobilisation be based on two, not three COrpS.50 
It appears that Brackenbury's reports on the state of mobilisation was taken 
by the army reformers and developed into a case for army expansion to strengthen 
colonial garrisons and ensure that mobilisation to the two army corps standard was 
possible. In other words, they were putting forward a military policy, and one 
opposed to the "blue water" policy that was developed by the navy. Wolseley 
argued, "our foreign garrisons are dangerously weak when we remember the 
suddenness with which hostilities now begin. We should not now have time to 
increase our foreign garrisons to war strength before they could be attacked by an 
enterprising enemy" and "we dare not send such transports [for troops] without 
sufficient convoy, so we must make up our minds to the certainty that all our military 
stations abroad will have to shift for themselves with the garrisons in them at the 
time whenever war is made upon us by a nation possessing a fleet.,,51 Neither did 
Wolseley trust that the Navy could support the army in event of war, 
When war was in the air, and the relations between England and any Foreign 
Power were somewhat strained, popular opinion would warn us that any 
serious augmentation to our forces abroad might precipitate the war we 
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wished to avoid, and that, consequently, it must not be attempted. When war 
had broken out with any Naval Power, our Navy would, most probably, have 
its hands so full that it might not be able to carry, or even to convoy abroad 
the reinforcements required to complete the garrisons of our distant 
possessions. 52 
Continental Defence Policy 
Because of the threat of a European power with a navy, colonial security 
could no longer be discussed without reference to continental security. If coaling 
stations and fortresses were under-garrisoned, Wolseley argued, then an enterprising 
enemy could take them and the navy would lose its freedom of movement. The loss 
of an overseas station would likely be the government's first notice that they were at 
war with a European power.53 Not only were the garrisons abroad dangerously 
small, so was the number of battalions at home, each of which had to be kept at a 
minimum strength of 4.5 to 5 times the size of the number of drafts they sent abroad, 
based on an estimate made by Colonel Grove in 1883, if they were to be more than 
depots for the overseas battalions. 54 Depot sized battalions could not realistically be 
expected to be part of an army corps intended for defensive or offensive operations. 
This military policy was something Wolseley and the Duke of Cambridge 
could agree on. Wolseley wrote that the military forces "are left in ignorance of the 
specific objects which that organization (sic) should aim at.,,55 He went on to say 
that the commander in chief was aware that there were certain known purposes that 
the military had to fulfil: support of the civil power, garrisoning India, fortresses and 
coaling stations, and additionally, to mobilise three army corps, six brigades of 
cavalry, and auxiliary troops, for the defence of Britain. An expeditionary force of 
two army corps, one cavalry division and troops to defend the lines of 
communications should be ready to ship out. 56 It was these priorities that Stanhope 
copied in his memorandum stating the priorities of the military. Wolseley expressed, 
however, some doubts regarding the limits of naval power, 
Although it is not assumed that our Navy is strong enough to guarantee this 
country against invasion, it is assumed that even in the event of a coalition 
between France and Russia against us, it would be at least able to prevent the 
enemy's ships which brought over the invading army of 150,000 men from 
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returning to France, and landing here a second anny of similar strength. It is 
hoped that we are justified in attributing this power to our present Navy.57 
India Policy 
W olseley was already concerned about the strength of the army. He felt that 
due to increasing military responsibilities, requests from India for 8000 more men 
(that is, 3 more battalions as well as 100 men extra for each battalion then in India), 
and the continuing occupation of Egypt, that the line army should be increased by 10 
battalions.58 Support for Indian reinforcements was denied in July 1887.59 Despite 
that, there was a rise in the establishment of ranks in the Indian army in the 
estimates. The number of non-commissioned ranks jumped by nearly 8000 between 
1885 and 1887 and India retained them through 1902. (See Chart 7 - India 
Establishment) The number ofline infantry officers rose by a modest 84 men in 
1886, but flattened out after that to around 1500 officers on establishment. (See 
Chart 8 - India Establishment: Officers) In these charts, the number of officers is 
marked in orange for the line infantry, and red to indicate the number of all officers 
on the Indian Establishment of the British army. The commissioned ranks are coded 
in light blue for the line infantry, and dark blue for all non-commissioned ranks. 
Another party who disagreed with Wolseley and the Duke on defence policy 
was Lord Roberts, who favoured a policy of "forward defence" in India on the 
grounds that the real threat was a Russian invasion ofIndia.6o The "forward" school 
advocated extending British influence into central Asia. The further British 
influence ran, the more distant would be Russian influence to India. The "masterly 
inactivity" school argued that India would be more tolerant of the British ruling, 
good government and low taxes than by expensive garrisons or aggressive foreign 
policies. If the Russians chose to attack India, they could risk the long lines of 
communications through a probably hostile Afghanistan. The "forward" school 
countered that the Afghanis would be happy to support an attack on India and were 
therefore possible Russian allies.61 Assuming the navy could secure the Indian 
ocean, any defence of India, according to the "forward" school, would have to be 
made by an army in the north-west, so any attempt to fight Russia elsewhere would 
only weaken the defence in India.62 The "Wolseley school", according to early 
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biography of General Lord Rawlinson, whose father first put forward the "forward" 
school of thought, 
... rejoined that we were first and foremost a sea power, and that to attempt 
to make our main effort against a great military power, such as Russia, on 
land, would be to resign our natural advantages. Our true policy for the 
defence of India, they argued, was to make it clear to Russia that any 
encroachment in Afghanistan would be a casus belli, and that if war came we 
should act where fleet and army could be used in combination. They 
proposed, therefore, that our policy should be to keep on the friendliest terms 
with Turkey.63 
Wolse1ey thought that fighting Russia through Afghanistan was of advantage only to 
Russia. He did not think at the time, 1890, that war with Russia was going to be 
soon, but that it would eventually occur.64 He distrusted relying solely on the navy 
for home defence, and was aware of the need for the navy as a means to deploy 
troops to defend the colonies.65 
The Russian Problem 
There were considerable problems involved in fighting in central Asia due to 
the long supply lines inherent in any operation in that area. The Russian force that 
marched from Tashkent to Khiva in 1874 was a force of a mere 5,500 men with 
8,800 camels. The British estimated that during the Second Afghan war in 1878, 
that it took 70,000 mules to maintain an expeditionary force of 36,000 for 15 days. 
5,000 mules was a line 10 miles long, so any individual force would be no more than 
four or five battalions large. 66 Part of that force would be dedicated to protecting the 
mule train. In 1878, the line of communication from Kabul to Peshawar was 
guarded by 15,000 men, leaving 12,000 men for field operations. 67 
Unfortunately for Russia, its advances in controlling central Asia merely 
caused concern to British interests, and sapped Russia's military resources. 68 Britain 
could not abandon India or allow it to be overthrown by hostile power. On other 
hand they were considering the possibility of a large land war in Europe with a 
modem state. Thus it was possible, given threat of Russia was real, then India might 
not be defensible69 
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Russia's real strategic concern was her Western border with Gennany and 
Austro-Hungary.70 Pan-Slavist movements risked war with both in the 1870's, and 
brought Russia into a war with Turkey in 1877. In 1879, Gennany and Austro-
Hungary agreed on an alliance, and Russian was assured that it was a purely 
defensive one. Russia reaffinned her adherence to the Three Emperor's League of 
1873.71 Gennan Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's careful diplomacy throughout the 
1880's maintained the peace in eastern Europe, though Russia (and Britain) had a 
war scare in 1885 over Afghanistan and Russia, a second in 1887 over the control of 
Bulgaria. 72 An Anglo-Russian agreement in 1887 decided the boundary between 
Russian and Afghan Turkistan.73 Russia refused to continue adhering to the Three 
Emperor's League in 1887 because of the involvement of Austria, so Gennany fell 
back on brokering a treaty that was to prevent either of them from going to war with 
each other if either became involved in a war with a third party. 74 
Other European alliances were also shifting; the League of Three Emperors 
collapsed in the early 1890's, leaving France free make an alliance with Russia. Once 
Bismarck was eased out, Gennan policies changed. Gennany refused to renew the 
reinsurance treaty in 1890, and began to look into building her own navy. Russia 
grew active in Far East, and its commercial and political interests came into conflict 
with China, Britain, and Japan.75 
Hartington commission 
Stanhope took another step to deal with the debate over costs by setting up a 
commission under the Lord Hartington and two other fonner Secretaries of State for 
War, W. H. Smith and H. Campbell-Bannennan. It had a narrow mandate to look 
into the relations between the Treasury and the anny and navy.76 It did not have a 
mandate to consider the number of home battalions, home defence issues, or whether 
either the army or the navy was able to pursue their missions given their allowed 
expenditures.77 It certainly did not have a mandate to decide military policy or who 
was to decide what that was. The principle of civilian control was implicit in the 
choice of commission members.78 
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The commission found that there was no regular communication and no joint 
planning between the army and navy, though mobilisation schemes that the army had 
made required it to transport troops. The committee recommended that a defence 
committee should be established to examine defence policy and advise on the needs 
of the services as well as preview the estimates. The position of Commander in 
Chief should be abolished and replaced by a War Office council to advise the 
Secretary of State. This council was to include the parliamentary and permanent 
under secretaries, the financial secretary, and five military officers including the 
Adjutant General, the Quarter-Master General, the Director of Artillery, the 
Inspector General of Fortifications and a chief of staff. The chief of staff would lead 
a general staff, which was to plan imperial defence and coordinate the plans of the 
army and navy. This committee was to advise on military policy, and co-ordinate 
with the Admiralty. The War Office council was created in 1890, but as a shadow of 
the recommendations of the Hartington committee, as it could not even open 
discussion on an issue the Secretary did not raise.79 Wolseley, Roberts, nor the Duke 
of Cambridge approved of the loss of the position of commander in chief, Cambridge 
because it would undermine the position of the crown, Wolseley and Roberts 
because they both hoped to succeed Cambridge.8o Campbell-Bannerman, and the 
Liberals in general, did not approve of the idea of a general staff. A general staff 
was favoured by witnesses on the grounds that, in view of the state of mobilization, 
the army needed a staff dedicated to creating and preparing plans of organisation and 
campaigns, as the War Office was almost entirely organised to deal with 
administration. Campbell-Bannerman did not want the Chief of Staffto become as 
powerful as the Commander in Chief was, and whose powers the committee had 
recommended be reduced, and suspected the military would try to create military 
policy ifthey had a general staff.81 Campbell-Bannerman succeeded Stanhope in 
1892, and let the civil service administer army affairs.82 There was the German 
experience to consider, where the army had slid its administration out from under the 
control of the War Minister to the general staff and the military cabinet.83 
When the Duke of Cambridge finally resigned as Commander in Chief in 
1895, the opportunity was taken by Campbell-Bannerman to reduce the power ofthe 
position to one that had supervision over military departments, but no authority over 
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them, and the Council met more rarely. It was not until 1901, when Lord Roberts 
took the position of Commander in Chief, that he collected power back to himself 
and gained control of the Adjutant General, the Director of Mobilisation and Military 
Intelligence, and the Military Secretary.84 
It was not until report of the Esher committee, one of several committees 
created in the wake of the South African war, pushed the creation of the Committee 
of Imperial Defence, the abolishment of the commander in chief, and eventually to 
create a general staff in 1906.85 There appears to have been no clear dividing line 
between the creation of policy and strategic planning. As a result, the government 
was unwilling to allow the military to examine contingencies closely, for fear of the 
resulting recommendations encroaching on political policy. This is one of several 
examples of the British governmental culture having so entrenched a fear of 
permitting the military, and especially the Army, to have power, that it harmed its 
own military power in its attempts to ensure the Army would remain politically 
powerless as an institution. Certain individual officers, of course, were far from 
politically powerless. 
Navy Policy 
Concern had been raised in 1884 in the Pall Mall Gazette over Frances' naval 
building program, and naval supporters, such as Vice Admiral Philip Colomb, 
argued that if the navy was large enough to blockade enemy ports or keep a fleet in 
reserve, fortifications were unnecessary. The naval manoeuvres of 1888 
demonstrated that the navy was not capable of blockading one enemy port and, at the 
same time fulfil other wartime duties. This only added to the concern and debate 
over national defence. 86 The Admiralty argued that a successful invasion depended 
on the destruction of fleet, which they "refused to contemplate".87 The "blue water" 
school argued that Britain could be invaded only if the enemy controlled the seas. 
Therefore, the navy had to guard the home waters to defend against invasion, as well 
as protect shipping. The invasion scares of the 1880s hung in the background of this 
argument. Ships posted to bases garrisoned by the army could protect trade 
overseas. India was expected to protect itself. 88 The invasion scares of the 1880s 
hung in the background of this argument. 
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In 1889, the government chose to back the idea that the navy should be the 
first line of defence against invasion and be large enough to compete with the next 
two largest navies.89 The government passed the Naval Defence Act, which gave the 
navy £21.5 million over five years to support a building program. The army got 
£600,000.90 "Naval spending thereafter was set more by the navy's perception of its 
own need, and less by financial orthodoxy.,,91 The War Office was losing not only 
the financial debate, but the policy debate as well, as the government used the inter-
service rivalry to establish military policy and limit the autonomy of the army high 
command. Yet the two-power standard became obsolete over the next decade as the 
European powers began to expand their own navies.92 
1890: More battalions? 
Wolseley continued to press for more money in 1890, arguing unsuccessfully 
that the estimates submitted were insufficient to provide the third army corps that 
would be needed to repel invasion.93 He further argued that either more battalions 
would have to serve abroad, or more native troops would have to be raised. Now he 
recommended that eleven regular battalions be raised, though only five if the 
occupation of Egypt turned out to be temporary, and the Duke recommended that the 
five battalions be raised as third and fourth battalions of existing regiments. Even so, 
this increase was to maintain the linked battalion system.94 
This was a new tack, as up to this point, Wolseley, and hence the War Office, 
had assumed the hard limit of 141 battalions, and based their arguments on the 
difficulty of maintaining the standard of one battalion overseas and one at home due 
to the increasing number of balls the army was expected to juggle. Within the 
framework ofthe linked-battalion system, the army was to maintain colonial and 
Indian defences at a level that was unclear without firm information from the navy as 
to their level of commitment in case of a major war involving the navy. At the same 
time, the army had to be able to augment those defences in case of a local war. On 
the European side of the policy equation, the battalions at home were expected to 
defend against invasion by a European power, to send forces for a colonial war, and 
to provide an expeditionary force to Europe. The policy arguments of the late 
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1880' s resolved part of the problem with the two army corps standard, which was 
expected to have the double function of solving the latter two force projection issues. 
Finance 
The failure of the army to advance its military policy in the 1880's can be 
seen through its effect on the army estimates. The estimates had risen due to 
fortification costs in the early 1860's, and the estimates had risen to reach £25.9 
million in 1865, an amount that wasn't seen again until 1885.95 As part of the 
Cardwell reforms, the military budget was cut by reducing colonial garrisons, 
withdrawing troops from overseas service, and cutting the establishment of the 
battalions at home - excepting those that were approaching their tum for overseas 
service. The Duke of Cambridge did not approve of these moves, though they were 
popular at the time. Nonetheless, by 1874, Cardwell was being pressed to reduce the 
estimates further. 
Another reform of 1870 was to place the administrative functions that had 
been run by the Horse Guards under the Secretary of State, including the Financial 
Department. The Financial Secretary collected the spending proposals from each of 
the departments, who had already, unofficially, consulted the Secretary of State, and 
reviewed them with the Auditor of the Army and the Accountant-General. The 
Secretary of State, in tum reviewed the estimates with the Financial Secretary and 
the Surveyor General before presenting them to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
the cabinet. This system meant that the departments tended to pursue their own 
budgets without regard to any overall military policy. While Wolseley and his 
supporters wanted to give the military more financial control, at the same time, they 
did not want to bolster the position ofthe Duke of Cambridge. 96 
The effects of the Cardwell reforms, and, later, the differences in military 
policy in the 1880' s, on the estimates and expenditures can be seen on the charts 
"Estimates and Expenditures 1871-1887" and "Estimates and Expenditures 1889-
1902".97 The presentation of the estimates was changed four times, on a line-by-line 
basis in 1887 and 1888, and further changes were made in 1889 and 1890 by both 
amalgamating and separating votes. Though effort was made in the estimates to 
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relate votes forward and back a year each year the votes changed, they were not 
reconciled across all the years, so the charts are not exactly equivalent. For this 
reason also, the estimates and expenditures for 1888 and the estimates for 1889 are 
left out. Approximately equivalent votes are given the same colour code for ease of 
comparison. In the chart "Estimates and Expenditures 1870-1887", Votes 1,2, and 3 
are "General Staff and Regimental Pay, Allowances and Charges", "Divine Service" 
and "Administration of Martial Law" respectively. They are grouped together and 
colour-coded blue, as is Vote 1 ("Pay & c. ofthe Army (General Staff, Regiments, 
Reserve and Departments)") in the chart "Estimates and Expenditures 1889-1902". 
Vote 14, "Establishments for Military Education", in the first chart is equivalent to 
vote 11 in the second, and both are coded pink. In the first chart, Votes 17, 18, 19, 
20, and 21 are, respectively, "Rewards for Distinguished Services &c.", "Pay of 
General Officers", Retired Full Pay, Retired Half-Pay, Pensions, and Gratuities, 
Payments Allowed by Army Purchase Commissioners", "Widows Pensions & c." 
and "Pensions for Wounds". In the second chart these are all accounted for under 
vote 14, "Non-Effective charges for Officers, & c." They are colour coded green. 
"Total estimate" and "expenditure" are coded in red. 
The early 1870's, under Cardwell, show that he was able to keep estimates 
and expenditures both flat, and fairly congruent. This did not last. Expenditure (red) 
was already starting to rise in 1876, and the estimates followed in 1878. Through 
1887, the estimates rose steadily, while the actual expenditure varied considerably, 
though it never fell below the 1876 figure. However, pay and related charges (blue) 
remained flat, and fell as a percentage of the total budget. Though it is not clear 
from the graph, estimates for education (pink) rose from £139,300 in 1870 to 
£181,283 in 1887, but the expenditures rose and fell, from a high in 1879 of 
£165,800 to below £120,000 in 1885. The estimates for non-effective charges for 
officers (green) more than doubled, to £1,739,339, reflecting the increasing costs of 
penSIOns. 
The estimates were being rearranged in just the years that the War Office was 
losing the military policy argument to the blue water school. 1887-8 was also the 
first budget year in which a formal accounting was made for army expenditure.98 
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The steady rise in estimates became very much shallower, and the army lost about 
£1,000,000 between the estimates of 1887 and 1890 and about £570,000 between the 
expenditures of 1887 and 1889, though the difference between the expenditures of 
1887 and 1890 was minor. There was a sudden concordance between estimates and 
expenditure, until the South African war. There is also a concordance in the charted 
votes as well, expenditure remaining about equal to, or lower than, their estimates. 
There was growth in defence spending, but it was not being spent on the army.99 
The army avoided complete financial disembowelment, but it is plain from the 
budget that the army lost the policy battle, and therefore the budgetary battle, with 
the navy. 
Conclusion 
The debate over mobilization plans was directly linked to the debate between 
the navy and the army over who had the responsibility for horne defence. This was 
implicitly a debate over military and defence policy, a debate that the navy won by 
the end of 1880s as other European nations turned towards the expansion of their 
own naVIes. 
The army maintained a rearguard action, advising on force requirements, but 
it had lost the budgetary battle, and hence the policy battle, to the navy.IOO As the 
European powers, as well as America and Japan, began to threaten British naval 
superiority by the end ofthe 1880's, naval spending rose, passing that ofthe army in 
the fiscal year of 1894_5.101 The navy had persuaded government that it could cover 
horne defence, but as Germany and other European countries increased their navies, 
it turned to Europe and concentrated on that competition, and on the defence of 
Britain, rather than to assisting the defence of the empire. Then the army began to 
agitate for more battalions to be raised, and more battalions abroad, on the grounds 
that the navy couldn't guarantee transport to colonies in case of war, so colonial 
defences had to be up to war standard at all times. All this was totally irrelevant to a 
navy more concerned with European competition in horne waters. 102 However, the 
South African war showed that the navy alone could not defend the empire. 103 
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The effectiveness oflinking battalions was damaged by the difficulties in 
recruitment, which were never going to be solved without more money or 
conscription, both political suicide. Thus the army was trapped in a logical hole 
because, unless the manpower problem was solved, it couldn't successfully argue 
that the army was capable of defending both home and colonies, and thus the navy 
successfully argued that it shouldered the primary burden of defence. Moreover, the 
army was trapped down a second logic hole, in that due to the 1888 reorganizations, 
the army was responsible for its quality and preparedness, but lacked the political 
autonomy and financial authority to ensure its own quality and preparedness. 
Furthermore, it lacked a coherent military policy beyond Stanhope's list of purposes, 
and could not create directed strategic plans with a general staff it didn't have, 
because strategic planning and a general staff threatened the British bias towards the 
absolute and unchallenged primacy of civilian government. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Deployment of the British Line Army 1870·1902 
In 1871, Edward Cardwell, Secretary of State for the new Liberal 
Government under Gladstone, implemented a series of reforms for the British Army_ 
One of these reforms was to link the single battalion regiments in pairs in each new 
recruiting district. The first, more prestigious, 25 battalions already had 2 battalions 
each. One of the key intentions of this reform was that half of the line battalions 
remained in Britain as a strategic reserve while the other half served overseas. 
Since then, there has been much discussion as to how well these reforms 
worked in practice. It was well known that recruiting problems and overseas 
commitments strained the ability of horne battalions to maintain their own 
establishments and to train troops to send abroad. It was also generally understood, 
incorrectly, that, due to colonial wars and overseas commitments, the ratio of horne 
based to overseas-based battalions got worse. l 
This chapter does not look at troop movement or the ratios of trained troops 
at horne and overseas, or to what degree the horne battalions were undermanned in 
favour ofthe battalions overseas. Instead it looks at the deployment pattern ofthe 
battalions of the infantry of the line, as whole battalions, for this period; to what 
degree the reforms intended to divide the battalions evenly between horne and 
overseas po stings actually worked. Though the number of battalions stationed in 
Britain declined slowly overall, and the length of deployments at horne and overseas 
varied throughout the period, there was no catastrophic decline in the numbers of 
horne-stationed battalions. For the officers, there were numerous opportunities either 
to serve overseas, or to stay in Britain; the challenge for the enterprising officer was 
to get war experience. 
The first deployment pattern to be looked at is the geographic patterns of 
deployment, that is, where the battalions were deployed from 1870 to 1902. The 
second pattern is how long the postings were, by battalion, again relying on charts. 
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Then the patterns of deployment surrounding the Ashanti (1873), Zulu (1879), 
Egyptian (1882, 1884-85), Bunna (1885-87) and South African (1899-1902) wars 
are looked at in more detail. Finally, deployment as related to the African and Indian 
"rings" is discussed. Deployments show where the British anny actually was 
engaged, as opposed to what it thought it might or ought to be doing, and this, in 
tum, shows where British units were getting their experience. Deployment patterns 
also show the ways in which the Cardwell Refonns did, and did not, work as 
planned. 
The first issue is whether the expansion of empire led to the expansion of the 
number places the line battalions were deployed. The first 25 regiments were the 
most volatile, showing a high in 1879 of 13 different locations and 12 to 13 from 
1891 to 1897. The chart (see Chart 16 - Number of Deployment Locations Each 
Year), following the four year moving averages, suggests a gradual rise overall. The 
relative low ofthe South African war was higher than the one in the 1880's, which in 
tum was higher than the low in the 1870's. The number oflocations to which the 
rest of the regiments were deployed show a fairly steady rise until 1890 of about 1.16 
regiments every 10 years, then dropped in the early to mid 1890' s. The number of 
deployment locations rose abruptly in the late 1890's and dropped again during the 
South African war. The number oflocations that the first 25 regiments were 
deployed to rose in the early to mid 1890' s, just as it fell for the rest. On the whole, 
the number of locations to which all the regiments were deployed each year rose 
steadily at a rate of about one regiment every ten years until the South African war of 
1899-1902, at which time other deployments were slightly restricted. This was 
where the strain on the regiments showed. There were 32 locations that these 
regiments deployed to at least once. Despite the early reductions of garrisons and 
leaving the defence of some colonies to the colony itself, the regiments were obliged 
to cover an increasing number of locations. 
During the South African war Britain retained deployment coverage of its 
colonies by drastically cutting down the number of battalions deployed in Britain. 
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Only Aden, Barbados, Bermuda, Canada, Crete, Cyprus, Mauritius and Singapore 
were partially or entirely dropped during the years 1898-1902. This list masks the 
fact that Barbados had been only sporadically occupied over the preceding 28 years, 
Canada was dropped entirely as of 1900, Crete had not been a deployment until 
1898, Cyprus was again added to the deployment in 1901, having been dropped as of 
1895, Mauritius had only been deployed to since 1890, after an absence of 18 years, 
and Singapore was deployed to in 1895, after a hiatus of 16 years. These locations 
had already been oflimited importance, in terms of whether they needed a line 
garrison, and were therefore a safe risk when battalions were urgently needed 
elsewhere. 
Deployment for wars was not a matter of sending battalions out directly from 
Britain. It was a vast game of musical chairs, as often a mix of battalions from the 
region, from Britain, and from other overseas po stings were sent to a war, and other 
battalions moved to fill their postings, though the South African war of 1899 was 
something of an exception to this, given the large number of battalions sent from 
Britain. Most of the time, these regiments were garrisoning the empire and, 
sometimes, were fighting wars or quelling more minor unrest. The line battalions 
did not fight on their own; they were assisted by artillery, by naval units and by local 
forces, such as the Punjab Frontier Force, the Natal Native Contingent, or the Indian 
Army. The line regiments were not getting a lot of war experience, but it was more 
than that of other European armies. 
The data is charted in three ways. First, all the battalions are charted by 
location. Deployment can be further broken down to differentiate the first 25 
regiments, all of which had two battalions, and the rest, which, until amalgamation in 
1881, were one battalion regiments, with the exceptions of the King's Royal Rifle 
Corps (60th) and the Prince Consort's Own Rifle Brigade, both of which had four 
battalions. 
There are a number of caveats regarding much of the material of this chapter 
due to the sampling data. First, and this is general to the chapter, the battalions are 
mentioned by number according to their post -1881 precedence. Hence, the 90th 
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Perthshire regiment will be referred to as the 26/2 the Cameronians, it having been 
linked as the second battalion, to the 26th, the Cameronian regiment. (See the Index 
ofthe Line Regiments for pre and post-1881 titles and precedents.) The charts are 
based on data from the January official Army List and Hart's Army List of 1871 to 
1903, and the location of a battalion as published in, for example, January of 1881 
may be considered to be where the battalion was late the previous year? As such, 
the data is accurate to the nearest year, and the published information. Some 
battalions have battle honours for locations where they were not resident according 
to the army lists, but, except for the Egyptian war of 1882 and 1883-85, this was not 
common, so the skew induced by this is limited. The second battalion of the 79th 
regiment was raised as a regular battalion in 1897, and all averages are weighted for 
this change where necessary. The locations of deployments, and their groupings in 
terms of region, are in appendix "Table 2 - Regions for Deployment Charts". All 
material not otherwise footnoted may be assumed to be derived from the sampled 
data. 
1. Deployment of Regiments by Region 
"Chart 9- Deployment of all Regiments by Region" is a chart of all the line 
regiments by region, namely, Britain, India, Africa, South Asia, East Asia, the 
.Americas and the Mediterranean, for a total of 141 battalions (142 from 1897). 
The most obvious feature is the sudden jump in the number of battalions in 
Africa that indicates the South African War in 1899 and the equally sudden, and 
corresponding, drop in the number of battalions in Britain, as home battalions were 
shifted overseas in response to the war. This same pattern can be seen for the war in 
Egypt in 1884-85, as the number of battalions in the Mediterranean rises and the 
number in Britain falls. A similar effect can be seen in the South Asia and India, as 
the Burma War ran from 1885 to 1889 and 1889 to 1892. 
Another thing to note is the line indicating the number of battalions resident 
in Britain. This stays relatively level for the period 1870 to 1898; the average 
number of battalions resident was 63.3, dipping noticeably only for Egypt and South 
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Africa. The percentage of battalions at home was 46%, or seven battalions below the 
standard of the Cardwell reforms. The actual drop in the average number of 
battalions at home from 1870 to 1879 to the period 1880 to 1898 was from an 
average of 65 to 62.1. More precisely, there was a slow decline that levels off in the 
1890's. The relative stability ofthe number of battalions in Britain suggests that, 
while the Cardwell reforms were not working perfectly, they were working, at least 
in terms of garrison coverage overseas. 
The number of battalions in India also stays fairly level (47) (34.2%) and dips 
for the Egypt and Burma wars period and for the South African war. The battalions 
in India were sent to the wars in India, Burma, Afghanistan and the Punjab, and two 
were sent to Egypt. They were being temporarily, but not permanently, siphoned out 
ofIndia. The number of battalions in African and the American theatres declines in 
the early 1880's, probably due to the push for colonial self-defence and the end of 
the African wars oflate 1870' s. Canada mostly had two battalions until 1884, but 
drops to one, and then to none in 1900, and Bermuda lost all but one resident 
battalion 3 years earlier, and lost all in 1900 also. The Africa line is entirely South 
Africa, excepting 3 battalions on the Gold Coast for the Ashanti war in 1873. The 
quieter garrisons were slowly dropped, while garrisons were retained in places, like 
the Gold Coast, where umest continued below the level of outright warfare. 
"Chart 10 - Deployment of Regiments 1 to 25 by Region" is noticeably more 
volatile, since it only plots the 50 battalions of the first 25 regiments, and again, there 
is the very conspicuous change for South African War. 
The war in Egypt in 1884-85 and the Burma wars of 1885-1892 show in the 
increase in the number of battalions in the Mediterranean and South Asia. The 
number of battalions in the Mediterranean line rises to 6 battalions due to these wars. 
Sub-Saharan wars can be picked out by the rise in African line. 
The number of battalions in Britain falls from a high of30 battalions at 
home, well over the Cardwell-mandated 50%, in 1871 and 1872 to a low in 1878 as 
the first 25 start getting treated like the other regiments due to the Afghanistan war, 
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but from 1879 to 1898 it was in fact relatively stable at 21.6. This was 43.2% of 
these battalions, slightly worse than the overall average. Another drop in 1885-92 
corresponds to the Burma wars. Of the 8 battalions that go to Burma for the wars, 6 
of these came directly from Bengal and the other 2 were from Madras. The drop in 
the British figures correlates with a slight rise in the Indian figures. For 1870 to 
1898, India averages 17.9 or 35.7% of these battalions. Over the whole period, 
except for the South African war, it was an average 22.8 or 45.5% of battalions were 
stationed at home. Thus, the Cardwell reforms essentially functioned in terms of 
balancing the battalions at home and away, for the first 25 regiments, at least in 
terms of numbers of battalions. 
Turning to the situation for the rest of the regiments, notice in "Chart 11 -
Deployment of Regiments 26 to 109 and the Rifle Brigade by Region" the very 
marked appearance of the South African war. The dip in the number of battalions in 
Britain in the mid 1880's corresponded to the war in Egypt. Of the first 25 
regiments, 3 battalions were sent to this war, and 19 battalions of the rest of the 
regiments, making these regiments over-represented compared to the first 25. The 
number of battalions in Britain was as stable as the average ofthe first 25 regiments 
at 40.5 or 44.5% of these battalions, at least until the South African war. Thus, 
again, the Cardwell reforms worked in terms ofthe ratio of battalions at home and 
overseas. There was no precipitous decline of battalions serving at home. 
The number of battalions in India averaged 29.2 or 32% ofthese battalions, 
so compared to the first 25 regiments at 35.7%, these regiments were slightly 
underrepresented in India. The small increase in the number of battalions in South 
Asia in 1890 was due to the war in Burma. 7 battalions of the first 25 regiments 
were sent to Burma, and 4 of these battalions. Therefore, the first 25 battalions were 
over-represented in the Burma wars. Small rises in Africa in 1873, and 1879-81, 
again correspond to wars. The higher numbered regiments were over-represented 
(by percentage of forces) in the Mediterranean, increasingly so after 1881, as well as 
in South Asia due to the wars in Burma. 
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In tenns of the Cardwell refonns, while the line infantry never managed to 
keep halfthe battalions at home, a fairly stable percentage of 45% was in Britain. 
Further, the idea of using the home battalions as a reserve worked in Egypt, and 
dramatically so in the South African war. The first 25 regiments were somewhat 
more likely to be in India, and the higher numbered regiments were more likely to 
have a chance to get to the Mediterranean, Egypt in particular, and South Asia. 
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A closer look at India is needed because India was the centre of Britain's 
overseas empire, and the wall blocking Russia's expected expansion southward. 
"Chart 12 - Deployment of all Regiments: India" actually looks much as one might 
expect. Most battalions present in India were policing Bengal due to the 1857 
rebellion. India has long been assumed to lose battalions that were deployed to 
regional wars and never return, resulting in a gradual decline in the number of 
battalions deployed to India, but this was not true. Though a particular regiment, 
once deployed out ofIndia, might not return in the period considered, the total 
number of battalions in India remained fairly stable between 41 and 50 regiments, 
excepting a relative high during the Afghan war and 1902, and relative lows in the 
late 1880' s and the South African war (see Chart 13 - Deployment of all Regiments: 
India (stacked chart)). 
The two most obvious features of this chart are first, the sudden increase in 
the number of battalions due to the war in Afghanistan in 1879 which correlates with 
a drop in the numbers in Bengal, and, second, the rise in the number of battalions in 
the Punjab, also corresponding to a drop in Bengal. As the Punjab became a war 
zone, battalions stationed in India (mostly Bengal) were moved to the Punjab and the 
North West Frontier. Until the wars in the Punjab started, there were an average of 
32.2 battalions in Bengal, but Punjab soaked up an average of 13.3 battalions each 
year. The number of battalions resident in Bombay and Madras remained quite 
stable through 1902 at 7.82 and 6.33 respectively. 
This chart can also be divided into charts for the first 25 regiments, and for 
the rest ofthe regiments. Like the previous chart, this chart (see Chart 14-
Deployment of Regiments 1 to 25: India) also shows the wars in Afghanistan and 
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the Punjab as rises in the number of battalions deployed to these places, both 
corresponding to drops in the number of battalions deployed to Bengal. Through 
1894, the number ofthese regiments in Bengal averaged about 12.5, about 25% of 
all the first 25 regiments. The Punjab then took an average of5.75 battalions, or 
11.5% of these regiments. There were early increases in deployments to Madras and 
Bombay through the 1870's that then remain mostly stable at those levels until the 
South African war. 
Looking at the rest of the regiments (see Chart 15 - Deployment of 
Regiments 26 to 109 and the Rifle Brigade: India) the Afghanistan war shows here 
also, though not as noticeable a drop in the number of battalions in Bengal. Again 
there was a sudden rise in the number of battalions in the Punjab, and the number of 
battalions in Bengal fell from a high of 23 battalions in 1894, and an average of 
19.76 between 1870 and 1894. The Punjab got an average of8.51 of these 
battalions, or 9.27%. This was more than the first 25 regiments in absolute numbers, 
but fewer as a percentage of these regiments. It appears that the 1 st 25 were 
selectively favoured for the early years of war, and battalions from the higher 
numbered regiments fill in, in Bengal. Madras and Bombay were both 
underrepresented as compared to the first 25 regiments. 
The pattern of deployment in India shows a pattern similar to the larger 'the 
number of home battalions drops and the number at the war zone rises' pattern, in 
that battalions stationed in Bengal went to local wars. Secondly, the first 25 
regiments, as a group, tended to be somewhat over-represented in India, as a 
percentage of their total strength as compared to the other regiments and likewise 
were preferentially sent to the Punjab. The first 25 regiments were somewhat over-
represented in India, and in the Punjab and Bunna wars, while the higher numbered 
regiments, were over-represented in Egypt. The more prestigious first 25 regiments 
also see more years of war. Most importantly, the number of battalions at home 
remains relatively stable and close to the 50% intended by the Cardwell refonns. An 
officer looking for overseas service was best advised to look for regiments serving 
overseas, rather than depending that any presumed prestige derived by order of 
precedence would offer significantly better chances of overseas or war service. This 
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is, in fact, what they increasingly did. The work of officers at home was not 
especially strenuous, being mostly the training and administration of recruits. 
Officers abroad policed the empire and had the opportunity to get in involved in 
conflicts, however minor. By the 1890s it was plain that officers were opting to go 
overseas to get valued experience. The progress of officers careers were dependent 
on gaining overseas experience, whether with their battalion, or in a staff position 
during a war. 
2. Deployment of Regiments by Length of Term in Location 
61 
The set of four charts (see Chart 17 - All Regiments: Years in Location, 
Chart 18 - All Regiments: Number of Years in Location, Chart 19 - Regiments 1 to 
25: Average Number of Years in Location, and Chart 20 - Regiments 26 to 109 and 
the Rifle Brigade: Average Number of Years in Location) are rolling averages of 
how long battalions remained in a deployment location. 
The first chart (see Chart 17 - All Regiments: Years in Location) shows the 
year-by-year rolling average. Each coloured ribbon indicates how many battalions 
were deployed to a particular location for a particular length of time. Looking, for 
example, at the blue ribbon at the front of this chart, in 1880, 6 battalions were in 
single year po stings, and in 1891, only one was. Each succeeding ribbon is a greater 
length of time, measured in years. The blue ribbons measure how many battalions 
were in postings of 1 to 4 years in length, the green of 5 to 8 years, the yellow of 9 to 
12 years, the red of 13 to 16, and the purple of 17 to 20 years. In succeeding charts, 
this chart is turned into four year bands, according to colour, for readability. 
Interestingly, the patterns ofthe ribbons generally fall into 4-year bands. 
Looking first at all the regiments together (see Chart 18 - All Regiments: 
Number of Years in Location), all the longest po stings are exclusive to Bengal or 
Britain. The mid length postings tend to be to either Britain or India generally, and 
all other locations are covered by shorter posting periods. 
As the average number of years of deployment rises, the number of 
deployment locations drops. In deployments of 1-5 years, all locations show up. For 
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deployment lengths of 6-12 years, locations other than Bombay, Bengal, Madras, the 
Punjab and Britain tend to fall away. After 13 years almost all the po stings are to 
Bengal and Britain (also Bombay, Punjab, South Africa). Postings of 17-20 years 
are all Bengal or Britain. Any officer who belonged to a regiment newly arrived in 
either Britain or India could probably expect to spend much of his career there. 
The longer average years in location (13-16 and 17-20) mirror each other 
over the whole period, as do the middle averages (5-8 and 9-12) until about the mid-
1890s, when the 5-8 year line rises as the 9-12 year line continues to drop. It was 
those middle years that show a decline in middle range of posting lengths in favour 
of longer ones and the shorter ones. So deployments were, for the most part, getting 
longer until the mid 1890's. 
The shortest period (1-4 years) rises abruptly after 1894, as longer 
deployments are cut short by the South African war. This also shows in the decline 
of all other posting lengths during this later period. This line of short deployments 
also tends to reflect the incidence of short wars, and also of places that tended to get 
short deployments such as Aden, Malta, Gibraltar, Cyprus and the West Indies. 
Following the general pattern so far (see Chart 19 - Regiments 1 to 25: 
Average Number of Years in Location) looks at the first 25 regiments. These 
regiments do not entirely follow the overall pattern of chart 18. The 1-4 year 
sequence shows a large jump around 1878 due to the Afghan war. Otherwise, these 
regiments follow the slow rise of the general pattern of chart 18. The 5-8 and 9-12 
year sequences, after an initial fall through the late 1870's, remain flat until falling at 
the tum of the century; in other words the number of battalions with 5-12 year 
posting lengths for the first 25 regiments was more stable than for the rest of the 
force. The 13-16 year line rises and falls like the main line, though not as smoothly, 
as does the 17-20 line. 
The pattern of the rest of the regiments (see Chart 20 - Regiments 26 to 109 
and the Rifle Brigade: Average Number of Years in Location) generally follows the 
main chart. 
((rinne L MahatIey Chapter 3 63 
Excepting short posting lengths due to wars, the average length of posting 
was increasing until the wars of the 1890s and the South African war cut them short. 
average number of po stings that each regiment enjoyed in 32 years was 10.2 for 
the first 25 regiments, and 14.7 for the rest, so the first 25 were moving somewhat 
less often than the rest of the regiments and deployment periods were lengthening. 
Statistically speaking, an officer with a 30 year career would change po stings 
perhaps three times in his career on average, but in fact the number of po stings any 
individual battalion had was highly variable. Some battalions moved only a few 
times in thirty years, while others moved every few years. 
An analysis of the deployment of the line infantry shows a number of 
interesting things. Wars are easily picked out, not only due to the sudden increase in 
battalions at the location, but also due to, for larger wars not local to India, the 
corresponding decrease in battalions in Britain and, for wars in India, Indian based 
battalions, so most conflicts are approximately accommodated by shifting 
deployments regionally. Officers who were deployed to either Britain or India were 
likely to be in those locations for much of their careers. All other deployments were 
shorter. Thus all officers could be loosely divided into those who spent their careers 
in India, and those who spent their careers everywhere else. This natural separation 
of officers directly supported the Roberts and Wolseley cliques. Not just geography, 
but also the length of deployments, defined the boundaries of those cliques; because 
deployments were long enough to ensure officers were unlikely to move into the 
other regional group, once deployed. Deployment was destiny for the regimental 
officer, defining whether he fell into the long deployment Indianist camp or the short 
deployment Africanist camp. However, it is unclear if this pattern simply reinforced 
the Roberts and Wolseley cliques, or helped produce them. They did not create it, as 
it predates the height of Roberts' influence. 
A more detailed examination of how some wars were accommodated is in the 
next section. Despite the many wars of the period, most battalions are involved, on 
average, in perhaps one or two wars large enough to justify the movement of 
battalions during the entire period. 
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3. Wars Considered in Detail: Ashanti. Zulu. Egypt. Burma and South Africa 
Five wars are considered here in detail. For each war there is a brief precis of 
events, a list of all the units involved in the war, and an analysis of how line anny 
deployments were shifted to accommodate these wars. 
Excepting the Bunna war, all these wars had a mix of battalions sent from 
Britain and ones from overseas. There are numerous discrepancies regarding the 
po stings according to the anny lists and known battle honours, but, excepting the 
Egyptian war, these are minor. The British line anny did not fight these wars alone; 
in all these wars, other British anny or, in some cases, navy units were also 
deployed, as well as Indian regiments and locally raised or standing units. Conflicts 
were usually accommodated by a mix of battalions sent from Britain, from points 
distant from the war or by transferring units already deployed in the general region, 
and such units as were already posted to the local area. After the war, the battalions 
were often posted onward to other overseas garrisons. 
The charts (see Chart 21 - Moves per Year and Chart 22 - Regimental Moves 
as a Percentage ofthe Number of Battalions) will be referred to repeatedly in this 
section. These are charts, first, of how many battalions were transferred to new 
po stings each year, and then the percentage of all battalions so transferred. As can 
be seen from chart 21 more transfers occur the year a war starts, and after it ends, 
than in more peaceful years, the exception being the Ashanti war, where there were 
more transfers in the year before and 2 years after. Wars in Afghanistan and South 
Africa in 1879, Egypt in 1882, and the Northwest Frontier in the later 1890s caused 
the most movement until the South African war of 1899. The movement of the first 
25 regiments and the rest follow each other fairly closely for the most part. More 
interesting is "Chart 22 - Regimental Moves as a Percentage of the Number of 
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Battalions", which is "Chart 21 - Moves per Year" converted into percentages. In 
other words, it shows what percentage of the first 25 and, separately, the rest of the 
regiments were moved each year. 
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Neither the first 25 regiments nor the rest held any monopoly on the 
likelihood of being moved. In the 33 years covered, there were 16 years in which the 
first 25 had a higher percentage of transfers, and the rest, 15 years. In 1889 and 
1893, the first 25 and the rest ofthe regiments were at nearly equal likelihood of 
being moved. It is also possible to pick out, in the years when a war occurs, which 
group of regiments (the first 25 or the rest) are more likely to be moved. Which of 
these groups of regiments was favoured depends on which war is being discussed, as 
there was no consistent favouritism in this. 1872, 1875, and 1882 were years in 
which the rest of the regiments were more likely to be moved than the rest and the 
percentage movement of the other regiments did not rise as well, suggesting that the 
rest of the regiments may have been preferred for the Ashanti and Egyptian wars. 
The first 25 regiments show a corresponding pattern in 1885 and 1891. More 
generally, all regiments tend to have a greater likelihood of being moved, both 
separately considered and all together, in 1879, 1888, 1895, 1899 and 1902. In the 
years 1885 and 1886, 1891 and 1892 one group shadowed the rising movement 
probability of the other. 
Ashanti War, 1873 
Unresolved disputes between the Ashanti head of state, Kofi, and the colonial 
administration of the Gold Coast, led to the Ashanti war of 1873. The administration 
blocked Ashanti trade routes to the coast. The Ashanti also lost revenue due to the 
end of the slave trade. The Dutch abandoned their trading posts on the Gold Coasts 
and ceded the port of Elmina to the British, who refused to continue paying annual 
tribute for its use to the Ashanti. In early 1873 an Ashanti army attacked those tribes 
that claimed British protection. An attempt by the administration to create a Fanti 
federation failed, and the rest of the year was spent securing the coastal region 
against Ashanti attack. The British government authorised a military expedition 
under the leadership ofWolseley to invade the Ashanti homeland and force terms on 
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Kofi. After fighting, and the occupation of the capital, Kumasi, Kofi sued for peace. 
This war and its loss by the Ashanti resulted in continuing instability in the area and 
its eventual occupation and annexation by the British in 1896.3 
The participants from the line army were the 23/2 Royal Welsh Fusiliers, the 
42nd, the Black Watch and the 2nd battalion of the Rifle Brigade. Other combat 
troops included (leaving aside support troops, both local and from Britain) 
detachments of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, about 100 marines, the 1 st 
and 2nd West India Regiments, various local irregular troops (members ofthe Abrah, 
Inkoorsolcoom, Annamaboe, Gambians, Kosoo, Fanti, Rausa, Denkara tribes) West 
Indian regiment pensioners, the Gold Coast Corps, the Cape Coast Volunteers, local 
police forces, some naval landing parties, and the Rausa police.4 
Of the line regiments, the 23/2 had been in Britain since 1866, the 42nd since 
1868 and the 2nd battalion of the Rifle Brigade since 1868. After the Ashanti war, all 
spent some years in the Mediterranean (23/2 and 2 Rifle Brigade until 1879 and 42nd 
until 1878). The 23/2 and 2 Rifle Brigade then spent until the mid-1890s back in 
Britain before further postings. The 42nd spent some years in Britain until it left to 
fight in Egypt, and then went on to Mediterranean po stings and thence to India in the 
mid-1890s. 
The actual number of battalion transfers in the years 1873 and 1874 were 
well below the average of the whole period of 1870-1902, and there were more 
battalions moved in the years before and after (1872 and 1875). Looking at the 
number of battalions moved as a percentage of all battalions, the first 25 regiments 
had a slight edge on the probability of being moved during 1873 and 1874, though 
the inverse was true in the years preceding and the year following. This suggests 
that that this war caused little, if any disruption in deployments. (see Chart 21 -
Moves per Year and Chart 22 - Regimental Moves as a Percentage of the Number of 
Battalions) The Ashanti war also caused a minor and temporary dip in the relative 
number of battalions in Britain, and a corresponding rise for the African figures for 
the years 1873-4 (see Chart 9- Deployment of All Regiments by Region). 
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This was, superficially a textbook example of how the Cardwell refonns were 
supposed to work in practice; battalions needed for a small war are taken out of the 
reserve held in Britain, causing little disruption in the routine deployments to other 
locations overseas. However, these were not the units that would nonnally have 
been allotted, that is, the first two battalions on the foreign service roster after those 
to be sent to India. The government didn't want to send British troops to the west 
coast of Africa, on account of the rate of illness prevalent in the recently returned 
marine shore detachments. Wolseley and the expedition finally went due to the 
backing of Lord Kimberly, the Colonial minister. Cardwell made the decision to 
bring the Royal We1ch Fusiliers and the 2nd battalion of the Rifle Brigade up to war 
strength and put them on standby.5 Three days after W olseley reported on the results 
of the Essaman raid, emphasising that native troops, however enthusiastic, were not 
a sufficient substitute for regular troops, the first battalion received orders to sail. 6 
Zulu War 1879 
In 1872, the Cape was granted the right of self-governance, and two years 
later, the British government looked into how to create a federation that would put 
all of South Africa under the British flag. Zululand was one of the obstacles to these 
ambitions. There had been friction for years between the Zulus and the Boers, who 
had been encroaching northwards to avoid British rule. Subjection of the Zulus was 
also thought to be a means to relieve the labour shortage that existed throughout 
South Africa, due to the need for labourers in the gold and diamond mines and the 
sugar fields of Natal. It was also a strategic issue, as security of India depended on 
the security of the naval route around the Cape, and the existence of independent 
black African polities was believed to be inherently destabilising. Border incidents 
between Zululand and the Boers were increasing, and diplomatic efforts to 
subordinate Cetshwayo's sovereignty by claiming the authority to legitimate his 
possession of the crown were not successful. It was also important to convince the 
Boers to accept the British annexation of the Transvaal in 1877, in furtherance of 
bringing all of southern Africa under British control. The military defeat of the 
Zulus would stabilise the border and bring them under British sovereignty.7 The 
Cape High Commissioner, Sir Henry Bartle Frere, and the Administrator for Natal, 
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Sir Theophilius Shepstone, were of like mind in their support for war against 
Zululand. Superficial talks with King Cetshwayo broke down, Frere sent an 
ultimatum he knew would be unacceptable, and Zululand was invaded in January of 
1879.8 
Chelmsford divided his forces into three columns to march on the capital, 
Ulundi, in an attempt to push the Zulus into open battle. In this, he was 
spectacularly successful. The central column was wiped out at Islandlwana. With 
some difficulty, Chelmsford withdrew his forces out of Zululand. On news of this 
disaster, Frere and Shepstone and Chelmsford were removed from their positions. 
Before Sir Gamet Wolseley, sent as his successor, arrived, Chelmsford invaded 
Zululand with greater care a second time, and won a decisive battle against 
Cetshwayo's remaining forces at Ulundi. 9 
The 15 battalions involved in this war were the 3/2 (the Buffs), 4/2 (the 
King's Own), 13/1 (Somersetshire Light Infantry), 21/2 (Royal North British 
Fusiliers), both battalions of the 24th (2nd Warwickshire), the 5ih (West Middlesex), 
the 58th (Rutlandshire), 60/3 (King's Own Royal Rifles), the 80th (Staffordshire 
Volunteers), the 88th (Connaught Rangers) the 90th (Perthshire Light Infantry), the 
91 st (Princess Louise's Argyllshire Highlanders), the 94th, and the 99th (Duke of 
Edinburgh' s ).10 
Other participants included the King's Dragoon Guards, 17th Lancers, a naval 
brigade, elements of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, and several battalions 
of native levees, including the Frontier Light Horse, the Natal Mounted Police, the 
Natal Carbineers, the Newcastle Mounted Rifles, the Buffalo Border Guard, Raafs 
Horse (also known as the Transvaal Rangers), Baker's Horse, Natal Light Horse, 
Natal native Horse, Natal native Contingent, the Natal Native Pioneers, and "Wood's 
Irregulars", and Zulus hostile to Cetshwayo and the Swazis. II 
This war, along with the Afghanistan war, which occurred in the same year, 
was very disruptive, in terms of the number of battalions transferred in the years 
1879 and 1880 (see Chart 21 - Moves Per Year). Of the 44 battalions transferred in 
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1879,8 were sent to the Zulu war, and 12 were sent to Afghanistan (see Chart 9-
Deployment of All Regiments by Region). Of those that went to the Zulu war that 
year, 4 were from the first 25 battalions (8% of these battalions) and 8 from the rest 
(8.8%). Ofthose going to the war in Afghanistan, 4 were from the first 25 and 8 
from the rest. Subtract these 24 moves and it would be a quiet year for transfers. 
There are some discrepancies with the samples that created the charts, in that one 
battalion (57th) that was there, was, according to the sampling, moved from Ceylon 
to Britain in 1879.12 These are problems that are due to data taken once a year from 
the Army List and from Harts Army List, whose information may have been dated 
before they were published. In 1880, 10 of 37 moves were to transfer units out of 
Afghanistan, and 4 to move units out of South Africa. Subtracting these leaves 23 
other moves for the year. Thus, the noticeable high in the number of transfers in the 
years 1879 and 1880 are entirely due to the wars of the day. 
"Chart 1 0- Deployment of Regiments 1-25 by Region" shows, for 1878, a 
large drop in British deployments, which starts to rise in 1879 to a local high period 
that ends in 1885, and a high point in both Africa and the Mediterranean, thanks to 
the Egyptian war. 1878 was the most interesting year, most noticeable due to a 
temporary drop in UK. Again, an artefact of sampling, of the 6 battalions that 
returned to Britain in 1879 according to the sampling (211, 311,811, 1311,1411,2411), 
2 were of battalions that were fighting in South Africa in 1879 (1311 and 2411). 312, 
which was also fighting in South Africa, was listed by the sampling as being 
transferred from South Africa to the Straits in 1879. Were these adjusted, the rise in 
UK deployments would not be until 1880, and South Africa would show a maximum 
in 1879. 
Of the 15 battalions in this war, 10 were sent from the UK, 2 had been 
sent from po stings in East Asia, and 3 were already posted to South Africa. After the 
war, 5 battalions were sent to the UK, but only one of these was returning. 5 were 
sent to India within 3 years, 2 went to East Asia, one went to the Mediterranean, and 
3 remained in South Africa. As with Egypt, discussed in the next section, some 
battalions were sent from Britain, but not all, and after the war the opportunity was 
taken to send most of the battalions on to other overseas postings. 
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Egyptian War 1882,1884-85 
This war was really two related wars, the first to put down the popular revolt 
headed by Egyptian army officers, and the second in Egypt's southern province of 
Sudan against the Mahdi. 
When the governor, later Khedive, Ismail took office in Egypt, he began to 
modernise Egypt. In particular, he had a great deal of infrastructure built, including 
rails, telegraph, irrigation, a modem harbour at Alexandria, schools, sugar refineries 
and canals. This required an influx of Europeans to build it, increased taxes, and, 
when tax revenue proved insufficient, international loans. Much of what grew into a 
nearly £ 90 million debt was due to the construction of the Suez Canal. The Khedive 
sold his shares to the British government in 1875, the latter having seen an 
opportunity to gain financial control over the strategic canal. This sale was 
insufficient to restore the Khedive's financial situation, and Egypt went bankrupt in 
1876. The Khedive was forced into European controlled receivership, and a system 
of "Dual Control" by the French and British governments that lasted until 1882. The 
Khedive was forced to attempt reform of the government to minimise expenditure, 
but this resulted in a revolt in 1879, which the Khedive used to form a new 
government. The Ottoman emperor was pressured to dismiss the Khedive, and his 
more amenable son Tewfik replaced him. 13 
A protest movement started up, which resulted in a revolt and take-over of 
the government by the officers of the Egyptian army under Colonel Ahmed Arabi. 
Prime Minister Gladstone attempted diplomatic intervention, but the French were 
unwilling to hand Egypt back to Turkey. A joint naval show of force off Alexandria 
failed, but the French were unwilling to become more involved. A force under 
General Wolseley was sent in, and it defeated Arabi's forces at Tel El Kebir. The 
British then took control of Egypt through British advisors, leaving the Khedive as 
the nominal head of state. 14 
Further south, the province of Sudan was in a state of civil war due to the 
military and religious campaign led by the al Mahdi. In 1883, the Khedive prevailed 
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upon the British to send a field force to put the revolt down, but the mostly Egyptian 
force was wiped out. Three other Egyptian armies were also wiped out keeping the 
Mahdi's forces way from the Red Sea Ports. On 19 February 1884, Prime Minister 
Gladstone ordered the evacuation of the inland garrisons under the command of 
General Charles Gordon. A field force was sent in to control the port of Suakin. 
Gordon, for his part, felt that he should attempt to regain control ofthe Sudan. He 
had some small successful engagements in the Khartoum area, but in August the 
Mahdi moved his forces northwards and besieged Khartoum in October. In the 
meantime, General Wolseley had been planning an expeditionary force to extricate 
General Gordon since April. It was sent up the Nile on 31 December 1884, but 
failed to reach Khartoum before the Mahdists took it in late January 1885. The force 
advancing from Suakin also failed to destroy the Mahdi' s forces. The British 
withdrew from the Sudan, and the Mahdi was succeeded by the Khalifah Abdullah 
Ibn al-Sayyid Muhammed, who continued to expand the borders ofthe Mahdist 
. 15 
empIre. 
This group of wars was by far the most difficult to reconcile with the stated 
deployment. Though the Army List agrees with the honours list about which 
regiments went to this group of battles, the Army List often has battalions that were 
involved in these wars stationed elsewhere in the Mediterranean, shifting between 
Egypt, Cyprus, Gibraltar and Malta, or in Mauritius or Aden. Though this was the 
conquest of another country, almost half of the battalions involved were transferred 
from Mediterranean deployments. 
The following line regiments were involved in the fighting in 1882: 
18/2 (Royal Irish), 32/2 (46) (Cornwall LI), 35th (Royal Sussex), 38th (South 
Staffordshire), 42nd (Royal Highlanders), 95th (Sherwood Foresters), 49th (Royal 
Berkshire), 50th (Royal West Kent), 53rd (Shropshire LI), 60/3 (King's Royal Rifles), 
96th (Manchesters), 65th (York and Lancaster), 74th (Highland LI), 72nd (Seaforth 
Highlanders), 75th (Gordon Highlanders), 79th (Cameron Highlanders), and the 87th 
(Royal Irish Fusiliers).16 
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The other units involved were: 
I Life Guards, 2nd Life Guards, Royal Horse Guards, 4th Dragoon Guards, 7th 
Dragoon Guards, 19th Hussars, Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, Scots Guards, 
2nd (Gardner's Horse), 6th King Edward's Own Light Cavalry, 2nd Queen's Own 
Sappers and Miners, 13th (Watson's Horse), 7th Rajputs, 20th (Brownlow's Punjabis), 
129th Baluchis, Royal Malta Artillery.I7 
However, discrepancies arise with six line battalions with respect to their 
postings. The 45/2 (95) was posted to Bengal from 1882 to 1887, having moved 
from Gibraltar, the 50th was in Cyprus in 1882 and 1883,6312 (96) was in Malta in 
1881 and moved to Bengal in 1882, staying there until 1896. The 65th had moved 
from Bengal to spend 1882 and 1883 in Aden, and was then posted to Britain until 
1898. The 72nd had just moved from Bengal to Britain as of 1882, where it would 
stay until 1896 and the 8ih had moved from Britain to Bengal as of 1883. Some of 
the discrepancy is likely an artefact of sampling, but note that these po stings are in 
Britain, and the unit was posted the following year to India (and could easily be 
involved in this war "on the way"), or to a Mediterranean posting, or to Aden, all of 
which are convenient for the fighting in Egypt. 
During the fighting in 1884-85, the following line regiments were involved: 
1812 Royal Irish, 19/1 Yorkshire, 70th Surrey, 32/2 (46) Cornwall Light Infantry, 35th 
Royal Sussex, 38th South Staffordshire, 42nd Royal Highlanders, 56th Essex, 49th 
Royal Berkshires, 50th Royal West Kent, 53rd Shropshire Light Infantry, 60/3 King's 
Royal Rifles, 65th York and Lancaster Regiment, 75th Gordon Highlanders, 79th 
Cameron Highlanders, 89 Princess Victoria's.I8 
Other units that also attended: 
5th Lancers, 10th Hussars, 19th Hussars, 20th Hussars' Grenadier Guards, Coldstream 
Guards, Scots Guards, 9th Hodson's Horse, 2nd Queen's Own Sappers and Miners, 
15th Ludhiana Sikhs, 17th (Loyal) Regiment, 128th Pioneers, Naval Brigade, RA, RE, 
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Royal Marines, Heavy Cavalry Camel Corps, Light Cavalry Camel Corps, Mounted 
Infantry. 19 
According to the Army List, the following regiments were sent to the 1884-5 
battles that had not been in Egypt in 1882: 1811,1911,3112 (70), 4412 (56) and 87/2 
(89). The following units had been in the battles in 1882, but were not present in 
1884-5: 1812, 4512 (95), 6312 (96), 7112 (74), and 72. 
Again, there are difficulties reconciling the presence of some line battalions, 
in terms of the Army List, and their battle honours. Both the 1811 and 3112 were 
posted to Egypt only for 1884, having been moved from Bengal, and afterward, on to 
Britain. The 1811 has honours for the Nile, 1884-5 and the 3112 for Suakin in 
1885.20 The 35th had left for Britain in 1885, again with honours for the Nile in 
1884-5, the 38th had moved to Gibraltar in 1883. The 60/3 was in Cyprus in 1884 
and 1885, despite several honours for that period. The 65th had moved from Aden to 
Britain as of 1884 (it has honours for 1884, but not 1885), and the 75th had moved 
from Egypt to Malta as of 1885, having honours for the Nile, 1884-5. The 8712 
(89th) was diverted on its way to Britain from Bombay to fight at EI Teb and Tarnai, 
near Suakin?1 The discrepancies involve movement between Britain and elsewhere, 
or movement within the Mediterranean or to Aden. 
The abrupt rise in deployments to the Mediterranean in the early 1880's was 
entirely due to the Egyptian war, and Egypt continued to be an element of 
Mediterranean deployment for the rest of the period. Deployments to Britain and 
Africa drop slightly to compensate (see Chart 9 - Deployment of all Regiments by 
Region). 
Most ofthe movement ofthe battalions during this war was in 1882, when 
the war started, and at the end of the war, in 1885 and 1886, as battalions were re-
deployed. "Chart 21 - Moves Per Year" and "Chart 22 - Regimental Moves as 
Percentage ofthe Number of Battalions" also demonstrate (as does simply looking at 
the list of battalions) that this was mostly a war for the higher numbered regiments, 
rather than the first 25. 40 battalions were moved in 1882, a high second only to the 
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Zulu war until 1895. Of these, 33 were from the higher numbered battalions (see 
Chart 21 - Moves Per Year and Chart 22 - Regimental Moves as Percentage of the 
Number of Battalions), or 36% ofthese battalions. Only 7, or14% of the first 25 
battalions, were moved that same year. Of the 17 battalions involved in this war in 
1882, 15 moved that year according to the Army List. Subtracting these 15 would 
leave 25 other transfers that year, an average year, so, like the Zulu war, the large 
number of transfers in 1882 was due entirely to war. 
Notably few battalions were moved in 1883, only 14; 5 ofthese were 
battalions that were involved in the Egyptian war (18/2, 38, 49, 53, 7112 (74)). 
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In 1884, again, an average number of battalions moved (see Chart 21 -
Moves Per Year), of which (49, 50, 60/3, 65, 8712 (89)) had been involved in 1882 
and were to be involved in the war of 1884-85. The battalions 1811, 1911,3112 (70), 
4412 (56) had not been involved in 1882 but were transferred for the war in 1884-85. 
7112 (74) was transferred for a year to Britain, and then to Bengal until 1896. 
Of all the battalions that were involved in this war, 5 came from Britain, 9 
from the Mediterranean, 5 from India and 1 each from South Africa and Canada. 
After the war, 10 were sent to Britain, 9 to the Mediterranean, of which 4 had been 
posted there before the war, and 2 to India. All but one of the battalions stationed in 
the Mediterranean was involved in the war in 1882. Plainly, it was expedient to send 
battalions that were nearby. 
Burma War, 1885-87 
The Burmese government attempted to play France off Britain by signing a 
trade treaty with the French in 1883, which was suspected by the British to include 
supplying arms to Burma. This worsened British concerns about the expanding 
French involvement in Indochina22 A Conservative government was briefly in power 
in 1885, and, contrary to civil service advice, approved of annexation, as opposed to 
deposing King Thibaw and replacing him with someone more amenable to British 
interests.23 
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Burma fined the Bombay Burma Trading Corporation on the grounds that 
they had exported more teak than they had paid for.24 This false allegation was the 
pretext for the British to issue an ultimatum demanding that the teak issue go to 
arbitration, that the king accept a British Resident, that trade be opened with China, 
and that Burma's external affairs be put on the same basis as those ofthe Emir of 
Afghanistan, that is, in accordance with the advice of the Indian government.25 
The King rejected this ultimatum, and the resulting war was very brief. 
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Though Burma was formally annexed on 1 January 1886, less than 3 months after 
the ultimatum was delivered, actual control of Burma required several years of war, 
as the Burmese army conducted guerrilla operations against the occupying British 
forces?6 
The line battalions that were involved in the Burma war were the 212 (Royal 
West Surrey), 812 (Kings Liverpool), 1312 (Prince Albert's), 2112 (Royal Scots 
Fusiliers), 2212 (Cheshire), 2311 (Royal Welsh Fusiliers), 2412 (South Wales 
Borderers), 67th (Hampshire), the 51 st (Yorkshire Light Infantry), 104th (Royal 
Munster Fusiliers), and the 1 st battalion of the Rifle Brigade?7 
The 1 012 (Lincolnshire) and 912 (Norfolk) were involved in 1888 and 1889 
respectively, and the 4th battalion of the 60th was involved in the operations of 1890-
92 that subdued the last ofthe opposition?8 
The following regiments were also involved in the war of 1885-87: 
7th Hurriana Lancers, 26th P. W. O. Light cavalry, 2ih Light Cavalry, 31 st lancers, 2nd 
Q. O. Rajput LI, 1 st PWO Sappers and Miners, 2nd QO Sappers and Miners, 3rd 
Sappers and Miners, 4th Rajputs, 1 st Brahmins, 5th LI, 10th Jats, 11 th Jats, 12th 
Pioneers, 16th Rajputs, 18th Infantry, 26th Punjabis, 27th Punjabis, 33rd Punjabis, 61 st 
Pioneers, 63rd LI, 72nd Punjabis, 73rd Carnatic Infantry, 74th Punjabis, 75th Carnatic 
Infantry, 76th Punjabis, 81 st pioneers, 83rd LI, 86th Carnatic Infantry, 8ih Punjabis, 
90th Punjabis, 95th Russell's Infantry, 96th Berar Infantry, 101 st Grenadiers, 105th 
Mahratta LI, 107th Pioneers, 123rd Outram Rifles, 125th Napier's Rifles, 127th Baluch 
LI, 3rd Gurkhas, 8th Gurkhas?9 There was also a naval brigade of 600 with 26 guns, 
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divisional troops that included a battalion of native pioneers and 6 batteries of 
artillery.3o Half of this artillery was from the Royal Artillery; half was mountain 
batteries from India.31 Thirty men of the 21 S\ along with 50 policemen and 14 
Rangoon Volunteers, together with officers from these units, were made into a 
mounted infantry corps at the request of Major General Prendergast.32 The Upper 
Burma Military Police was created after upper Burma was annexed in January of 
1886, but it was later taken into the Madras army. Various volunteer units were also 
involved, including the Rangoon Volunteer Rifles (formed in 1860), the Moulmein 
Volunteer Rifles (1877), the Rangoon Volunteer Artillery and the Rangoon and 
Irrawaddy Volunteer Rifles (1879), and the Upper Burma Volunteer Rifles (1886).33 
There is, as noted elsewhere, a preponderance of battalions from the first 25. 
Despite all these battalions, this caused relatively little disruption, in terms of the 
number of battalions moved each year. Though both this and the Egyptian war were 
concurrent in 1885, and the number of battalions moved that year and in 1886 and 
1888 were high compared to other years, fewer battalions were moved in each of 
those years than were moved for the Afghanistan war in 1879 or the start of the 
Egyptian war in 1882 (see Chart 21 - Moves Per Year). 
Thus, India was being used as a reserve for this war. This is also confirmed 
by the drop in the number of battalions in India from 1885-1890. Though the 
number of battalions in India had slipped just below average in 1882, the real lows 
occurred from 1885 to 1890 (see Chart 9- Deployment of all Regiments by Region 
and Chart 13 - Deployment of all Regiments: India (stacked chart)). The battalions 
involved in this war came from India, and most returned there. All of the battalions 
had been transferred from Bengal, with the following exceptions: 1312,21/2,2412, 
67 (3712), and 104 (101/2), came from Madras and 1 Rifle Brigade came from 
Bombay. These battalions also returned to Bengal, with the following exceptions: 
912,2212,60/4,67 (3712), and 51 were sent to Britain, 1312 returned to Madras, and 
2112, and 104 (10112) were sent to Madras. 
Corinne L Mahaffey Chapter 3 77 
South African War, 1899-1902 
Having failed, in 1881, to force a federation on the Transvaal, Britain 
watched with growing concern the increasing nationalism and national wealth from 
gold deposits in the Witwatersrand. During the 1890's Cecil Rhodes, hoping to 
discover more mining opportunities, used his company to carve out what turned out 
to be a mostly agrarian colony that was officially recognised as Rhodesia in 1897. 
This conveniently stopped any northward expansion of the Transvaal. In 1895, 
Rhodes backed a coup against the Transvaal government. The miners who 
supported this backed out, but the invading force that was supposed to support the 
miner-raised rebellion did not, and the Jameson raid was an abysmal failure. The 
Boers, for their part, viewed this as a British-backed coup attempt. The Kaiser took 
the opportunity to congratulate the president of the Transvaal, Paul Kruger. This 
alarmed the British government, earlier disturbed by the German acquisition of the 
coast of southwest Africa in 1884. Various elements in the British government, 
concerned with British supremacy in the area, or upset by earlier defeats that resulted 
in partial independence for the Transvaal, attempted to destabilise the Transvaal in 
an attempt to force it to unite with the rest of South Africa under the crown, or to 
find a reason to declare war. The crucial issue turned out to be the political rights of 
immigrants involved in mining the Transvaal. The failure of negotiations, gone into 
with less than entirely good faith by Milner, precipitated the war.34 
The Boers' invasion of the Cape ground to a halt with sieges at Ladysmith, 
Kimberley and Mafeking. Relief attempts by the forces of Sir Redvers Buller, the 
commander in chief, met with failure, and Lord Roberts replaced him. The capitals 
of both Orange Free State and the Transvaal surrendered due to a flank attack from 
Kimberley. The Boers responded with two years of guerrilla warfare. The British 
resorted to a war of attrition, and finally did enough economic and military damage 
to force the Boers to come to terms.35 
This was the largest war that Britain was involved in during the years 1870 to 
1902; so large that it dwarfs any other war of the period. It was nearly as large, in 
terms of battalion-years, as all other wars put together. Every regiment of the line 
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anny sent at least one battalion to this war. In all, 80 battalions were sent to this war, 
of which 27 were from the first 25 regiments. Even so, 23 battalions, of which 7 
were from the first 25 regiments, never saw this or any other colonial war in the 
years 1870 to 1902. 
In addition to the line regiments, there were numerous other British units 
involved. These included 26 regiments of cavalry, the Grenadier, Coldstream and 
Scots Guards, horse, mountain and field artillery, naval artillery and several naval 
brigades, 44 yeomanry regiments, and 51 militia regiments.36 
Less regular units involved were: 
The Cape Mounted Rifles, Cape Field Artillery, various local volunteer corps in 
South Africa, native levees, and contingents from Australia, Canada, India, New 
Zealand, and Tasmania.37 
As is obvious from "Chart 9 - Deployment of all Regiments by Region", 
most of the battalions were moved from Britain, and most also returned there after 
the war, though the number of battalions stationed in India, the Mediterranean, South 
Asia and the Americas also drops during this war. This war was so large that taking 
battalions from Britain was not sufficient. More precisely, 37 battalions were 
transferred from Britain to South Africa in 1899, of which 12 were from the first 25 
regiments, 13 in 1900, of which 7 were from the first 25 regiments, and none in 
1901. In 1899, 16 battalions were transferred to this war from other locations, that is 
Bengal, Bombay, Ceylon, Crete, Egypt, Gibraltar, Malta, Mauritius, and the Punjab. 
Ofthese, five battalions from the first 25 regiments came from Crete, Gibraltar, 
Malta and the Punjab. In 1900 six arrived from Bennuda, Canada, Egypt, Gibraltar 
and Malta, and in 1901 none arrived. In 1902 four battalions were rotated in, from 
Britain, Hong Kong, Barbados and the Punjab, and one battalion was sent from 
Ceylon in 1903, and one from Bengal in 1904, as regular garrisoning resumed. 
In 1901, battalions began to leave. 612 was sent to Bennuda from South 
Africa. 19 battalions were transferred to Britain from South Africa in 1902, 18 in 
1903, and lOin 1904, of which six, nine and five were from the first 25 regiments, 
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respectively. In 1902, 25 left South Africa for Aden, Bengal, Bombay, Burma, 
Ceylon, Egypt, Hong Kong, Madras, Malta, Mauritius and the Punjab, and four left 
for Bengal, Ceylon, Egypt and Singapore 1903, of which two had been posted there 
briefly after the war. 
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Five battalions, 811, 1711, 1811, 6012 and 10212, were already present in South 
Africa in 1898, and 4912 was transferred there that year. As intended, battalions in 
Britain were used as the reserve deployed for a major war, but other regions also saw 
their garrisons reduced. 
The consistency between the honours and where the battalions were deployed 
was generally good, unlike Egypt. Access to this war was about even for the first 25 
and the rest ofthe battalions, as 54% of the former and 57% ofthe latter are 
involved. Some effort also seems to have been made to send battalions back to the 
posting region they were in before the war, though many were sent on to new 
po stings. 
Like all the wars discussed here, most battalions moved in the first year of 
the war (1899) and at the end (1902). Fewer than usual were re-deployed during the 
war (see Chart 21 - Moves Per Year, Chart 22 - Regimental Moves as Percentage of 
the Number of Battalions). The first 25 regiments moved out of South Africa in both 
1902 and 1903, whereas the rest of the regiments were mostly re-deployed in 1902, 
suggesting that the rest of the battalions were given priority for redeployment 
elsewhere. This was confirmed above; in that 6 battalions from the first 25 
regiments were sent to overseas po stings after the war (1902-06) (12%), and 24 from 
the rest (26%), and most ofthe overseas deployments for all battalions was in 1902. 
Redeployment in the face of wars conformed partially to the intent of the 
Cardwell reforms, in that battalions in Britain were sent, but it was as, or more, 
convenient to transfer battalions that were closer, or diverted from normal 
redeployment. For the Burma war, in particular, it was faster to send battalions 
posted to India than to wait on battalions from Britain, or ones being re-deployed 
from the Egyptian war. If a battalion was sent from Britain, it was, in the cases of 
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the Ashanti or Zulu wars, likely to stay overseas for some years afterward. In the 
case of the Burma war, battalions were taken from India and sent back there, while a 
minority were sent to Britain after the war. The deployment for these wars, for the 
most part, conforms to the geography ofthe cliques. Egypt, however, sitting on the 
geographic boundary, breaks this pattern, having battalions from Britain, the local 
region and from India. Field experience for a regimental officer was dependent on 
overseas deployment. An officer that gained field experience demonstrated that he 
had the professional competence that would in tum help to advance his career. 
Unlike German officers posted to the frontiers, British officers posted to the frontiers 
were advancing their careers by gaining and demonstrating professional knowledge 
and competence. 
The South African war was on a scale so large that these patterns failed. The 
original intent to use the battalions posted in Britain as a war reserve re-emerged, 
although the war proved so large that these alone were insufficient. There was no 
consistent pattern of favouritism toward the first 25 in terms of whether they were 
preferred for wartime deployment, though some individual wars show a preference 
for one of the other. The Cardwell reforms largely succeeded in their primary aim of 
keeping half the battalions at home as a war reserve, but the South African War 
demanded more regular battalions than Britain actually had. However, the Cardwell 
reforms arguably failed, in that British battalions in Britain were under-manned 
training units, a problem outside the scope of this paper. 
4. Deplovment and the Indian and African "Rings" 
Another deployment issue is whether the Africanist and the Indianist "rings" 
had any influence on deployment. One of the consequences of the lack of a general 
staff was that a field commander had to do his own planning, pick his own staff and 
work out his own logistics and transport. As a result, both Lord Roberts and Lord 
W olseley developed their own "rings" of officers whom they could depend on as 
staff and subordinate commanders in wartime, and, in Lord Roberts' case, to acquire 
staff for the Indian army. These rings offered patronage to more junior officers, in 
terms of access to staff positions, field appointments during wars, and advocates for 
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their grievances and claims and help with their career advancement, and assist their 
sons.
38 Wolseley was careful to mention the meritorious service of his officers in 
dispatches. There are 10 pages of these mentions for the officers involved in the 
campaign in Egypt in 1882.39 Lord Roberts supported Sir Henry Rawlinson as a 
junior officer because his father was a supporter of the "forward defence" policy that 
Lord Roberts advocated.4o 
The rings were never closed systems, since particular officers could die or be 
unavailable, or an officer from the other ring would have the needed skills. 41 
General Sir Ian Hamilton, in 1884 a major, and who had recently acted as Assistant 
Military Secretary to Lord Roberts (that he wasn't confirmed in this position by the 
War Office he blamed on Sir Redvers Buller, an Africanist), sailed to Cairo in an 
attempt to join the Gordon Relief expedition. Finding that numerous other officers 
had had the same idea, he contacted the Gordon Highlanders, the regiment in which 
he had been a subaltern and was offered a position. The base commandant, Colonel 
Ardagh, refused to forward the appointment to the chief of staff, Redvers Buller. 
The colonel eventually relented, and Buller gave Hamilton the position: a 
demonstration of both the use of connections in gaining positions, and the fact that 
the rings were not closed. General Sir Evelyn Wood got him out of the rearguard 
company he had been assigned to by leaning on Hamilton's colone1.42 This episode 
also demonstrates the degree of competition among British officers to get combat 
experience - in the absence of British maneuvers, the only field command 
experience they could get. The staff college instructor and historian, Colonel G. F. 
R. Henderson, was a "find" ofWolseley, who, on discovering he was the author of 
The Campaign of Fredericksburg, had him added to the teaching staff at Sandhurst in 
1890. This did not stop Lord Roberts from taking Henderson along to the South 
African war as his director of intelligence. 43 
Patronage was probably a wider practice than just within the rings. Evidence 
taken by the commission on the South African war suggests the practice was 
widespread, not only to support the meritorious, but also the merely well connected. 
Major General Kelly-Kenny, because he had the best of connections, spent much of 
his career serving in combat support staff positions, never commanding in the field 
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until he was given 6th division in the South African war.44 Then General, later Field 
Marshall, Sir Evelyn Wood stated that it was easy to get rid of subalterns, but when 
officers had the ranks of captain and major it was hard to reject them for promotion 
on grounds of incompetence because family and general officers would intervene.45 
Lieutenant General Sir Ian. Hamilton, then Military Secretary and a key member of 
the Roberts "ring" who had found Roberts' backing a considerable accelerator for his 
career, spoke from the other side of the issue; 
q. At any rate, the present position with regard to the supply of officers and 
their education leaves you in almost a dangerous position? Yes, that has also 
struck me in connection with the question of outside influence which I rather 
bear the brunt of as Military Secretary. I think there is nothing that shows the 
fierce light which beats on the War Office more than the way that the 
ordinary human actions and feelings are twisted into something special 
against that department. Of course, influential people, political or social, ask 
for advancement for their friends frequently; but they do so knowing 
perfectly well that the Military Secretary will refuse it if it is improper; and 
they are thus able to satisfY their constituent, or whoever it is, and to put the 
odium on to somebody else's shoulders. What I mean is that people are 
perfectly satisfied if they ask a thing, and they are shown that it cannot be 
done under the Regulations, and, as a rule, there is no more trouble. As 
regards female outside influence, I think it is the most natural thing that 
mothers should wish to help their sons, and they come to see me or write to 
me, and very often I am able to meet their views without doing harm to 
anyone else, and in cannot do it without harming someone I do not do it.46 
Hamilton, in his tum, had become a patron. 
The rings, and patronage in general, helped and also hindered 
professionalization. On the one hand, it was a means to advance by merit, assuming 
that was what the patron was looking for. However, patronage did not make for a 
consistent means to advance the careers of competent officers because personal ties 
or political connections were also reasons to support an officer. Patronage operated 
in the absence of a more systematic means of defining and promoting meritorious 
officers. It could be a very costly system, as when feuding between the rings 
hampered the prosecution ofthe South African war.47 
Corinne- L MahatTey Chapter .3 83 
The only point at which the officer cliques can be seen in terms of the 
movement of battalions was in the relatively few numbers of battalions that, having 
been posted to India at some time in the years 1870 to 1898, were posted to Africa in 
that period. If either group could claim to have any grip on the po stings, it might 
have been the Indianists, given that most of the regiments deployed to India never 
went to Africa, though, as discussed below, there are other reasons for the 
predominance of po stings to India. Moreover, Indian po stings were semi-permanent 
even before Roberts rose to prominence. 
Officers could not have easily have remained in the same regiment for their 
entire careers and hope to avoid India. A voiding Africa was also not possible 
without moving between battalions at some time in their career. This would suggest 
that a particularly Africanist officer would have to be less loyal to his regiment, and 
more likely to move to the battalion linked to his own (after 1881), or to another 
regiment altogether, or to the staff, in order to avoid service in India. 
Looking first at the battalions that were posted to India, and seeing how many 
of these battalions also went to which other po stings, it is clear that the garrisoning 
of India overwhelmed all other deployments. Of the 141 battalions of the regular 
army (ignoring in this section, for the purposes of comparison, the 2/79, which was 
raised in 1897 and was posted to Britain for the years 1897-98), 126 spent at least 
one deployment in India in the years 1870 through 1898 (table 1). Ofthese, only 30 
were ever deployed to Africa in this period (table 2). Of those that were not 
deployed to Africa in this period, 43 did go to Africa for the South African war of 
1899-1902. The South African war drew more battalions that had deployed to India 
than did all the deployments to Africa in the 28 years before it. 
Table 1: Number of Regiments Posted to Each Region: 1870-98. 
India SE Asia* EAsia Africa Americas Mediterranean 
Regiments 1-25 45 25{41 (11 4 12 7 29 
Regiments 26- 81 36 (9) (5) 8 25 19 61 
Rifle Brigade 
All Regiments 126 61 (13) (6) 12 37 26 90 
*The first bracketed number refers to the number of those battalIons that went to SE ASIa, whose only 
posting in that region was to Aden. The second bracketed number is the number of battalions sent 
C crinne L I'vIaha11E:y Chapter .3 
only to Mauritius in SE Asia. These are in addition to the main number, which is the number of 
battalions that went to any SE Asia posting. 
Table 2: Number of Regiments Posted to India, Plus Other Regions: 1870-98. 
84 
India and ... SE Asia* EAsia Africa Americas Mediterranean 
, Regiments 1-25 22 (4) (1) 2 10 5 23 
Regiments 26- Rifle 31 (9) (5) 6 20 15 50 
Brigade 
L All Regiments 53 (13) (6) 8 30 20 74 
*The fIrst bracketed number refers to the number of those battalions that went to SE Asia, whose only 
posting in that region was to Aden. The second bracketed number is the number of battalions sent 
only to Mauritius in SE Asia. These are in addition to the main number, which is the number of 
battalions that went to any SE Asia posting. 
All 69 regiments had at least one battalion go to India at some time in the 
period 1870-1898. Of these, 30 regiments sent a battalion to Africa. Of these, 10 
were from the first 25 regiments, and 20 from the rest. Ofthe 39 regiments whose 
battalions were never posted to Africa, 15 were from the first 25 regiments and 24 
from the rest. Thus, regimental experience was not very well spread between India 
and Africa, since less than half of all the regiments ever sent a battalion to Africa, 
but, as an officer could transfer between the battalions of his regiment, his chances of 
varying his overseas experience were not as poor as they would have been ifhe 
could not do so. 
Separating out the first 25 regiments, 45 of 50 battalions had been deployed 
to India (table 1). Ofthese, 10 were deployed to Africa (table 2). Ofthese 
battalions, 15 were only deployed to Africa for the South African war. Thus, of 
these 45 battalions, 24, or 53.3%, were not deployed to Africa before the South 
African war. 
Of the rest of the battalions, 81 were deployed to India from 1870 to 1898 
(table 1). Of these, 20 were deployed to Africa (table 2), and 28 were only deployed 
to Africa for the 1899-1902 war. 
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In other words, less than a quarter of the battalions that had been posted to 
India ever went to Africa before the South African war (table 3). Further, the first 25 
regiments were slightly more likely than the rest of the battalions, if they had had a 
posting to India, to be posted to Africa. 
Table 3: Table 2, as Percentages. 
India and ... SE Asia EAsia Africa Americas Mediterranean 
Regiments 1-25 48.9 4.0 22.2 11.1 53.3 
Regiments 26- Rifle 38.3 7.4 24.7 18.5 61.7 
Brigade 
All Regiments 42.1 6.5 23.8 15.9 58.7 
Only 37 battalions of 141 went to both India and Africa because India, to 
which 126 battalions were sent, so predominated where battalions were posted. 
There are a number of causes for this. First, deployments to India, as noted 
elsewhere, were among the longest (matched only by the length of deployments to 
Britain), and therefore there was less opportunity for a regiment deployed to India 
(or Britain) to go to Africa. The second issue is partly a matter ofthe relative 
number of po stings to which battalions could be deployed. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
battalions were deployed only to the Gold Coast and to South Africa. Egypt has 
been accounted as a Mediterranean posting. Postings to India included Madras, 
Bombay, Bengal, Nepal, Afghanistan, and, later in the century, the Punjab. It was 
also considered important, for many years in the wake of the Indian rebellion of 
1857, to maintain a large military presence in India. Finally, there were simply more 
wars in India and surrounding regions, which meant more battalions were required to 
maintain the peace and to pursue these wars. 
Table 4: Number of Regiments Posted to Africa, Plus Other Regions 1870-1898. 
Africa and ... SE Asia* EAsia India Americas Mediterranean 
Regiments 1-25 3 (2) (0) 1 10 4 6 
Regiments 26- Rifle 9 (2) (4) 4 20 6 17 
Brigade 
All Regiments 12 (4) (6) 5 30 10 23 
*The first bracketed number refers to the number of those battalIons that went to SE ASia, whose only 
posting in that region was to Aden. The second bracketed number is the number of battalions sent 
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only to Mauritius in SE Asia. These are in addition to the main number, which is the number of 
battalions that went to any SE Asia posting. 
Table 5: Table 4, as Percentages. 
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Africa and ... SE Asia EAsia India Americas Mediterranean 
Regiments 1-25 25.0 8.33 83.3 33.3 50.0 
Regiments 26- Rifle 36.0 16.0 80.0 24.0 68.0 
Brigade 
All Regiments 32.4 13.5 81.1 27.0 62.2 
To look at the issue from the perspective of Africa, 37 battalions had been 
deployed to Africa between the years 1870 and 1898 (table 1). Ofthese, 30 were at 
some time deployed to India (table 4). Ofthe 37 battalions, 19 were also sent to the 
South African war, having been posted to Africa in earlier years. These 37 battalions 
are spread among 32 regiments, all of which has sent at least one battalion to India, 
suggesting a wider spread of experience in the 'African' regiments, as compared to 
the 'Indian' ones. 
Of the first 25 regiments, 12 battalions had, at some time between 1870 and 
1898, been posted to Africa. Of these, 10 were deployed to India (table 4). 8 of 
these 12 battalions were also posted to Africa for the South African war. 
Of the rest ofthe battalions, 25 had been posted to Africa (table 1), of which 
20 were also deployed to India (table 4). 11 of25 battalions were also sent to the 
South African war. 
Generally, battalions that were posted to Africa were very likely to be also 
posted to India at some time. It is also clear that those battalions of the first 25 
regiments that had been posted at some time to Africa were slightly more likely than 
those of the rest of the battalions to be deployed to India at some time in the years 
1870-98. About half of all battalions that were previously posted to Africa went to 
the South African war, but those battalions from the first 25 regiments were more 
likely to be sent to the war than the rest of the battalions. 
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Only 5 battalions (the 46th (32/2), 35t\ 71 S\ the 101 st and the 102nd) were sent 
to the South African war, yet were never posted to either India or Africa in the years 
1870-1898. Three other battalions, 4/1, 2011, and 79/2, were also anomalies, in that 
they were never posted to either India or Africa, even for the South African war. 
The 79/2 only came into being in 1897. It spent two years in Britain, and then was 
shipped out to the Mediterranean, spending three years in Gibraltar, one in Crete and 
one in Malta, after which it was sent to South Africa in 1904. The 411 and the 2011 
had similar experiences, in that much of their time in Britain overlapped, and their 
tours in anyone location tended to be short. The 411 was posted to Britain from 
1868 to 1873. It was then posted to Gibraltar for five years, and the West Indies for 
two. It returned to Britain in 1881, where it remained until 1894. It then travelled to 
a series of one and two year po stings to Malta, Hong Kong, and Singapore, and 
returned again to Britain in 1900. It was sent back out to Malta in 1902. The 2011 
was in Britain from 1867 to 1872. It was sent to two and three year po stings in 
Bermuda, Nova Scotia, and Cyprus, returning to Britain in 1880. Its next 
deployments were to Crete in 1899, Malta in 1901, and Gibraltar in 1902. 
What of deployments east of India, or west of Africa? Looking again at 
tables 2 through 5, these deployments do not correlate with whether a battalion was 
ever posted to either India or Africa between 1870 and 1898. Aden and Mauritius 
are noted separately in the tables below; because of the relatively high percentage of 
battalions whose only posting to SE Asia was one of these locations. 
Of all the 126 battalions that were posted to India, 61 (48.4%) were also 
posted to points further east, not including those that went only to Aden or Mauritius. 
The first 25 regiments sent 45 to India, and 24 ofthose also went to SE and E Asia. 
Of the rest of the regiments, 81 battalions were posted to India, and 61 of these also 
went to Asia. Finally, of the 126 battalions that went to India, 94 were sent to 
po stings west of the Suez. Of these, 29 were from the first 25 regiments. Not 
surprisingly, a battalion that was posted to India had a 42% chance of going to SE 
Asia; better if the battalion was among the first 25 regiments. Such a battalion had 
an even better chance of being posted to the Mediterranean than to SE Asia, belying 
any west of the Suez/east of the Suez division of regiments (table 6). 
Chapter 3 
As with battalions that had been posted to India, battalions that had been 
posted to Africa were not precluded from serving east of the Suez, though the 
ljkelihood of such battalions of going to the Mediterranean was much better. 
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A battalion that was posted to India had a somewhat greater likelihood of 
also going to SE Asia than did a battalion posted to Africa, but this was reversed for 
E Asia; a battalion that was posted to Africa was slightly more likely to be posted to 
E Asia than a battalion that had at some time been posted to India (tables 3,5). A 
battalion posted to Africa had a better chance of going to both the Americas and the 
Mediterranean than a battalion that had been posted to India (tables 3, 5). 
SimplifYing tables 3 and 5 further (tables 6 and 7, respectively), it was true 
that a battalion posted to India was more likely to be posted to Asia than a battalion 
posted to Africa, but the difference was only a few per cent. It was also true that a 
battalion posted to Africa was somewhat more likely to be posted to the Americas or 
the Mediterranean, than was a battalion posted to India, but the likelihood in both 
cases was quite high. If po stings to Aden and Mauritius are included, they 
significantly increase the percentage of battalions that went to Africa that also went 
to SE Asia po stings by 27%, and battalions that went to India by 15% overall. 
Table 6: Derived from Table 3, as Percentages. 
India and ... Asia Americas and 
Mediterranean 
Regiments 1-25 57.7 (66.7)* 64.4 
Regiments 26- Rifle Brigade 45.7 (63.0)* 80.2 
All Regiments 48.4 (63.5)* 74.6 
Table 7: Derived from Table 5, as Percentages. 
Africa and ... Asia Americas and 
Mediterranean 
Regiments 1-25 33.3 (50)* 83.3 
Regiments 26- Rifle Brigade 52.0 (76)* 92 
All Regiments 45.9 (73)* 89.2 
.. 
*mcludmg Aden and Mauntlus. 
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In other words, except in the case of cross posting from India to Africa, there 
was no significant barrier for a battalion that was once posted to India to be posted to 
points west, or a battalion once posted to Africa to be posted to points east. 
Any' African' battalion may have been cross-posted east ofthe Suez, or an 
"Indian" battalion west, but did it get any experience in any wars eastwards? Of 
these 37 battalions the breakdown for the period 1870-98 was as follows: 
Table 8: "African" Battalions at War. 
Never went to war War only west War only east Both 
of the Suez of the Suez 
Regiments 1-25 4 4 0 4 
Regiments 26- 11 11 1 2 
Rifle Brigade 
All 15 15 1 6 
Table 9: "Indian" Battalions at War. 
N ever went to war War only west War only east Both 
of the Suez of the Suez 
Regiments 1-25 11 6 20 8 
Regiments 26- 36 17 21 7 
Rifle Brigade 
All 47 23 41 15 
For an officer trying to improve his career prospects by being involved in a 
war, these are disappointing charts. It was relatively uncommon for any regiment, as 
opposed to a battalion, not to have seen at least one war in the years 1870 to 1898. 
Of all battalions, 52 of 142, of which 14 were from the first 25 regiments, (keeping 
in mind that 7912 was raised in 1897) saw no war before the South African war of 
1899. In other words, more than one third of all the line battalions have no 
experience of war for nearly thirty years. However, in terms of regiments, only 10 
out of 69 saw no wars in this period. On average, a regiment saw 1.9 ±1.4 wars from 
1870 to 1902, not including the South African war. The odds, if one were in the first 
25 regiments, were slightly better than if one were in the rest of the regiments (2 ± 
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1.0 versus 1.8 ±1.6). There are few wars to attend in a 30-year career, if an officer 
remained with his regiment. 
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The above officer's options can also be seen in terms of battalion-years; that 
is, like man-hours, how many total years of po stings there were. From 1870 through 
1898, there were 4091 battalion-years of po stings. In that time there were (to the 
nearest year) 251 battalion-years of war. In other words, of all the years all the 
battalions were posted, only 6% were war years. Compare this to the years the army 
was at war in South Africa from late 1899 through the spring of 1902. In these four 
calendar years there were 568 battalion-years of po stings. If the honours are taken at 
face value (i.e., a battalion has honours for 1899-1902), and considering that was 3 
years of war, there were 232 battalion-years of war in these 4 years. A more 
conservative estimate, taking the number of years a battalion was posted to Africa, 
according to the army lists, results in 189 battalion-years of war. There was also one 
battalion-year each of war in Egypt (1899) and China (1900). Thus, from 1870-
1902, between 43% and 48% of all battalion years at war were in the South African 
war alone. Little wonder that officers pulled every string they could to get to this 
war and this uncommon opportunity to fight. 
Lord Roberts, in evidence before the commission on the South African war, 
felt that it was important for the officers to spend part of their careers overseas, a on 
the grounds that taught them to be effective in war. 
.. .it is not in England, however, that our officers are trained, but in India, in 
Egypt, and in Eastern and Western Africa. It is there that they become 
familiar with war, accustomed to command and to organise, and to adapt 
their means to their end ... Our campaigns for the last 20 years show the value 
of this training. In Burma, Uganda, Ashantee, and on the North-west Frontier 
of India, and in Egypt, our unbroken success has been due in great part to the 
energy and ability of the younger officers.48 
General Sir Grove agreed with the importance of overseas experience and combat. 
The performance of the ordinary regimental duties in peace does not give a 
man a chance of showing whether he is very much better than other people. 
It is not until you come to active service that you can find that out, and on e 
of the greatest difficulties of promotion and of selection is the fact that we are 
not always on active service. If we were the thing would be simplicity itself. 
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There is not difficulty whatever in selecting a man, as far as I know, on active 
service. In war a good man gets pushed on very quickly, because you have 
the chance of really judging his qualifications; but in peace you have not the 
same opportunities for testing and judging a man.49 
The army was always on active service, but not every officer was. The current 
solution of regular, realistic training for all ranks did not yet exist. Scheduling 
small wars for the convenience of her Majesty's officers' careers in lieu of training 
had its limitations. Small wars do not have the uniformity or universality of realistic 
training - wherein everybody attends the same scripted battles, and the same scripted 
wars. On the other hand, militaries suffer from the unique position among 
professions, of mostly training in their profession rather than actually doing it. 
Fighting a war is doing, not practicing; it's the difference between a heart surgeon 
who has done bypasses for ten years and a heart surgeon just out of residency, or 
who has done no bypasses for a decade. A war fought by a professional corps is (or 
should be) able to put the theory, the class and field education, and the exercises, into 
practice. It is a demonstration of expertise, an application of their professional 
education. It is also a test: is the expertise that was taught correct? Relevant? For 
30 years the British ad-hoc system of on the job training was good enough. 
Because oflocalisation, and budgetary parsimony, it was too expensive to 
move troops down to Aldershot for higher levels of training, and recruiting was such 
that recruits were mostly sent overseas. Given that last issue, it is questionable 
whether sufficient bodies could have been collected from battalions other than those 
being built up for overseas deployment to proceed with large-scale manoeuvres. 
Small scale training at home could not have been especially productive, since a 
quarter of regimental officers might be away from regimental duties, and the ranks 
tasked to fatigues, there were few officers to train the men, and too few men with 
which to teach the junior officers. 50 
Following the Prussian lead in introducing large-scale manoeuvres, Cardwell 
ordered manoeuvres for 1871, but manoeuvres on a large scale ended with the 
manoeuvres of 1873 because they were considered to be too costly and possibly also 
due to the difficulties of dealing with landowners. Despite further bills for 
manoeuvres in 1875 and 1882, it was not until 1898, when Salisbury plain was 
bought for the purpose oflarge formation training, that large-scale manoeuvres were 
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possible. Prior to this, manoeuvres had to be conducted at Aldershot, and it was not 
suitable for setting large units against each other.51 Manoeuvres at a smaller scale 
had resumed in 1890.52 Training at a large scale, however, was possible at some of 
the larger garrisons in India.53 The largest formation training at Aldershot was the 
brigade manoeuvres that started at the end of June. The other training conducted 
there was route marches, to the scale of brigades, field duty training, and target 
shooting by halfbattalions.54 Aldershot also suffered from its proximity to London, 
as some officers were keener to catch the train to London than to properly finish the 
training day.55 This was still a problem in 1898, when that year's manoeuvres ended 
daily in time for the London theatre and local socialising.56 Because of this the 
exercise was criticised for being a series of field days, rather than one long exercise. 
Although the manoeuvres of 1898 were the largest since 1873, setting two corps and 
2 cavalry brigades against each other, the event was criticised for the use of 
antiquated tactics, lazy reconnaissance due to over-familiarity with the ground, and 
lack of corps level command, as generals tried to command each battalion directly. 
Due to budgetary constraints, the exercise the following year was held at both the 
Curragh, where Roberts oversaw individual training and close attacks, and at 
Aldershot, where the larger scale manoeuvres were conducted, and where much the 
same criticisms were made as the previous year. Also at Aldershot, General Buller, 
who had not held a field command in twelve years, abruptly ended the manoeuvres 
with an unsuccessful assault. 
Colonel Henderson's comments, that these manoeuvres indicated that 
officers needed to be trained in independent command and that formal formations 
were being over-used, suggest that these newly resumed manoeuvres, being very 
unlike the wars that the army experienced, had significant limitations as a substitute 
for experience in the colonial wars in which the army had hitherto fought. 57 That 
being so, it could hardly be used as a way to estimate an officers merit when it came 
to promotion the way competence in battle could, or have the direct comparability of 
a score on an exam. Neither were the two years oflarge-scale manoeuvres sufficient 
training for the South African war. Large-scale manoeuvres did not teach officers 
how to fight a guerrilla war, or to manoeuvre troops in mapless territory for months 
against enemies who they had never before encountered. Exercises are oflittle use if 
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they are not realistic. And the realism of even the exercises of European armies was 
not ideal. Reports on foreign manoeuvres noted the trust in the offensive force of the 
line and a low estimation of probable casualties. 58 A war is useful as a means by 
which the umpires can gauge the effectiveness of a particular tactic, or how great the 
need for its crisp implementation, the effect of coordination between units and 
branches, or the lack thereof, or to estimate realistic casualties. One of the results of 
the South African war was an abrupt shift in the British perception of the quality of 
continental manoeuvres, because it showed British officers how much war had 
drifted from the assumptions of European exercises. The greater the drift, the more 
exercises not only do not teach lessons in fighting wars, but teach false lessons. 
Some samples of British commentary on European manoeuvres after the South 
African War: 
The tactics employed by the French infantry during these manoeuvres could 
only be regarded with amazement after the lessons of the Boer war. To put 
the matter shortly, the formations adopted and the methods of attack were 
almost precisely those used by the Germans at the commencement of the war 
of 1870. Various reasons have been assigned for the retention at manoeuvres 
of a method of warfare which fills British officers with astonishment. The 
principal reason given is that the manoeuvres in France are only meant as an 
exercise for the higher commanders in the concentration and moving of large 
bodies of troops, as a test of organisation, &c., and that no attempt is made 
during manoeuvres, when once the troops come in contact, to practice troops 
in the methods of fighting they should adopt in war. .. ,,59 
It should be stated that, as the [French] assailants approached the objective, 
the defenders, who had usually been kneeling until then, rose up and 
advanced to meet them. The absurd spectacle was then witnessed of the 
attackers and defenders standing opposite one another at about 150 yards 
(both usually in two ranks) and firing as fast as the magazine would allow. 
Comment on such tactics is needless.6o 
In the report on the Imperial Manreuvres of 1900 .. .it was stated that there 
was no sign of any change in the German tactics due to any experience 
gained by the war in South Africa. It is true that the formations of infantry in 
the firing line in 1901 were a trifle less dense than in 1900, but the most 
which can be said of this is, that this year the formations were more 
according to regulation ... none of these armies [German, French, Russian] 
have fought under modem conditions. It remains to be proved how far the 
best disciplined continental troops will stand if suddenly exposed to heavy 
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fire, coming, perhaps, from points difficult at first to locate owing to the use 
of smokeless powder. .. ,,61 
The South African war changed how Britain ran exercises, at least for a few 
years. Nonetheless, by 1904 Lord Roberts expressed fear that the British army was 
losing its collective memory of the lessons of the South African War. 62 
War service could be of significant advantage to an officer's career. It could 
get him noticed by one of the rings and remembered for the next conflict, and result 
in brevet promotions and medals. Speaking again of General Sir Ian Hamilton, 
service in Egypt garnered him not only campaign experience but also a mention in 
dispatches, medals and the rank of brevet major.63 Notice from Lord Roberts in the 
1879 Afghanistan war for his bravery and competence resulted in a mention in 
dispatches and a commission for Colour-Sergeant, later Major General Sir, Hector 
MacDonald.64 For his services in the Ashanti war, then Lieutenant Colonel Evelyn 
Wood received the order of Companion of the Bath and a brevet rank of colonel. 65 
War service could also be quite lucrative. Roberts picked up a formal thanks, a 
GCB,2 swords of honour, an honorary degree, a baronetcy, and 12,500 for his 
successful campaign during the Second Afghan war in 1879.66 On the whole, senior 
officers like Buller, Brackenbury and Wolseley thought advancing in rank was more 
valuable than medals, but regardless, the higher the knightly order or peerage, the 
better.67 
War service alone was not a guarantee of continued advancement, though. 
The officers who commanded at Rorkes Drift, during the Zulu war, Lieutenant John 
Rouse Merriot Chard, RE and Lieutenant Gonville Bromhead, commanding B 
company of the 24th Foot, both collected Victoria Crosses and promotions to brevet 
major, but they did not collect the approving eye ofWolseley, who felt that, given 
the options, they had little choice but to fight. 68 Even more advantageous than 
combat experience was combat experience plus the notice of one of the rings. 
War service also had its disadvantages. In testimony before the commission 
on South Africa, Major General Sir Bruce Hamilton stated, 
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Until the South African war the choice of Generals was limited to those who 
had been lucky enough as youngsters to go to some small war - because the 
only promotion that could be obtained at all was by getting a brevet for active 
service, and it could not be got for anything else but active service. The 
present system of reward by brevet produces false situations, and is very 
irregular in its effect, giving some men eight years advantage and others none 
at all. Many good officers now leave the Army because they have no 
prospects, who would remain if they saw a chance of advancing themselves 
by proved efficiency.69 
There was another, more serious, and sometimes terminal, disadvantage. Perceived 
lack of competence or bravery could destroy a career, or lives. The reputations of 
senior and respected officers, such as General Sir Redvers Buller and Lieutenant 
General Lord Methuen, were destroyed by the South African war. Captain, later 
Major General Sir, Charles Townshend, who very successfully commanded the 
forces besieged at Chitral fort in 1894, gaining a CB and a brevet majority from the 
experience, later also commanded, having just been promoted major general, the far 
less successful siege at Kut-al-Amara in World War eo During the Zulu war of 
1879, a supply column in laager under the command of Captain David Moriarty was 
attacked at Myer's Drift. Lieutenant Henry Howard, camped on the other side ofthe 
drift, had formed a defence with Colour-Sergeant Henry Booth. The lieutenant then 
rode to Luneburg, five miles away, to inform Major Tucker, commanding the 
garrison there that (according to the later testimony of the major) the laager had been 
destroyed. Major Tucker and a mounted detachment found the sergeant and forty 
other troops still holding out. The sergeant was later awarded a Victoria Cross, and 
the lieutenant was court-martialled. Other officers in that war who were perceived to 
have acted in a cowardly manner were sent home for medical reasons, court-
martialled, or transferred out of combat command.7! One of these officers was the 
unfortunate Lieutenant Jaheel Carey. He chose to join the French prince imperial, 
Louis Napoleon, who had been tasked to sketch the ground that Lord Chelmsford 
columns were to march over the following day. The prince imperial's daring and 
enthusiasm had already thoroughly alarmed the senior officers who were responsible 
for his continued good health. Lord Chelmsford, commanding the expedition, 
therefore tasked him with sketching terrain presumed to be safe. These officers, and 
the prince's guard, encountered 40 Zulu'S, who killed the prince and 3 ofthe 7 
guards. Lieutenant Carey, having lived to report, was court-martialled for 
(e;-irme L IvIahaiTey Chapter 3 96 
misbehaviour in the face of the enemy. The charge was eventually dropped due to 
pressure from the empress Eugenie, but his career was finished. 72 During the 
rebellion in Manipur in 1891, the political agent, the chief commissioner and the 
commander of the Indian forces were murdered while attempting to parlay. The two 
junior officers remaining failed to show the requisite leadership, so the wife of the 
political agent, Ethel Grimmond, led the forces out. She was rewarded with the 
Royal Red Cross and a lifetime pension. The officers were cashiered.73 
It was also possible to gain combat experience outside the limits of the wars 
that the line armies were involved in, though there is no evidence in these examples 
to support the possibility that these sorts of opportunities furthered a line officer's 
career. An officer could join the Indian Army. Sir Percy Cox, later the Political 
Resident in the Persian Gulf, first gained attention with the Bombay Staff Corps 
when he successfully commanded a force of Somalis in an expedition against a 
rebelling tribe in 1895.74 There were numerous expeditions to be had with the 
Punjabi frontier force. 75 The Royal Niger constabulary fought the Niger-Sudan 
campaign of 1897 against the Fulani Emirates with seconded regimental officers.76 
The War Office allowed line officers to serve on the Bechuanaland Border Police 
when it helped occupy Mashonaland in 1890-91 as part of plans by the British South 
Africa Company to control Bechuanaland.77 Until his failure at Kut-al-Amara, 
Townshend saw active service with the Gordon relief expedition and the Hunza-
Naga expedition, served in several regiments, both infantry and cavalry, in the Indian 
army, commanded a Sudanese battalion under Kitchener in Egypt, took a staff 
appointment in India, and was the military attache to Paris - yet it was not until 
World War 1 that he gained field rank.78 
The scale of po stings to Britain and India loom large in the years 1870-1902, 
as does the South African war of 1899-1902. Though po stings to Britain as a 
percentage of all po stings were slowly losing ground, about 45% of all battalions are 
posted there at anyone time. Excepting short posting lengths that were the result of 
wars, the average length of po stings was increasing overall until the South African 
wars and other wars in the 1890's. Though the stated policy, according to a 
memorandum of 1880, was that the infantry were being sent abroad for 12 years, the 
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number of battalions with longer po stings was already rising.79 Critical po stings 
were always covered, but less critical ones were not. The first 25 regiments were 
somewhat more likely to go to India than the rest of the regiments, but these latter 
regiments were somewhat favoured for the Mediterranean and South Asia. 
Battalions that were posted to India generally did not get posted to Africa, and vice 
versa, though there was no bar to either ofthese groups of battalions from serving in 
other regions. An officer could generally stay overseas, if that were his choice, 
without leaving his regiment, but ifhe intended to travel somewhere in particular, 
some regiments were more suitable than others. 
In terms of war experience, the South African war overshadows all other 
wars combined. The amount of war experience in this war alone nearly matches, to 
the nearest year, the total number of war years in the 29 years previous. For all that 
there were many small colonial wars in this period the wars were small. Almost 
every battalion saw at least one war in these 29 years, but two wars in 29 years for a 
regiment still means little experience of war for the members of the regiment. The 
first 25 regiments were somewhat favoured in terms of having more years of war, 
but they were not favoured to go to every war over the rest of the regiments. The 
battalions sent to any war tended to be a mix of home, overseas and battalions near 
the war zone. An officer desirous of war experience for the sake of his advancement 
would not reliably be able to do so within his regiment, and would have to be 
seconded or transferred to a battalion that was going to a war, or to the wartime staff. 
Thus the "rings", and the patronage they offered, became important and persisted 
because they solved this problem for enough ambitious officers. While not an 
optimal solution by modem standards, the rings provided a means by which 
demonstrated professional merit could be rewarded. In addition, the desperation of 
officers to obtain combat command demonstrates the importance of combat 
experience in the British officer's conception of the nature of professionalism. 
Officers without combat command experience needed to support their careers 
through patronage connections or staff experience, while officers with all three 
supports were usually on a fast track to high rank. 
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That combat experience was central to British officer's concept of their 
profession is in no way surprising. What is noteworthy was that, with field 
manoeuvres rare to absent, it was the primary means for officers not already blessed 
with connections to patrons to gain those connections. The other means open was 
staff positions, which were increasingly closed to officers who had not passed Staff 
College. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Education and Promotion 
l02 
Abolition of purchase did not create a new fonn of professional advancement 
to replace purchase. A system of "seniority tempered by selection" was advocated, 
but this general policy did not have legislation or organisation to implement it. 
There was no clear system of career progression that supported both seniority within 
regiments, and also selection by merit, as criteria for professional advancement. 
Initially classroom education was not linked to promotion, being seen as something 
to be obtained at the beginning of one's career, just as in the civilian professions. 
From the end of purchase, the Royal Military College served this purpose for the line 
infantry, while higher education was supported by the Staff College. Under the 
initiative of the government in the 1870s, promotion examinations were instituted for 
regimental officers. Thus education was directly linked to promotion up through the 
rank of major, but not above. Staff positions, however, were increasingly closely 
linked to passing Staff College - and staff positions were a faster promotion track 
than waiting for an opening within the regiment's seniority track. In this roundabout 
manner, education became increasingly, though not inextricably, linked with 
promotion between 1870 and 1902. 
In all three elements of the education system, coursework tended to be 
narrowly focused on directly military knowledge, rather than liberal arts, and 
increasingly focused on classroom studies, rather than practical outdoor lessons. 
When the South African War ended, however, education came under criticism, as 
with many other elements of the anny, and the Akers-Douglas Committee was 
created to examine the education system. 
Most of the infonnation for this chapter does not distinguish between cavalry 
and infantry because the source material does not do so, and this should be kept in 
mind when looking at the numbers, though cavalry officers were a relatively small 
proportion ofthe officers. The documents mostly used here are the five-yearly 
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reports by the Director-General for Education, which end, for no clear reason, in 
1892; and, for the RMC, the yearly Board of Visitors inspection reports. There is 
relatively little by way of internal unpublished memoranda or reports. This chapter 
covers the three elements of the educational system in the order an officer usually 
encountered them. 
1. The Royal Military College 
Significant changes were made in the operation and function of Sandhurst in 
the decade following the Royal Commission on Military Education of 1868, also 
known as the Dufferin Commission. After some early false starts, either an 
education at Sandhurst or entry from the militia system (after passing an exam) 
became the prerequisite for a commission. The course requirements were under 
irregular modification throughout the 1880's and 1890's. Various changes were 
made to the entrance exams and to the course content, and minimum required final 
grades were lowered and later raised. Concern was expressed in the 1880' s as to 
whether the milieu at the RMC was appropriate to the social and professional 
education of the cadets. It also appears that the quality of education declined, 
particularly in the 1890's. 
As a result of the abolition of purchase, as of 15th December 1870, Royal 
Military College, Sandhurst ceased to be a place where commissions could be 
obtained, as all commissions were obtained by direct examination, resulting in a sub-
lieutenancy. Therefore either RMC Sandhurst had to be closed, or a new role found 
for it in the post-purchase army. Initially, it was envisioned that the RMC would 
exist for the military education of sub-lieutenants who had already briefly served 
with their regiments. I This was found to be unworkable within a few years, and in 
the mid through late 1870' s, the RMC' s structure and purpose, as with the other 
educational elements, was modified. The key change was that commissions would 
only be granted upon successful completion of the course at the RMC. Thus the 
RMC would serve as the first exposure to the military, and to the knowledge an 
officer was expected to have, for candidates seeking commissions, while the militia 
served as an alternate route. For the army, these training programs and the exams 
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were means to screen prospective officers. As such, it was somewhat difficult to 
pass the entrance exam and gain admission to RMC, but it was also very rare to fail 
RMC course, a pattern that prevailed at the Staff College as well. 
Students attending Sandhurst increasingly came from the public schools, 
from 12% in 1883 to 55.4% in the years 1896 to 1900, and to 62% during the South 
African war? The public school system was increasingly closely tied to officer 
education over the later nineteenth century. But it was also closely, and increasingly, 
tied to the education of the professional classes in genera1. The public schools 
catered to the professional classes and the government service. The gentry existed as 
a minority, and the vast majority of them sent their sons to Eton.3 Thus, the ideals of 
the public schools were not the ideals of the aristocracy, but of the professional 
middle classes. The emphasis on character in the public schools ofthe time was 
itself a reform from earlier practice: 
The whole system came to be aimed not a socializing a leisured class for a life 
of cultured idleness and aristocratic field sports (the individual sports of 
hunting, shooting, and fishing), but at forming an active, responsible, 
physically fit, self-disciplined elite of professional men and administrators for 
public service in church and state, the empire and the liberal professions.4 
The concept of a gentleman was redefined to suit the professional ethos: a 
gentleman was "honest, upright, considerate and dedicated to the service of his 
fellows and his country"; he had "manners, a classical education, manliness, 
courage, self-sacrifice, loyalty, duty".5 Latin was reconceived as a means to teach 
"the history, literature, philosophy and politics of the model ruling elites of the 
ancient world.,,6 The emphasis on character was not distinct from a desire to instil a 
sense of vocation, as Harries-Jenkins would have it, but aligned with it. 7 As the 
army drew from the public schools, and made them, in the 1870's, a prerequisite, not 
a substitute, for further specialised training at Sandhurst, before commissions were 
granted, it aligned itself with the behaviour of the other professions. In this, the 
education of officer candidates was very distant from the one criticised in the 
Dufferin Commission, from which Harries Jenkins draws most of his material on this 
topic. In fact, Harries-Jenkins appears to be completely unaware that there was any 
change in the British officer education system between the Dufferin report and the 
Akers-Douglas Commission. 
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Harries Jenkins decries the significant influence that the public school system 
had on the content of these entrance exams, and their emphasis on character training 
and a liberal education, as opposed to the Prussian Realschule education, whose 
more varied curriculum was designed to meet the needs of future 
professionals in the Civil Service, industry and commerce .... Success in these 
fields was dependent on entrants having undergone a preliminary education 
and training process which prepared them for this sense ofvocation.8 
However, as mentioned earlier, the situation in Prussia was not ideal; about 
a third of officer candidates had a substandard education from the cadet schools that 
themselves emphasised the development of character, while the Realschule 
requirement could be waived, and an increasing number of candidates were applying 
with the higher standard of the Abitur.9 It was the British Civil Service 
Commissioners, who administered the entrance exams, who advocated an entrance 
examination based on "those branches of a liberal education which are most directly 
useful in the military profession" and "those which are most commonly taught in 
ordinary places of English education, and especially in the great public schools". I 0 
Certainly the Headmasters Conference had increasing input from 1881 and 
advocated the importance of modem languages over the sciences. I I But the 
increasing influence of the public school system on the entrance exams was the 
product of a specific recommendation of the Dufferin Commission that the army 
should recruit directly from the public schools.I2 
Upon gaining commissions as sub-lieutenants, and being sent to their 
regiments, the new officers were expected to learn regimental orderly duties for 
commanding guards, basic field exercises, rifle drill, the principles of musketry, the 
Queen's Regulations and Orders as it applied to subalterns and to being a member of 
a court-martial, and regulations regarding pay, messing and supply of the troops and 
the prescribed method of carrying kit. These were much the same exam subjects, 
less field exercises, that were required of lieutenants transferring from the militia 
some years later. On acquiring a certificate, stating they knew these subjects from 
their commanding officer, they were expected to go to the RMC for their 
education. I3 
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However, the new system of sending sub-lieutenants to the RMC did not 
begin until 15th January 1873.14 In the meantime, to bridge the two-year gap in 
implementation, 200 men who had passed the direct examination for commission in 
1871 and 1872, and were waiting to be sent to regiments, joined the RMC in two 
classes for a year's instruction each in fortification, military drawing, military 
history, tactics, drill and riding. Of these, 162 passed the final exam. IS Because they 
already had their commissions, many officers saw no reason to put a great deal of 
effort into their studies. 16 General Sir Ian Hamilton was one of these. He wrote in 
his memoirs that, "During the year 1872, it was easier to shirk work and to get away 
with it than at any other period during the history of the Royal Military College.,,17 
Due to the reduction of subalterns in April 1870, and the need to absorb a 
large number of supernumerary officers, the exams held from 1870 to 1872 were for 
Queen's Cadets, Indian Cadets and Household Troops only. It was from these that 
the 200 men were drawn, out of808 candidates, of which 572 qualified. 18 It was 
found, however, that vacancies occurred sooner than expected, and the open 
competitive exams for commissions began in May 1873.19 Around 72% of the 2662 
candidates from 1873 to 1875 passed these exams, of which 42,46 and 29 per cent, 
respectively, gained commissions in the line, guards and cavalry (these groups not 
being separated in the statistics). Additionally, 394 militia lieutenants attempted the 
exam, of which 184 "passed for commissions" and 130 candidates from the 
universities applied for the 72 vacancies that were allotted them?O 
Three separate classes of 10.5 months (including holidays) ran each year, 
starting 15 January, 1 May and 1 September. The initial course of instruction 
covered "purely military subjects", that is, Queen's Regulations, military law, 
tactics, fortification, military drawing, and riding?1 In 1876 this already very 
practical course syllabus was changed to include Queen's Regulations and Orders for 
the Army, including regimental interior economy and accounts and correspondence, 
military law, elements of tactics, field fortification and the elements of permanent 
fortification, military topography and reconnaissance, and infantry and field artillery 
drill, riding, and gymnastics?2 
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A synopsis of the course of instruction suggests an education eminently 
suited to small units with no maps. Field fortification included lectures on artillery 
pieces and their projectiles, types of basic field works and obstacles and the drawing 
of plans, profiles, and time needed to build them, lines of entrenchment and the 
building of bridges. The students were expected to construct some basic field works, 
including a shelter trench, a palisade, and a revetment, trace and profile works on 
hills, and make several kinds of bridges. They were also expected to draw various 
plans and profiles ofVauban fortress works, plan an entrenchment for a bridge and 
the defence of a post. 23 
In military topography, the sub-lieutenants were expected to draw sections 
and contours, use scale drawing tools, use compass and triangulation, make field 
records, and field map sketches with and without instruments. Attention was to be 
paid in these efforts to the quality of the roads for the purposes of supply and 
transport, and a detailed appraisal of the terrain, including reference to the soil, 
rivers, woods, marshes, defiles and "specialities" on a scale of 12 inches to the mile. 
The same was to be done for a river, including notes of breadth, depth, current 
channels, banks, bridges, fords, ferries, navigation, and surrounding country. The 
students were expected to make maps of a maximum of a three quarter square mile 
piece of ground, and ofthe Blackwater River near the RMc.24 
Tactics included a discussion of information and security, including issues of 
mobility, concentration of forces and supply. The cadets were also lectured on the 
duties, size, and placement of outposts, sentries, piquets and patrols, the composition 
and strength of the reserve and how far the covering outposts should be from the 
force, how to reconnoitre, organise a march, a convoy, and the duties and structure 
and placement of advanced and rear guards. They were also instructed on the nature 
of the ground and its relation to concealment, movement, and how it affected the 
concealment, movement and action of the three arms. Finally, they were also taught 
the defence and attack of rivers, defiles, villages, and woods. All of this was based 
on three texts: Field Exercises, The Soldier's Pocketbook by W olseley and Minor 
Tactics by Clery?5 
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Under the heading of military law, the cadets were taught the mutiny act, the 
articles of war, and the basics of courts-martial, and courts of inquiry and boards. In 
terms of the elements of military administration, the cadets were taught the Queen's 
Regulations and Orders as they referred to the duties of a company officer and on the 
interior economy of a company and a battalion, the basic rules of enlistment, the 
periods of service and discharges of soldiers, the organisation of the British army, 
including reserves and auxiliaries, and the same for the armies of Prussia, France, 
Austria and Russia?6 Much ofthe practical work was as applicable to colonial 
warfare as European, though on the theoretical side, all ofClery's examples were of 
European warfare?7 
Successful completion of the final exam led to promotion to the rank of 
lieutenant. As an incentive, it was initially decided that the officers' commissions as 
lieutenants were to be antedated by a maximum of two years for first class passes 
and that these officers would be exempt from further examination in the above 
subjects for their later promotions. The final exam had to be passed within 3 years, 
shortened to two by 1876, ofthe date of commission, or the officer would be 
removed from the service.28 
By 1875 it was plain that sending commissioned officers to a years' course 
was not workable. Junior officers were taken away from regimental duties to attend 
Sandhurst or garrison classes, and the practice of antedating commissions on the 
basis of how high a junior officer passed out of Sandhurst added yet more 
complexity to determining regimental seniority, a system that already had to 
accommodate militia officers entering as lieutenants, purchase lieutenants making 
exchanges and non-commissioned officers promoted to lieutenant.29 
A number of changes occurred, mostly in the period of the late 1870s through 
to the early 1880s. In 1876 the War Office took control of education at the RMC 
from the civilian board of commissioners that had been supervising it and handed it 
over to its own Sandhurst committee. This ended the brief period of civilian control 
that had been started on the recommendation of the Dufferin commission on 
education in 1869.30 This brought education back under exclusive purview of the 
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military, which allowed the War Office greater opportunity to manipulate the 
officers' education at Sandhurst for the needs ofthe army. New regulations for the 
RMC were drawn up in 1875 that would continue to allow sub-lieutenants to obtain a 
military education there until 1877 , but thereafter the RMC would educate only 
successful candidates in the competitive examination for admission. Commissions 
would be granted only upon successful completion of the course and the final exam, 
as had been the case before the Dufferin commission. Significant modifications 
were made to the entrance exams, and some changes were made in the course 
content. The number of classes running each year was shortened to two, with terms 
running from 10 February to 30 July and from 10 September to 15 December, and a 
new class was admitted at the beginning of each term. Minimum final exam grades 
were lowered, but were later raised. Also, the cadet establishment dropped to 200 by 
1883, but then rose throughout the 1880's to an eventual establishment of360 in 
1889, and for the most part remained that high throughout the 1890's.31 
The question of whether the atmosphere at the RMC was appropriate to the 
education, professional and social, ofthese cadets, came up repeatedly in the 
education reports. 
The students must be young men, whose commissions shall be entirely 
dependent on their conduct while at the Royal Military College. Having 
successfully competed before the Civil Service Commissioners in the 
subjects a fair knowledge of which is held in the public schools of the 
country to constitute the education of a gentleman, they must also prove by 
their professional acquirements and habits of discipline while at a 
Government Institution, such as that at Sandhurst, that they are in all respects 
fitted to hold commissions in Her Majesty's Service, before they can be 
gazetted to them.32 
This issue of the cadet's conduct came under discussion in the 1878 Board of 
Visitors inspection report, when General J. W. Fitzmayer expressed concern that the 
discipline of the cadets was insufficient and their personal luxuries too great.33 
General Napier, then Governor of the RMC, replied to these accusations (as did 
Major-General John Adye, the Governor ofRMA), 
Sir James Fitzmayer's reminiscences carry him back half a century to the 
days in which he was a cadet, and he fails to see that a system which was 
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very good for boys of 13 or 14 years of age is quite unsuited to young men of 
from 17 to 24. We must move with the times, and whatever may be the 
private feelings of a man at the head of a college he cannot indulge them. 
For myselfI would willingly prohibit smoking and billiards in the College, 
but I know what the consequence would be. The public-houses and public 
billiard tables would either be crowded with cadets or we should have to 
resort to the former plan of setting sergeants to watch and report them. 
It must always be remembered that Sandhurst is no longer a school 
for boys in which they are to be trained and coerced and watched like 
children, but an institution to which young men about to enter the army, 
whose general education is finished and whose habits and character are 
already formed, resort for one short year, to be instructed in certain military 
subjects before joining their regiments. The object is to teach them these 
subjects, not to worry and torment them with "spartan" rules of discipline, so 
long as their conduct is correct and gentlemanlike.34 
It appears that the views of Napier and Adye prevailed. The 1880 board of visitors 
were of the opinion that, 
In consequence of the more advanced age of the Cadets on entering the 
College [18, versus that ofRMA cadets who had entered 2 years earlier], the 
Authorities deemed it expedient to place them on a somewhat different 
footing to that of the Woolwich Cadets. At Sandhurst the Cadets dine late, 
and are allowed a moderate amount of wine for dinner, for which they pay. 
The punishments are similar to those in use among the undergraduates of the 
Universities; and in short it is recognised that the Cadets have passed into the 
stage of life when they can no longer be dealt with as boys, but must be 
treated as young men who are undergoing a short professional training 
previously to their being commissioned as officers of Her Majesty's 
Service.35 
The issue of the atmosphere at the college was brought up by the Report of the 
Committee on Military Educational Establishments of 1888, also known as the 
Harris committee, which felt that the mess arrangements, while suitable for officers, 
were "unnecessarily elaborate" for cadets and this directly interfered with the 
Sandhurst's purpose to "train future Officers to habits of work, discipline, and self-
control".36 This general issue was again raised in the early 1890's by the Board of 
Visitors, particularly with respect to the high out of pocket costs of extra messing as 
well as the messing system in general as being "unduly extravagant", and the 
increasing popularity of the expensive sport ofpolo.37 There had been repeated 
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prodding by the boards of the middle 1880's to repair recreational facilities such as 
the racquet court, to add lighting for the riding school, and to add a lavatory and 
dressing room for the gymnasium, but it is not clear from the visitors' reports 
whether these changes were ever made.38 According to General C. G. Arbuthnot, 
("Sandhurst, in my opinion, still suffers from the system introduced when it was 
converted into a school for young officers. Permission to keep horses and to run up 
bills to the extent of 2s. a day for extra messing, are, no doubt, relics of that 
system.,,39 
The Board ofthe early 1890's also increasingly commented on how the 
cadets were spending their free time. They objected to involvement in what were 
apparently regular dramatic performances, and felt that not enough time was being 
devoted to study.4o The condition of the internal economy ofthe RMC was such that 
the cadets were playing whist and billiards instead of studying because the 
government-supplied gaslight to their rooms was too poor to read and write by.41 
Polo was becoming popular (and expensive), and was disapproved of by the boards 
of 1891 and 1892, though not by the next board, probably due to a turnover in 
rnembers.42 The member ofthe 1891-92 board to be retained in the 1893 board 
(General C. G. Arbuthnot) continued to disapprove, adding, "Life at the College as 
well as the actual instruction must, no doubt, as stated in para. 7, be regarded as a 
preparation for the Cadet's future career in the Army, but an institution, at which, 
according to the same paragraph, unnecessary entertainments have to be provided to 
find occupation for the spare time, can scarcely be considered a good preparation for 
a career in which nowadays real advancement can only be counted on by those who 
devote themselves to the study of their profession.',43 It appears there was 
deterioration in the standards of studiousness, though not to the social life, at 
Sandhurst though the 1890s. 
The question of the atmosphere at the college is an important one. For those 
candidates not joining the army through service in the militia instead, this was their 
first experience of the military and military culture, and in particular, of the culture 
of the officer corps to which he was attempting to join; "the Cadets receive an 
insight into, and a training for regimentallife".44 Here was where he first learned 
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what his profession expected of him, both in tenns of his education, and in tenns of 
his social behaviour. For this reason the Harris committee opposed suggestions that 
early officer education could be done commercially, thereby saving the government 
money that could be then spent on other parts of the anny. "We do not think it is 
sufficient to look solely at an Officer's theoretical acquirements on being 
commissioned. We believe that the habits of discipline, of obedience to regulations 
and to orders are more surely acquired at establishments which are conducted on 
military principles than at those of a private character, and that the result is beneficial 
to the Officers themselves and to the service they join.,,45 
Yet many officers' memoirs barely mention their time in Sandhurst, before 
diving into a lengthy narrative of their early years in their regiment, its campaigns 
and its social life. It was the regiment that decided standards of behaviour such as 
how expensive the lifestyle was, and whether Staff College was a proper ambition 
for any of its officers. Harries-Jenkins' assertion that the officers who joined from 
the militia system did not go through any military socialisation, unlike the 
Sandhurst-derived officers because "their group experience was exclusively derived 
from their membership of a particular regiment", is an accusation that could as 
correctly be levelled at the entire officer COrpS.46 Part of an officer's professional 
socialisation happened at Sandhurst, or in the militia regiments, but not all of it. 
The instructors at Sandhurst were officers who chose to take a position 
teaching as openings occurred. The positions were neither well paid nor prestigious. 
The officer instructors were important, not only as instructors, but also as divisional 
officers, in charge of cadet supervision. "It is very necessary, too, ... that there 
should be persons to carry on from year to year the traditions ofthe place.,,47 But it 
was felt by the Harris committee of 1888 that the then arrangement of extra pay of 
£I 00 was sufficient to attract suitable officers for this duty.48 In 1885 an earlier 
committee had reported on why it was difficult to get and retain officer instructors: it 
was seen as a detriment to their career. The committee understood that the officers 
felt that first, accepting these appointments would prevent them from rejoining their 
regiments in case of war; second, that it damaged any claim they had to gain 
appointments on the staff and that being an instructor was itself a detriment to 
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gaining a staff appointment; and finally, that they lost social prestige in choosing to 
teach. The committee suggested corrections. An officer's time as an instructor 
should not be subtracted from any future five-years appointment on the staff, as was 
currently the case. Service as an instructor should be understood to be an additional 
qualification. After three years as an instructor, the officer would be considered 
eligible for the post of professor, and, finally, the selection of officers as instructors 
would be preferentially from those who had passed the Staff College.49 
Despite the opinion of the Harris committee, this problem had not been 
solved by the tum ofthe century when the Akers-Douglas Committee on the 
education of officers noted that it was still seen as a professional step down to take 
on the job of instructor, and a means to dodge routine regimental duty and the costs 
of regular regimental moves "which constitute such a serious tax upon the pocket of 
the married officer.,,5o However, Major-General Sir C. Grove said, in evidence 
before the commission on the war in South Africa, that it was difficult to find 
officers who were also good teachers. "You get decision, you get great quickness of 
action, you get self-reliance, you also get the habit of expecting what you direct to be 
done being done at once without argument, and that kind of thing, but you do not get 
the quiet patience required to develop another man's nature, and to train another 
man's mind.,,51 
This was a 10ng-tenn problem, while though addressed, was never fully 
resolved before the South African war. 
The divisional officers were supervising an establishment of cadets at the 
RMC that increased in 1878 to 300 per year. But, according to the third report on 
officer education in 1883, the supply of second lieutenants was not equal to the 
increased demand, due to the "exigencies of the Service" that is, the Afghanistan and 
Zulu wars and the threat of war with Russia. Cadets admitted from September 1877 
through May 1878 went through shortened courses, the May 1878 batch being 
acquired from unsuccessful candidates from the exams of the previous December. 
The February 1878 course was passed out at Easter of that year, without 
examination. 52 The establishment of cadets dropped temporarily in 1881 and 1882, 
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due to the need to absorb a large number of supernumerary officers. 53 However, 
there was again a large number of vacancies for junior line officers in 1883, so the 
establishment of cadets was raised again in September of 1883 from 200 to 250, 
from 250 to 300 in February of 1884 and on several occasions previously qualified, 
but not admitted, applicants were allowed entry. 54 The establishment was raised 
again from 300 to 360 in February 1889, on the recommendation ofthe Harris 
committee of 1888. This committee actually recommended raising it to 450, but it 
was aware that this was not financially feasible, because it required spending money 
on buildings. The Secretary of State objected to the related recommendation to add a 
third term if the number of cadets accepted annually were not increased (resulting in 
fewer graduates per year) because there was presently a high demand for officers for 
India. Looking at Chart 8 - Indian Establishment: Officers, the number of both line 
officers in India, and the number of officers in the British army in India generally, 
had been falling since 1873. In 1873 there were 1646 line officers in regiments in 
India and in 1882, 1400. In 1886 this number finally rose to 1484, but hovered 
around 1500 officers thereafter. As can be seen from Chart 6 - Home and Colonies 
Establishment: Officers, the number of line officers in Britain and the colonies had 
also fallen in 1882, to 2823 from a high in 1879 of 3378, and also failed to recover 
until the end of the century. 
The compromise recommendation of the 1880s was to raise the number of 
cadets accepted to 360, and to extend the course to 9 months, to match that ofthe 
RMA.55 These recommendations were applied within a year. 56 It was suggested in 
the fourth report of 1889 that the high demand for officers was beginning to end, and 
suggested that the best way to diminish the number of new officers would be to 
lengthen the course of instruction by six months, for a total of 14 months. In 
particular, it was thought this would add needed instruction time for fortification.57 
Considering that the number of officers in the line regiments had been quite flat in 
this period, the high demand for officers was due to high turnover. This may have 
been related to the expense of being a junior officer; under questioning by the 
commission on the South African war, General Sir Evelyn Wood placed the blame 
for the officer shortage on the need for a private income. 58 In 1891, notice was given 
that the course would be lengthened to 3 terms, and the number of candidates to be 
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admitted would lower to 120 per half year, resulting in 240 cadets passing out each 
year. 59 
At the same time, the age limit for candidates was dropped from 20 to 19, 
rather than let the graduating age rise. These changes had the advantage, from the 
point of view of the military educational authorities, of deterring candidates from 
spending the months that otherwise would exist between graduating from public 
school and applying for a commission with private tutors, that is, crammers.60 
However, from the visitors' reports, the actual establishment of students at the RMC 
during this decade tended to be reliably around 350, and never dropped below the 
315 who were attending in 1893.61 Throughout the 1880's, about 70% ofthe 
students had used crammers and this average only began to decline in the mid-1890s, 
sliding down to 52% in 1900.62 The use of crammers does strongly suggest, 
however, that the RMC entrance examinations were not a formality. 
The quota for university students remained stable at 24 each year for 2 
classes. The likelihood of open competition candidates passing was significantly 
lower, often less than 113 for around 700 to 1100 applicants each year up to 1891.63 
The evidence in the visitors' reports suggests cramming was common among 
candidates from the public schools.64 Major-General Dunsterville recalls this being 
the case. "At the time I am speaking of [1883], competition for Sandhurst was very 
severe, and the normal procedure was for a boy to finish his time at public school 
and then go for six months, or a year, to a crammer, and then take the exam.,,65 
However, the lengthening ofthe RMC course was also seen as an opportunity to 
limit further the entrance of university students. After 1891 they could no longer 
take the entrance exam direct from college, but had to join a militia or volunteer 
corps to learn drill, attend a school of instruction to get a certificate of proficiency 
and, finally, to qualify in the military subjects at the exams held for the militia.66 As 
well, the number of places offered university students would be dropped 
proportionally to 16.67 This was reflected in the number of university students at the 
college. While their numbers were generally above the quota from 1878 through 
1891, there were no university students as of 1895.68 This attitude was in noticeable 
contrast to the evidence later taken by the Akers-Douglas committee. The approval 
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of university candidates was "practically unanimous" by the military authorities, and 
the universities consulted were keen to comply with whatever educational 
requirements the War Office laid down. The committee therefore recommended that 
100 direct commissions be offered annually, of which 10 were for the Royal 
Artillery and the rest for the guards, cavalry, line infantry, and the Indian staff 
COrpS.69 The government was treating Sandhurst as a means to align the supply of 
officers to the demand of the regiments, treating the required quality of the 
candidates and the length of the education as the means to adjust the flow. 
In 1883 the Civil Service Commissioners, who administered the entrance 
exam, recommended changes they thought should be made in them. These 
recommendations were then passed on to the Conference of Head Masters of Public 
Schools, who made a separate set of recommendations. 70 By 1880, this conference 
had established itself as a significant lobby and a channel of communication between 
the military authorities and the public schools.71 Their recommendations, in fact, 
differed very little from that of the Civil Service Commissioners. The initial version 
of the entrance exam, as mentioned earlier, required that candidates took up between 
two and five of the following (excluding drawing): mathematics, English 
composition, English literature and history, Latin; Greek; French; German; 
experimental science; geography and geology; drawing.72 The Civil Service 
Commissioners recommended that the subjects be divided into three classes. 
Mathematics, Latin and French were to be made compulsory as class I subjects. 
Class II subjects were Greek, German, English History, higher mathematics, 
experimental science, and geography, of which candidates could choose one. 
Finally, class III subjects were English composition, geometrical drawing and 
freehand drawing, of which the first two were compulsory and the last optional. The 
Headmasters' Conference recommendations were similar in most particulars. Greek 
and German were taken out of class II and put in class I, of which candidates took up 
three subjects, of which one had to be a modem language, and all subjects in class 
three were to be optional.73 The latter would allow a candidate to take fewer subjects 
and, in particular, would allow him to avoid mathematics altogether. Latin and 
French were not, in either case, avoidable. The military chose something between 
the two in terms of subject class, but mostly favoured the Civil Service as to the 
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requirements, though mathematics remained safely avoidable. Class I was 
mathematics, Latin, French and German (catering to the choices of both groups) of 
which three were required, class II was Greek, higher mathematics, English history, 
experimental sciences, and physical geography and geology of which one was 
required. No more than four subjects could be taken in these two classes. Class III 
was as both agreed, and could be taken optionally in addition to the four required 
subjects.74 In 1890, however, the Civil Service Commissioners recommended that 
the grade value of colloquial French and German be halved from 400 to 200, though 
leaving the total weighting of these languages at 2000 each. In their opinion, an 
ability to converse for the 10 minutes of the oral exam weighed too much against the 
three-hour written exam and because it encouraged the candidates "to attain a 
superficial readiness in conversation to the neglect of what is of more fundamental 
importance in the accurate study ofthese languages.,,75 Ifthe oral examiner were 
stringent in his examination, 10 minutes would be sufficient to determine if the 
student was comfortable in the language. A written exam emphasises the ability to 
read the second language over speaking it. The use of both oral and written exams 
would have supported a more accurate judgement of the candidate's skill in a second 
language. The emphasis in the exams for oral skill also tended to militate against the 
desire of the military to get students directly from the public schools, in that the 
candidates tended to leave public school for schools on the continent to improve 
their language skills. The goal of all of these changes was to "discourage mere 
superficialism" and to ensure that they obtained well-educated cadets.76 The 
requirements for French and German seems reasonable given that much military 
literature was in these languages, and France, despite its loss to Germany, was still 
considered to be a military threat into the 1890's, but the requirement for Greek and 
Latin seems to have functioned as a filter favouring public school students and the 
classical education they offered. The problem with these exams, as pointed out by 
the 1902 Akers-Douglas Committee on the education of officers, was their quality, in 
that they failed to measure what they were intended to. The exams as written 
favoured regurgitation over retention, while aggregate grading favoured taking up as 
many subjects as possible, rather than taking the minimum number of subjects and 
obtaining good grades.77 It appears that, for all the discussion over the subjects of 
the exams, no effort was made to confirm the quality of the exam questions. 
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Whatever the quality of the exams may have been initially, as of the 1890s (being the 
period for which criticisms of junior officers would be relevant), they were not, in 
opinion of the Akers-Douglas Committee and its witnesses, passing candidates 
with the requisite general knowledge base. The focus on education provides an 
informative contrast to 1855, when junior officers could enter Sandhurst with only 
the most basic education.78 By the later nineteenth century, education had become a 
requirement of a professional, even if the content of that education was disputed. 
A year after the War Office's resumed the supervision of Sand hurst the 
course content was changed. The study of permanent fortification was dropped, and 
marks were assigned to drill, gymnastics, and riding. The professors of military 
administration and law were allowed, as professors of tactics, fortification, and 
topography already were, to assign marks that would contribute to their final overall 
grade, though not to the grade for that particular subject, which depended on the 
candidates' exam grades. With the end of the rank of sub-lieutenant, the antedating 
of commissions was ended, as was any exemption from future examination.79 It 
"had been found to be attended with great inconvenience and to be a premium on 
future idleness".8o In an attempt to encourage some effort, a probationary exam 
taken at the end of first term was added, but it only required a grade of33% to 
pass.81 
Several suggestions were made at this time to change the course content. 
One such suggestion was to add a physical fitness component to the final exam, but, 
though it was agreed in principle that it was a good idea, it was concluded that it 
would be too difficult to implement. 82 There was also a suggestion by the Board of 
Visitors in their report of 1878, to omit instruction on the keeping of company 
records and army regulations, as these could be learned when the officers joined their 
regiments.83 General Napier disagreed. Much as he would have liked to devote 
more time to more interesting subjects, "I have the honour to observe that it is very 
true that such matters ought to be learned with one's regiment, but I fear it is equally 
true that they are not so learned" [his italics].84 He likewise argued against dropping 
military law from the curriculum on essentially the same grounds. 85 As it turned 
out, no change in the course was made. 86 Finally, the Board of Visitors repeatedly 
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stated that more time needed to be given for modem languages, an issue that was 
finally taken up with the Secretary of State in 1883.87 This continued to be an issue 
as late as 1895, when the Board of Visitors complained that both French and German 
were still not obligatory options.88 These finally became part of the curriculum in 
1897.89 This was not the only recommendation for course changes made by the 
Board of Visitors. With the extension of the course to three terms, in 1893 the board 
suggested, not only that French, German and freehand drawing be added as optional 
subjects, but also that a course in military history and geography be included, while 
tactics be cut back.9o French, German and a course in military history and geography 
were added, with the cut in tactics instruction, and this was reflected in the weighting 
of the final grades. The Boards of Visitors' recommendations for reform did not 
always end up agreeing with the criticisms of the Akers-Douglas committee. The 
latter roundly condemned the addition of languages, the more so because they were 
being given exam weighting identical to that given by tactics (tactics had an 
additional 113 marks given for in-class work). The teaching time devoted to tactics 
by these changes was 60 hours each year, down from [my estimate of] 162 hours. 91 
This was apparently exacerbated by a policy of dividing the subjects into three 
groups, with the available teaching time divided evenly among them. Group one 
contained all of military administration, military law, tactics and military history and 
geography, while military engineering (fortification) and military topography were 
each in a group by themselves.92 
The boards of the 1880' s also recommended that musketry should be taught 
as a subject, though they noted that the cadets had themselves started up a private 
revolver and rifle club in the absence of formal instruction. The Harris committee 
also suggested that at least the principles of musketry be taught, the practical side 
being covered by the cadets' voluntary efforts.93 Musketry was, as of 1888, part of 
the military exercises, but the instructors of fortification and topography complained 
that this addition cut into their instruction time.94 This failure to provide adequate 
instruction on musketry, especially when the RMA was doing so with fewer 
resources, was to offend the Akers-Douglas committee some years later.95 
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The boards throughout the 1890's were concerned that the cadets had very 
poor riding skills, and were spending too much time on drill, the latter to the 
detriment of their studies, though earlier boards from 1883 forward had reliably 
commented approvingly of the cadets' physique. There was, at the same time, also a 
new concern with the high out-of-pocket expenses that cadets were subject to.96 
There was considerable concern evident in the reports of the boards of the early 
1890' s about the quality of education the cadets were getting. Particularly with 
reference to studies out of doors, a few days of wet weather was said to disrupt the 
whole schedule, and the reduction of the working party of engineers and infantry, 
also mentioned in the 1890 report, made such instruction more difficult 97 However, 
by 1895 the members of the board had entirely turned over and for the next several 
years it mostly tended to concern itself with matters of internal economy, perhaps 
reflecting the interests of Lord Harris, the Under Secretary of State for War, who was 
on the committee during those years, and perhaps due to influenza, which was a 
repeated visitor.98 It appears, in the light of the condemning remarks of the post-
South African war Akers-Douglas education committee, that these and other 
concerns raised by the visitors boards of the 1890' s were never addressed. The 
education committee, too, stated that too much time was spent on drill, for no better 
reason than to demonstrate it at the annual inspection.99 Too much time was being 
spent indoors, with too little time being spent outdoors on practical application. In 
particular, too much time was being spent drawing out artistic sketches for 
topography and neat plan drawings on fortifications, rather than on building them, a 
ratio of60% to 40% of the candidates' time, according to the committee. Class work 
was crowding out fieldwork; fortifications were drawn, but not made. Tactics was 
crowded out by military law, and tactics was a purely classroom subject, not 
connected to fieldwork in topography or military engineering. lOO The balance 
between how much of war fighting could be taught in a classroom, and how much 
had to be learned by doing, had not been found. The balance still had not been found 
by the 1920's. In the years following the Boer war, and continuing after the First 
W orId War, the education of junior officers was considered to be too restricted; they 
knew little more than how to command a platoon. One of the reforms made in the 
post-World War I years was to make two fifths of a cadet's education be topics other 
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The final exam was not intended to be difficult; "it must be borne in mind 
that the examination in question is not competitive, but merely of a qualifying 
character, such as any youth of ordinary ability and application should be able to 
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pass without difficulty',.102 This was certainly true; once a candidate passed the 
entrance exam, with its high probability of rejection, it was very unlikely that he 
would fail to gain his commission. The final exam standard required a final grade of 
50%, though the grade of an individual subject could be as low as 25%, but first pick 
of the regiments went to those with the higher grades. 103 Of 1708 admitted to college 
from 1877 to 1882, only 29 did not get commissions due to exam failure, removal, or 
withdrawa1.104 The Harris committee noted that a recent change in grading, such that 
there was no qualifying minimum in any subject, and that if a cadet got a grade 
lower than 25%, it did not count towards his final average, was an ill-advised move. 
This, with good marks from drill, riding and gymnastics, plus grades in course work, 
could alone mount to nearly the minimum final grade of 50%.105 "It has been stated 
to us in evidence that many of the Cadets fail to acquire more than a superficial 
knowledge in some ofthe subjects taught, and the above described system of 
marking does not in our opinion supply sufficient inducement to study. The recent 
change, by which an obligatory minimum in each subject is no longer required, 
appears to us to lead to inattention respecting any particular subject for which a 
Cadet may have a distaste.,,106 It was admitted in the fourth report of 1889 that 
failures were rare, simply because the standard of passing was so low.107 From 1883 
to 1888, 1707 candidates took the final exam, and 26 failed to obtain commissions 
due to failure on exams, removal, withdrawal, and one death.108 It was not until 
1890 that the decision was made to lengthen the course by a term as of the following 
year, and to use that as an opportunity to take up the recommendations of the Harris 
committee and raise the standard for the exams. Each of the now two term-end 
exams and the final exam had to be passed with a grade of 50%, with a minimum per 
subject of33%. From 1889 to 1891, 1034 cadets took the final exam, of which 12 
failed to obtain commissions through withdrawal, removal or resignation lO9 
Unfortunately, no report includes an example of the final exams, which would 
greatly clarify what was required of the students. 
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The military educational authorities went to a great deal of effort, first to 
redefine the purpose of the RMC in the wake ofthe end of purchase, and then to 
define it again as an institution to educate potential officers in their careers. In the 
wake of this latter, critical change in role and function, significant changes were 
made to the entrance exams, course content, course length, and final grade 
requirements, especially in the years following the change in role. Yet it is plain that 
in the opinion ofthe Akers-Douglas committee that the quality ofthe course at 
Sandhurst had declined precipitously from the original vision, and it appears that 
much of it may have occurred in the 1890's, and possibly also throughout the late 
1880' s, given the concerns expressed by the visitors reports of the early 1890' s. 
However, because length of service, on average, for a newly commissioned captain 
was just under nine years (see chapter 5, table 11) the comments by the Akers-
Douglas committee on the education of junior officers cannot, with certainty, speak 
to the education of junior officers earlier than the 1890' s. If the entrance exams were 
the critical screening tool, rather than the RMC, it would explain why the entrance 
exams were so difficult, and the quality of the course less important. This pattern of 
reform and apparent decline, though, also occurs in the system of exams for 
promotion. 
2. Exams for Promotion and Garrison Study 
During the early to mid 1870's, young men qualified for their commission by 
passing a direct entrance examination, after which they were expected to spend a 
year at their regiment as sub-lieutenants. However, militia lieutenants were 
conditionally commissioned as lieutenants, pending attendance ofRMC. The direct 
examination included both a preliminary and further exam, both conducted by the 
Civil Service Commissioners. It was one of the new features of the system that 
commissions could be obtained by open examination, without requiring nomination. 
The Director-General, Major (later Lieutenant) General W. C. E. Napier, was 
probably replying to some uneasiness when he wrote, 
It is as yet too early to judge the effect of thus throwing open the Army to the 
public on the principle of competitive examination. The Director-General 
therefore refrains from offering any opinion upon this great change in the 
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method of officering the Anny, until time and experience shall have afforded 
some data from which reliable conclusions maybe drawn. I 10 
The open competition was not, in fact, all that open. Anyone could attend 
the preliminary exam "without reference to age or moral character". However, 
access to the further exam required that the candidates present, as had been true since 
the beginning of the direct commission system, certificates of age and good moral 
character. I II Further, the subjects of the direct examination and their grading were 
designed to allow candidates to pass, without the need of a tutor, directly after 
graduating from, specifically, the public school system. I 12 As mentioned earlier, the 
group from which the army expected to draw was, in fact, relatively narrow. 
Initially, the vision for officer education was a very limited one. All of their 
education was to occur at the beginning of their career; first spending some time 
learning at their regiment, followed a one-year course at the RMC. I13 Those 
applying to take the direct entry examination to gain a commission as a sub-
lieutenant could apply from one of several routes, these being by "open" 
competition, through the universities, as a Queen's or India Cadet or page of honour, 
and through the militia. This last would be directly commissioned as lieutenants on 
passing this exam. 
In 1875 a new regulation inverted this order of commission then education. 
Direct entrance exams remained, but, as of 1877, successful candidates went directly 
to RMC as cadets without commissions, which were granted only upon successful 
completion ofthe RMC course. I 14 All infantry and cavalry subalterns who had 
either not passed the old exam for the rank for captain before 1 July 1871, and all 
officers who joined the army after 1 May 1870, were expected to gain an equivalent 
education by passing a "special army examination". Garrison classes were instituted 
to instruct those officers who so desired it to assist in study for this exam. I 15 In other 
words, the education system initially had effectively only one level. All other 
regimental officers were encouraged to take these garrison courses as well. In 1875 
this was made a requirement, but it was not enforced until 1880, at which time 
qualifYing exams were instituted for all levels of promotion to the rank of major. 
These exams did not guarantee promotion; they qualified an officer to be considered 
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for promotion within the regiment and by seniority. This established a tiered system 
directly connected to promotion. The nature of officer's ranks was thus redefined. 
Their status ceased to be defined in terms of private income and seniority within the 
regiment; instead their professional status was defined by an exam-mediated 
structure. The fault line lay in whether an officer's educational status in any way 
corresponded to his merits as an officer. To put it another way, ifthe education the 
officers received was not relevant, then the rank they possessed based on that 
education was meaningless as an indication of their standing as professionals. 
As with the RMC and the Staff College, significant reforms were made to the 
system in the late 1870's and early 1880's, as failures in the initially conceived 
system became apparent. Initial hopes for enthusiasm from the officers were soon 
shown to be misplaced regarding the more senior regimental ranks as well as the 
junior ranks, and efforts were made to change the regulations so as to eliminate 
exemptions to taking the exams or courses and laxity in the local administration of 
exams. The required grades were adjusted downwards. These modifications were 
viewed to solve the most egregious difficulties, but by the early 1890's concerns 
were again raised about the support that the educational system was getting at the 
regimental level. Some years later, from the evidence of the Akers-Douglas report, it 
appears that the system had declined considerably from its intent. 
As of the end of 1872, 306 officers passed the special army examination and 
an estimated 300 per year were expected to take the course until all officers for 
whom the course was obligatory would complete it, after which it was expected to be 
attended by lieutenants joining from the Militia and others who had not gone through 
Sandhurst. Il6 Though, as Harries-Jenkins points out, not all went to the RMC 
Sandhurst and gained the advantage of the "professional socialization (sic) and 
assimilation" to be had there, all were expected to pass equivalent coursework and 
exams, and so it was not the case, as he claimed, that these officers "lacked even a 
modicum of professional training". 1 17 
In order to prepare officers for this special examination, a supervisor and 
sixteen Garrison Instructors were appointed to provide instruction on Military Law, 
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Field Fortification and Military Sketching and Reconnaissance. 118 The instructors 
were initially stationed at Aldershot, Colchester, Curragh, Devonport, Dover, 
Dublin, Edinburgh, Fennoy, Gibraltar, Halifax (Nova Scotia), London, Manchester, 
Portsmouth and Shomcliffe.119 Because of the novelty of the idea, "it was 
considered prudent in the beginning to leave much to the free will of the officers" .120 
The instructors established two courses, running from 1 February to 31 May and 
from 1 August to 30 November as of 1872, with an examination at the end of each 
course.
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This system expanded temporarily, when students at the RMC changed from 
being commissioned sub-lieutenants to cadets studying towards their commissions. 
The garrison instructors for Sandhurst equivalency examinations now tutored those 
sub-lieutenants who were then serving in their regiments in expectation of going to 
Sandhurst for eight months. 122 As of December 1875, 162 sub-lieutenants had been 
instructed in this manner, 12 of them twice, having failed their first examination.123 
A further 111 officers of other ranks voluntarily attended the Garrison Instructors 
classes, of which 104 got first class, and 6 second class. 124 This pressure on the 
resources of garrison instruction system ended, however, by June 1876, when all the 
sub-lieutenants were expected to have completed the coursework and examination. 125 
There was, at least initially, considerable official enthusiasm, as well as 
considerable official apprehension regarding the new educational system. "Such a 
system of instruction was a great innovation in the British Service, and required 
considerable tact and judgement on the part of the officers entrusted with its 
introduction,,126 The officers appeared to demonstrate a "general good spirit" and 
the first report on the education of officers of 1873 was pleased to state that "it has 
been clearly proved by the results of this Garrison instruction that the British officer 
is glad to avail himself of means of instruction when offered for his acceptance".127 
"This instruction, therefore, combined with that given at the Royal Military College 
to all future sub-lieutenants will render it a matter of certainty that future officers of 
the English army will be professionally educated, while it is very probable that many 
of the senior officers, actuated by the feeling that they should not be less instructed 
than their juniors, will also apply themselves to the acquisition of such 
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knowledge.,,128 "It can hardly be a matter of doubt that the eventual result of the 
various means described in this Report, for the education of officers, will be to create 
among them an interest in their profession of a higher order than that which has 
hitherto existed, and a corresponding desire to qualifY themselves for the higher 
commands,,129 The only apparent early difficulty ofthese garrison courses, as of 
1876, was to maintain attendance despite leaves of absence and parades, though the 
junior officers on the whole were reported to be enthusiastic about the opportunity to 
leam. 130 But it soon became apparent that there was resistance to the whole system 
from the higher ranks. Later reports also suggest that the enthusiasm among 
regimental officers, at least for the exams, was lower than originally expected, 
though it is unclear if this was true from the beginning, if enthusiasm declined over 
time, if attitudes changed, or if opposition from higher ranks influenced the officers' 
reactions. Had these early subjects ofthe new system simply seen which way the 
wind was blowing and grudgingly got the lessons behind them so they could 
advance? This is a critical but unanswerable question, given the information in these 
reports, because these young officers were the senior officers expected to enforce the 
system twenty years later and be in command positions in the South African war. 
Another element was added to the garrison education system when an exam 
system was set up for captains as a requirement for their promotion to major, and put 
into effect by the General Order of 1 November 1875. These captains, having a 
minimum of five years of service, were expected to demonstrate knowledge of map 
reading, and of commanding a small combined force of infantry, artillery and 
cavalry. They were expected to study by using the Kriegsspiel to illustrate past 
battles with the assistance of the garrison instructors, and to acquaint themselves 
with the standard works on tactics, specifically attack and defence, guards and 
outposts. Most of the exam was to be oral, given by "Boards appointed at the 
various stations". In addition, there was a written exam on tactics, supervised 
separately by examiners appointed by the Director-General, intended to demonstrate 
the officers' ability to place troops on a map and questions intended to "to induce 
officers to think for themselves instead of merely exercising their memories". I3I Yet 
it was not enforced until 1880.132 The use ofKriegsspiel died out fairly quickly. By 
1876 it was reported that it had "to some extent declined" among officers, and, 
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excepting at large military stations where associations have been formed for playing 
it, "there is reason to doubt whether it will find much favour in the Army, the 
extreme minuteness of the German rules being perhaps one of the main objections to 
its more general adoption".133 It was said to be popular with the volunteers, though 
not with the regulars, in 1891.134 In 1900, another magazine claimed thatthe 
Kriegsspiel was being played at the War Office by the headquarters staff, Aldershot 
and the United Service Institute. Play was described as being arbitrated by the 
judgement of the umpire and a coin, which would certainly cover objections to the 
rules' complexity. The article understandably recommended "a capable and 
experienced officer to act as umpire, as the value of the exercise much depends on 
the scheme set, the manner in which the game is umpired, and the criticisms passed 
when the play is over".135 Static tactical models proved to be more popular among 
the regular officers than the German Kriegsspiel games, which proved not at all 
popular by 1883.136 "In some, however, their [Kriegsspiel games'] value is either 
not appreciated, or sufficient inducements are not held out to render attendance at 
war games as frequent as might be desired". Eventually, tactical models were, at 
most stations, mostly used to assist in the instruction of tactics and topography. 137 
It was hoped that the Captain's promotional exam would lead to "a more 
careful and intelligent study on the part of Captains of this most practical and 
essential part of their duties than has hitherto prevailed in their rank ofthe Service". 
138 It was further hoped by the Director-General that if the examining boards "apply 
themselves to a rigid and conscientious discharge of a most important duty in 
conducting the viva voce examination", which was most ofthe exam, then "the 
Director-General cannot but think that in course of time an increased degree of 
intelligence will be apparent in the conduct of officers commanding small detached 
bodies of troops in the field".139 It was suggestively mentioned that the Prussian 
army had long enforced such exams "with the best results, and there can be no 
reason why regimental officers of the British service should not acquire a similar 
facility in handling troops, if the necessity for applying their minds to the subject be 
once fairly brought home to them".140 While Prussian officers did receive further 
training in their regiments, as mentioned in chapter 1, they don't appear to have had 
promotional exams. Director-General obviously felt that the examining boards (that 
Corinne Mahaffey Chapter 4 128 
is, presumably, the officers appointed to the examining board) were lax in the 
discharge of their duty. The tactics exam, Director-General, wrote, "will be 
conducted by Examiners acting under the Director-General, and the questions will be 
so framed as to induce officers to think for themselves instead of merely exercising 
their memories". 141 
By the late 1870's a number of problems had shown up in the further 
education system. The transition to the new educational system had resulted in 
varying examination requirements for promotion, depending on when any junior 
officer had entered the system, and, with that, various exemptions. It also appears 
that there was either indifference or resistance among the more senior regimental 
officers. In the late 1870' s and early 1880' s, various exemptions were ended and 
adjustments to the program were made. Garrison instruction retained its value by 
teaching preparatory courses for officers studying for their promotion exams. In 
1878, it was made a requirement of promotion that officers take a promotional exam 
for all ranks to the level of major. When it was enforced by general order in 1880, 
the number of senior ranking students at garrison classes jumped for a few years, but 
eventually declined. 
As of 1877, when Sandhurst made the transition to teaching cadets who 
passed the army entrance exam, rather than sub-lieutenants who had been promoted 
upon passing the army entrance exam, the sub-lieutenants who had had only one 
term at Sandhurst were transferred to the garrison instructional system to complete 
their coursework. These, and lieutenants who had transferred from the militia, made 
up a significant number of the students for several years. 142 (See Tables 1,2 and 3: 
Officers attending garrison classes) The standard of knowledge ofthe latter was 
found to be so low that they often found the classes difficult, suggesting, in the 
Director-General's opinion, first, that the standard for the direct entrance exams was 
too low and second, that wider knowledge be demanded ofthem in the Competitive 
Examination in Military Subjects. Therefore it was ordered (in GO 130 of 1880) that 
officers were expected to do preparatory work before attending the garrison 
course. 143 In 1879, the officers transferring from the militia were required to take a 
competitive examination in military subjects, including rifle drill and the theory of 
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musketry, officers duties, parts of the Queen's Regulations and Orders, the Mutiny 
Act, and regulations regarding pay, messing and the provisioning of troops and the 
mode of carrying kit. This was in addition to passing the direct examination. In 
January 1881, presumably in response to the low level of knowledge demonstrated 
by the militia officers, this competitive examination was expanded and changed to 
include the elements of field fortification, military topography, elements oftactics, 
and military law. 144 This is a list of topics very similar to that taught at the RMC. 
Additionally, it should be noted that, from 1879, the quota for regular commissions 
from the militia was 120 (60 at each half-yearly exam), but under the circular printed 
in June of 1881 it was announced that the following exam in September, the quota 
would be dropped to 40 at that exam, and 30 each exam thereafter, which raised the 
bar considerably for militia officers. 145 
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Year Term Numbers who Total 
attended classes 
Sub-lieutenants Lieutenants and Captains and 
Provisional C'!})tains Provisional Majors 
1876 1 st 96 21 3 120 
1876 2nd 9 88 6 103 
1877 1 st 118 55 4 177 
1877 2nd 52 85 16 153 
1878 1 st 13 63 14 90 
1878 2nd 6 37 21 64 
1879 1 st 7 35 11 53 
1879 2nd -- 37 10 47 
1880 1 st -- 33 3 36 
1880 2nd -- 72 7 79 
1881 1 st -- 16 33 49 
1881 2nd -- 25 73 98 
1882 1 st -- 40 87 127 
1882 2nd -- 43 96 139 
Total -- 301 650 384 1335 
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Table 2. Officers attending garrison classes. 147 [can see transition to 2 month 
courses] 
I Year Term Numbers who Total 
attended Classes i 
Captains Lieutenants 
Two Months Four Two Four Two Four 
Months Months Months Months Months 
1883 1 st -- 125 -- 83 -- 208 
1883 2nd 45 94 37 74 82 168 
1884 1 st 22 93 30 93 52 186 
1884 2nd 28 40 26 44 54 84 
1885 1 st 1 13 
I 
5 26 6 39 
. 1885 2nd 50 16 62 33 112 49 
1886 1 st 41 17 66 38 107 55 
1886 2M 31 6 43 16 74 22 
1887 1 st 43 7 60 13 103 20 
1887 2nd 38 3 46 5 84 8 
1888 1 st 48 1 55 7 103 8 
1888 2nd 26 -- 33 -- 59 --
Total 373 415 463 432 836 847 
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Year Term Numbers who 
attended Classes 
Captains Lieutenants Total 
1889 March and April 21 32 53 
1889 September and October 18 36 54 
1890 March and April 35 58 93 
1890 September and October 34 55 89 
1891 March and April 44 55 99 
1891 September and October 45 58 103 
Total 197 294 491 
More senior students also volunteered to attend the courses, of which the 
Superintending officer said in 1878, "The growing interest in the profession of arms 
which is now prevalent in the Service and an increasing recognition of the practical 
value of garrison instruction have brought forward numerous officers of considerable 
service, Captains, and even Field Officers, who have voluntarily placed themselves 
under instruction, especially in Tactics. Such officers have, as a rule, paid the 
greatest attention to the teaching of the Garrison Instructors, who were sometimes 
.. hI" 149 JUnIor to t emse ves . 
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The GO 130 of 1880 also enforced the requirement, laid down in the Royal 
Warrant of 1 May, 1878, and amended by Royal Warrant 30 March, 1880, that all 
officers must pass a promotional exam as a prerequisite for promotion to each rank 
through to major. 150 It was hoped that few officers would then need a second course 
to refresh their learning so as to pass their promotion exam, "which is intended 
merely as a test that proper attention has continued to be given to professional 
subjects.,,151 In response to the general order, the number of Lieutenants and 
provisional captains taking garrison classes rose abruptly in 1882 and the number of 
captains and provisional majors rose by a factor of lOin 1881, (see Table 4, 
Promotion exams) to nearly the class capacity. As a percentage of captains and 
provisional majors taking the exam, the maximum was in 1882, when 174 such 
officers were taking the courses to 163 taking the exam. This declined to 69% the 
following year and from then to 1892 stabilised at around one third. 152 The numbers 
of more junior officers in classes rose and fell, with their highest numbers from 1883 
to 1887, but these numbers were less stable throughout this period than the 350-450 
who took the exams each year through to 1891. (see Table 4. Promotion exams) 
Major-General Dunsterville did not find them to be particularly challenging, "there 
were a few simple examinations which officers up to the rank of Captain were 
expected to pass, and they generally succeeded in doing so with a great deal of 
kindly help from selected instructors. So long as you didn't get into trouble, your 
promotion came along in its tum and was almost entirely dependent on the length of 
your service".153 
The number of more senior officers taking garrison courses began to decline 
as of the 2nd term of 1885, as most ofthese officers were understood to have taken 
some form of professional course. This decline was anticipated in 1884, when a 
General Order limited the permission to join the four-month long courses to those 
officers who had joined without any previous training. 154 Two-month courses were 
also set up as an alternative so as to minimise officers' absences from their 
regiments. 155 By 1888 there were so few applicants for the four-month course that it 
was ended in favour of two two-month courses, whose term times were set to take 
advantage of better weather for instruction in surveying and reconnaissance. I 56 
Through the early 1890's, the number of senior officers taking the two-month 
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courses remained fairly stable, but significantly fewer relative to the number of 
officers taking the promotion exam because almost all serving company officers had, 
at some point, been instructed in the course subjects. 157 It is also likely they, like 
Dunsterville, found the promotion exams to be less than challenging; staff officers in 
charge of military education at home were quoted in the fifth report of 1892 that 
those officers who took the courses generally failed to do any preparation work 
before classes. 158 (see Table 4. Promotion exams) 
Table 4. Promotion exams.159 
Year Garrison Examined % Garrison Examined for % 
Classes for for column 2 Classes for Promotion to column 6 
Provisional Promotion to 3 Provisional Major to 7 
Captains and to Captain Majors and 
under under 
1876 109 96 114 9 --
1877 140 136 103 20 --
1878 100 110 91 35 78 45 
1879 72 97 75 21 73 29 
1880 105 132 80 10 150 7 
1881 41 84 49 106 327 32 
1882 103 90 114 174 163 107 
1883 194 218 89 264 383 69 
1884 193 436 44 183 517 35 
1885 126 368 34 80 239 33 
1886 163 446 36 95 243 39 
1887 287 357 80 91 173 53 
1888 95 362 26 75 199 38 
1889 68 406 17 39 236 17 
1890 113 315 36 69 210 33 
1891 113 349 32 89 271 33 
There was no less of a shakedown in the promotion exams than there were in 
the courses to prepare for them. In the third report, three problems were noted to 
have cropped up. The first was that various exemptions from all or part of the 
examination for promotion to the rank oflieutenant had been permitted to those who 
had previously taken up some or all ofthe subjects of the exam. Those who had 
passed with first or second class certificates from Sandhurst as sub-lieutenants were 
also exempt from exam before promotion to captain. "The effect of this was to give 
a premium on idleness, and to cause a tendency to grow rusty in the knowledge 
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obtained at Sandhurst. The main object of most appeared to be, not to show their 
knowledge, but to prove their right to exemption from so doing.,,160 
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The second problem circulated around, not the captains, who remained under 
no obligation to attend garrison classes, though many did so voluntarily, and took the 
course exams, but around their examiners. (see Table 4, Promotion exams) The oral 
and written promotion exam was, as previously noted, started in 1875, "but the 
conduct ofthis duty by the boards to whom it was intrusted (sic) had not answered 
the expectations fonned by the late Director-General regarding it".161 This was a 
disappointment, because it seemed obvious to the current Director General, Lt Gen 
c.p Beauchamp Walker that captains should be instructed in tactics and 
administration and should prove that they had retained the knowledge they had 
gained as lieutenants on their promotion to higher rank. 162 It was surely also a 
disappointment that the officers making up these examination boards continued to 
fail to take these exams seriously. 
The third problem was an issue of semantics. Apparently the use of the tenn 
"educational" to refer to the higher subjects, and "professional" to subjects such as 
Drill and Duties gave the impression that not all the subjects were equally 
"professional".163 Or, presumably, relevant. 
In October 1880, General Order 130 was published, that regularised the 
system and eliminated the above exemptions, problems with the examining board, 
and semantic issues. This created enforceable regulations based on the Royal 
Warrant of 1 May 1878.164 The tenn educational versus professional was abolished. 
All officers, of all arms, were now required to pass promotion exams before being 
promoted to all ranks up to major. The required professional subjects were outlined 
in a syllabus, and the scope of knowledge required was widened with each increasing 
rank. The exam periods were made fixed and simultaneous for both home and 
abroad. Each exam was divided into two parts. Drill and regimental duties had to be 
taken first, under the supervision of the General Officer commanding, who had to 
follow regulations intended to produce unifonnity in the exam's administration. The 
most qualified officers, including some from each ann of the service, were to be 
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selected by the officer commanding to fonn the standing Boards of Examination to 
conduct this practical exam. However, as of this general order, this board was no 
longer responsible for the honest conduct of the candidate taking the exams. It was 
the candidate himself who was expected to endorse the certificate to that effect. 165 
The military law and duties in the field (the latter including field fortification, 
military topography and tactics) exam was conducted under the supervision of the 
Director-Genera1.166 The exam in drill and regimental duties was taken by all ranks 
(second lieutenants, lieutenants, captains) prior to promotion, and military law and 
duties in the field by lieutenants and captains only.167 In 1884, the exam in military 
law was made a wholly open book, rather than setting one open book exam of issues 
that an officer ought to be able to solve off the top of his head, and one closed book 
exam of questions that would nonnally require recourse to the relevant references. It 
was decided in 1889 to revert back to the older system, because the index ofthe 
Manual of Military Law was sufficiently good that all questions could be answered 
by looking them Up.168 
As it stood in 1883, the syllabus and structure ofthe exams was as follows. 
Much of it is, unsurprisingly, very similar to the topics of instruction at the RMC. 
Regimental Duties was taken both written and by viva voce, with all questions set by 
the examining board. The officers were expected to understand their duties in 
garrison, and field, and in movement by land or sea, at the level to which they were 
being promoted, courts-martial, and the interior economy of companies and 
battalions. Drill was in two parts also, written and in the field. The field portion 
specifically required the candidate to demonstrate the ability to give commands on 
parade, and to explain the execution of manoeuvres to the troops under his 
command, at squad, company, battalion, and battalion in a brigade levels, and 
eventually to know the whole of musketry instruction. For these two exams there 
had to be at least 40 written questions for second lieutenants, 50 for lieutenants and 
60 for captains, and the officers had to get a grade of at least 50% in each exam. 169 
The military law exam expected the candidate to know the history of the 
military code, discipline, articles of war, enlistment law, and the law on billeting and 
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the impressment of carriages, supplemental provisions as to courts martial, 
proceedings of courts martial, and the whole of the Anny Discipline and Regulation 
Act. The field fortification exam was also both written and in the field. The written 
section included the use of instruments, drawing field fortifications to scale and 
freehand, a general understanding of artillery, mostly in terms of their effect on field 
works, the object and general principles of field works as well as technical terms, 
kinds of field works, their disadvantages, their use in various combinations for 
mutual support, the defence and attack of houses, and the hasty demolition of 
bridges, barricades, railways, and telegraphs. The practical examination involved the 
laying of angles on the ground with tape and pickets to demonstrate a knowledge of 
field geometry, hasty entrenchments, improvised field defences, obstacles, 
revetments, the trace and profile of field works, the distribution of working parties 
and calculating the required dimensions of earthworks, as well as the construction of 
a single lock or frame bridge. Under the heading of military topography, the 
candidate had to demonstrate skills needed for field map-making, and to reconnoitre 
a road, a river and part of a defensive position, including the submission of a report 
and a corrected trace map. Captains were expected to do a reconnaissance of an 
entire small position, with a full report on its defensive capabilities, and to be able to 
place troops on it. In tactics, the officers were expected to know the functions of 
infantry, cavalry and artillery, in terms of their characteristics and weapons, the 
tactical unit, and time and space occupied by marches and formations separately and 
jointly, how to obtain security and information, advanced and rear guards and 
outposts for all arms, reconnaissance by patrolling, screening and reconnoitring 
duties of cavalry, and the tactical employment of all arms separately and in 
combination.]70 The entire board was to be present for the practical examinations, 
and at least one member of the board had to be present to supervise the written 
exams, all of which were supposed to occur over a period of five days, two days of 
which were the outdoors exams for fortification and military topography and 
reconnaissance.]7] On the face of it, this is a strenuous and stringent exam, oriented 
toward a practical demonstration of the officer's knowledge. Yet over the ensuing 
two decades, either these requirements were never seriously implemented in the 
regiments or the quality of these exams slid. 
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The Akers-Douglas report in 1902 condemned the practical exam for being 
made too easy by the local board of examiners. As to the second exam, on military 
law and duties in the field, to which had recently been added an exam on 
organisation and equipment, the report concluded that the written part, as currently 
set by examiners from the War Office, rewarded memorisation. In the last few 
years, the supervision of the sketching of an unknown piece of terrain was no longer 
under that ofthe board and the result graded, but under that of a fellow officer, and 
apparently not graded. The report admitted the tactical exam had improved, but 
remained too theoretical. Of the field fortification exam, the candidate was expected 
to know detail that would be better looked up, such as the number of stones required 
for a certain work. The topography, law and organisation and equipment exams had 
the same problem of requiring detail in lieu of a more general understanding of the 
subject. 172 The intended "object of compelling officers to maintain and develop their 
professional knowledge" had plainly not been realised.J73 Candidates crammed for 
the exams, but otherwise failed to keep up on their knowledge. The military 
witnesses unanimously recommended that these exams be made less written and 
theoretical and more practical. l74 Thus the particular failures of the exams were 
different in their local and centralised incarnations. Local boards refused to set 
difficult exams for their colleagues (and the senior officers failed to enforce 
standards), and the centralised exams had devolved into (easier to mark and 
interpret) rote memorisation, over a more general demonstration of competence, that 
is, a more "practical" exam. In general though, the problem was that standards of 
examination were not being maintained. Surely the witnesses to the Akers-Douglas 
committee had gone through this educational system itself? What happened when 
they were senior regimental officers? Did they not enforce these exams? How did it 
get to this state if they were so opposed to it? All these questions warrant further 
research. 
The minimum passing grades were modified several times, as the results of 
previous modifications were demonstrated in the grades the officers achieved. Poor 
results led to a lowering of the grade required, because the original emphasis was not 
on passing exams, but to use the threat of exams as a means to enforce continued 
study and review of professional skills. When the threat seemed too threatening, as 
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demonstrated in the failure rate, the standard was lowered. "The preamble of this 
General Order impressed upon officers that the object of examination is not so much 
as to ensure a simple passing of the tests, which are fixed at a low standard, as to 
encourage, and to a certain extent to compel officers to improve themselves by 
reading and practice in general professional knowledge and attainments during their 
service.,,176 It is also possible, in introducing these exams, that these exams were set 
so low as not to risk overt protest against the new educational system, and to create a 
source of objection by which the entire system might be successfully opposed. A 
third possibility is that the varying, but generally rising, requirements for officers 
meant that the pass rates had to be set low enough to ensure enough passes to ensure 
that establishment requirements were satisfied. The drops in standards in 1880 and 
1885 correlate reasonably closely with rises in the need for officers due to war and 
retirement. The minimum grades originally set in 1876 were 0.5 for each subject, 
and failure in any subject exam meant that all the exams had to be retaken. 177 
Special certificates were to be granted to those who passed high.178 The passing 
grade for tactics, fortification, military topography and military law, already not 
noticeably high at 0.5 for each subject, was, in 1880, lowered to 0.4 for each of these 
subjects, though the overall required average in these subjects was raised to 0.55. 
Failure in any exam meant that only that subject had to be repeated, if the officer had 
got the required average in the other three exams. In 1882, an officer was allowed to 
count the grades in the subject he failed to make up the average in the other three. 179 
In 1884 the aggregate number of marks required for passing was dropped back from 
0.55 to 0.5.180 But lowering, and maintaining low, standards was found to be 
ineffective. Lowering the standards lowered the standard of knowledge; "worse 
results were being obtained from officers who had studied those subjects before 
getting their commission, than had been obtained 15 years previously [c. 1878-79] 
from officers whose knowledge of Military subjects had been acquired after their 
entrance into the army.,,181 After each lowering ofthe standard, the percentage of 
failure dropped, but then rose again. This effect was worse with the exams done by 
the captains, but somewhat less consistent for the exams by the lieutenants. 182 (see 
Table 5, Percentage of Failures at the Examinations, Table 6, Examinations for the 
rank of Captain and Table 7, Examinations for the Rank of Major) As of 1 July 
1892, the required grades in fortification, tactics, military topography, and military 
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law were put back up to 0.5, where they had originally been, and the required grade 
for a special certificate was raised from 0.65 to 0.75.183 As the fifth report 
acerbically noted, "It [cannot] be considered that it is exacting too much to require 
that an officer should, in each subject, give a correct answer at least as often as an 
incorrect one".184 The attempt to avoid having the exams be seen as a threat to one's 
career by making them easy to pass enforced exactly the opposite of the original 
intention, which was to convince the officers to learn, and regularly brush-up on, the 
material. 
Table 5. Percentage of Failures a the Examinations in [ exams] ( c.) [military law] 
and (d.) [duties in the field]. 185 
Year Captains. Lieutenants. 
Standard lowered in 1880. 
1881 2.75 9.52 
1882 11.65 11.11 
1883 22.97 17.67 
1884 24.37 15.83 
Standard lowered. 
1885 12.55 8.60 
1886 9.87 12.17 
1887 13.87 12.50 
1888 14.51 10.35 
1889 13.13 9.45 
1890 24.28 21.18 
1891 21.40 15.22 
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T bi 6 E a e ~ h nk fC xammatlOns or t e ra 0 . 186 aptam. 
I Year Number Passed Failed Percentage 
i examined failure 
1876 96 87 9 9.37 
I 1877 136 112 24 17.64 
· 1878 110 77 33 27.27 
f--~ 
. 1879 97 84 13 13.51 
1880 132 106 26 19.69 
1881 84 76 8 9.52 
1882 90 80 10 11.11 
1883 218 179 39 17.88 
1884 436 367 69 15.82 
1885 368 329 39 10.59 
1886 446 390 56 12.55 
1887 357 326 31 8.68 
1888 362 325 37 10.22 
1889 406 367 39 9.6 
1890 315 252 63 20.00 
1891 349 294 55 15.75 
T bi 7 E a e t h ank fM . xamma IOns or t e r 0 aJor. 187 
Year Number Passed Failed Percentage 
examined failure 
1878 78 62 16 20.51 
1879 73 65 8 10.95 
1880 150 147 3 2.00 
1881 327 318 9 2.75 
1882 163 144 19 11.65 
1883 383 295 88 22.97 
1884 517 391 126 24.37 
1885 239 209 30 12.55 
1886 243 219 24 9.87 
1887 173 147 24 13.87 
1888 199 171 28 14.51 
1889 236 205 31 13.13 
1890 210 159 51 24.28 
1891 271 213 58 21.40 
The requirement that an exam had to be passed before promotion to each 
rank was not only to minimise the amount of "rust" in the officers' knowledge over 
time, but also to make the exams seem less of an obstruction. Originally, the one 
exam had to be passed within 6 years of first commission; else the officer would be 
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removed from the service. Because the junior officers were increasingly RMC 
graduates, this requirement fell on those who either passed poorly out of the RMC, 
or those transferring from the Militia, who then had to fit in preparation and the 
exam around their duties at home or overseas. The result, according to the third 
report, was that "examination [ came] to be looked upon as a bugbear to be passed as 
early as possible, with a view to abolish all necessity for reading and attention to 
Military subj ects henceforth" .188 This was obviously not a desirable attitude to 
promote. The intent, in requiring an exam at each promotion, was to "cause 
examination to be looked upon as a test ... that an officer continues to give due 
attention to all necessary Military subjects" for which it was therefore preferred that 
it not be taken as soon as possible to get it out of the way. The solution was seen to 
be to institute a minimum period of service before the exams could be taken - second 
lieutenants not until dismissed from drills, lieutenants after 2 years service, at least 
one of which was as a lieutenant, and captains after 6 years of service, at least two of 
which in that rank. 189 This also resulted in further change to the rules of provisional 
promotion. Instead of denying it to officers at home, regardless of how little 
opportunity they had to take the exam, and allowing it to officers overseas for the 
grace period of one year, regardless of how many opportunities they had avoided, the 
period of provisional promotion was allowed through to occurrence of the first 
opportunity to take the exam. 190 The Secretary of State approved this change, on the 
conditions that the exams would be "real, that supersession should be the 
consequence of failure, and that repeated supersession should involve removal" .191 
In a bout of what would prove to be unwarranted enthusiasm, the Director-General 
concluded, "The effect of these new rules has been eminently satisfactory. An 
earnest study of their profession may now be said to characterise the officers of the 
Army generally. They have met the new system in a good spirit, as the following 
tables will show, and are now in a position to take that lead in instructing their men 
during peace, which will be as much incumbent on them in future as that remarkable 
power of leading the men in the field, which has always been a characteristic of 
British officers."I92 
There was no commentary on the reaction of officers to the promotional 
exams in the fourth educational report, but by 1891 it was clear that these exams 
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remained unpopular, and that at least some of the more senior officers made no effort 
to enforce the system. The then Director-General recommended that these officers 
be held more directly responsible for the military qualifications of their subordinate 
officers. "It ought to be considered to reflect on the military character of a 
commanding officer, ifhis officers, after a reasonable time in each rank, are neither 
qualified for promotion, no have made any attempt to qualify themselves.,,193 
Worse, not only did the more junior officers attempt to avoid the exams, but also at 
least some higher officers supported them, deliberately undermining the system as it 
was intended to function. "Many officers, unfortunately, look upon these 
examinations as merely so many irksome bars to promotion; and it is not uncommon 
for an officer, on being informed that he is about to be passed over for promotion on 
account of his not having passed the requisite examination, to offer as an excuse that 
he did not expect his tum for promotion to arrive so soon; and this excuse is even 
endorsed by some commanding officers, who thus apparently consider the 
examination solely as a technical qualification for promotion, and not as an 
indication that the officer is possessed of such military knowledge as is essential for 
the proper performance of his public duties.,,194 A decade later, the Akers-Douglas 
report on the education of officers reported some of the specifics of this obstruction. 
"The futility of the examination in A. [drill] and B. [regimental duties] is 
notorious" .195 The locally manned boards would make the questions as easy to 
answer as possible, and there was no evidence that there was any supervision by 
general officers. The report recommended that the commanding officer report, and 
thereby be personally responsible, at such time as they thought a junior officer was 
ready for promotion.196 The Akers-Douglas committee also complained that the 
exams encouraged the cramming of facts to the detriment of deeper understanding of 
the subjects or originality ofthought, with the result that the junior officer is 
"inclined to lose interest in his studies, and to regard them as a nuisance which need 
trouble him no more once he has obtained his commission".197 In fact, 
The witnesses are unanimous in stating that the junior officers are lamentably 
wanting in Military knowledge, and what is perhaps even worse, in the desire 
to acquire knowledge and in zeal for the Military art. The Committee have 
been informed on very high authority that the majority of young officers will 
not work unless compelled; that "keenness is out of "fashion"; that "it is not 
the correct form; the spirit and fashion is "rather not to show keenness"; and 
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that "the idea is, to put it in a few words, to do as little as they possibly 
a 
198 
c n. 
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Yet an internal report on the reform of the promotion of officers the following year 
stated, "If we have learned anything from the late [South African] war with regard to 
our officers it had certainly been proved beyond question, that officers in the junior 
ranks, and especially the company commanders, have come through a trying ordeal 
most creditably," suggesting that there was not, internally, necessarily agreement 
with the conclusions ofthe Akers-Douglas report. 199 
In the opinion of the committee, the key problem was that promotion was not 
dependent on the effort the officer made to acquire professional skilL "Under the 
existing system the promotion of indolent officers is as rapid as - and may be more 
rapid than - that of their more industrious comrades.,,2oo As secondary problems, it 
was agreed by witnesses, first, that it was extremely difficult to do any field training 
in Britain, specifically because of the system of using home regiments to feed troops 
to those overseas. Troops available in Britain were mostly employed in non-
regimental duties, or in fatigues, and battalion training was inevitably interrupted and 
discontinuous. Secondly, once the junior officer reached his battalion, he was either 
given no real responsibility, or given too much, and left to rely upon the senior non-
commissioned officers, and thus did not gain the habit of responsibility and 
command.201 
I would add three further, related reasons why keenness was out of fashion. 
First, by the end ofthe century, the junior officers were, as their professional 
development, expected to memorise the minutiae of their profession to pass exams, 
rather than the more general issues upon which the minutiae are based, such as the 
ability to build a field fortification. The gulf between what they needed to know as 
officers, and what they were expected to know to be promoted was surely obvious to 
them. Second, when they took these exams, it was equally plain that their superior 
officers were willing to give them a great deal of slack in these exams, and were 
choosing exam questions that took no competence on their part to grade. The 
commanding officers that should have been enforcing exam standards were not 
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doing so. All this appears to add up to a professional culture that failed to take its 
own education seriously. It is also possible, however, that the senior officers 
themselves were also frustrated by the intermittent changes in standards and 
requirements that had been recurring since they themselves were junior officers. The 
more general and overarching problem was that, though these exams were directly 
connected to promotion, so was seniority. Since an officer would rise though the 
ranks by seniority, the exams were not there to present a challenge of expertise, in 
which doing well was of any career advantage, but as a barrier that had to be 
overcome. 
Thus, although the promotion exams were linked directly to whether a junior 
officer was promoted, promotion was also equally directly linked to seniority. This 
made the study for and taking of these exams to be an obstacle in the way of rising 
through the ranks that, because of seniority, required no other especial effort on the 
part of the officer. This dynamic may have encouraged officers to view formal 
education as a nuisance, instead of a necessity. If so, this is a direct contrast to the 
Prussian system, in which high rank was attainable almost exclusively through the 
War Academy. Thus the Prussian system subtly encouraged academic study as a 
means to promotion despite its lack of promotion exams, while the British system 
favoured practical experience despite the use of promotion exams. 
There is plainly, however unclearly, a dynamic between the education 
authorities and the officers of both junior and senior rank. The educational 
authorities were initially very concerned as to the level of acceptance they would 
receive; understandably, since it was unclear how the new education system was 
going to affect officers' careers. As the authorities understood it, there was generally 
an initial positive reaction from the junior officers at both the advent of the system 
and the changes made in the late 1870's, which, in both cases, later faded. From 
more senior officers, there is evidence of neglect and lack of interest. There appears 
to be a growing culture in the 1880's and 1890's of declining standards and 
regimental obstruction and indifference at commanding officer levels, levels that had 
presumably been through the system themselves by this time. There was also, 
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increasingly, failure on the part of junior officers to see career advantage in 
education and study, as compared to earlier decades. 
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The reforms of the late 1870's and early 1880's, that were meant to solve 
problems that showed up in early application and make the education more generally 
prevalent, resulted in connecting education more directly to career progression by 
linking it to promotion. Gradually, however, the low expectations that were intended 
to be unthreatening, and possibly to mollify those senior officers who didn't want it 
in the first place, caused problems of their own, and the exams became gradually 
disassociated from the knowledge they were trying to test. Neither did garrison 
education ever teach the officers the skills they needed beyond the level of 
regimental ranks. 
3. Staff College 
The Royal Commission for the Education of Officers of 1868 precipitated 
changes in the Staff College, as well. On its recommendation, the number of 
students was increased from 30 to 40, with 20 vacancies opening annually, "five of 
which may be filled by officers of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, provided 
they are among the 20 candidates highest on the list", suggesting the author ofthe 
report thought the infantry and cavalry would do much better than they, in fact, 
did?02 These slots were assigned on a quota system, of which 6 were reserved for 
the RA, 4 for the RE, and one supernumerary from the Royal Marines, with the rest 
being cavalry and infantry?03 The latter were restricted to one officer from anyone 
b 1· . . 1 204 atta IOn or regIment, respectIve y. 
In an effort to screen out officers who were not likely make to suitable staff 
officers, a number of requirements were brought in. Half of these depended on the 
judgement of a candidate's superior officers and had to be satisfied before the 
entrance exam was even attempted. The candidate had to have served for at least 
five years, have passed the examination for a troop of company and the special Army 
examination (discussed in the last section, being the initial promotion exam before 
the system of promotion was restructured in 1877), ifhe was not yet a captain, and a 
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medical certificate. He further required a certificate from his commanding officer 
that he is "in very respect a thoroughly good regimental officer", a confidential 
report covering his character, habits, and disposition, as well as his general 
qualifications for employment on the staff, written by a board of his commanding 
officer and the next two senior officers within the regiment. Finally, he had to, 
where possible, be attached for a month to the staff of a general officer commanding 
a brigade or division, who was also to report on the candidate's suitability. Only 
then could the officer take the entrance exam?05 This turned out to be a successful 
system; in the opinion of the next Director-General, it "has worked well in guarding 
the service against the appointment to staff of officers who are deficient in the 
peculiar attributes of a good staff officer", despite otherwise "possessing more than 
the average power of application to books,,?06 These peculiar attributes were not 
defined, presumably being so obvious as to preclude the need for definition. In 
1894, Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, the chair of military art and history at the Staff 
College since 1892, made a presentation called, "Lessons from the Past for the 
Present": "At the conclusion of Henderson's plea for a vigorous program of 
professional reading, the chairman (Sir Evelyn Wood) cautioned the audience to 
"look at Blucher, look at Lord Clyde: these two men were certainly not clever, they 
were certainly not well read, but they had force of character." Wood concluded that, 
" ... force of character was a much more valuable possession for the leader of an army 
or fleet than any amount oftechnical or naval or military knowledge.,,207 This view 
was even institutionalised in the expectation that a candidate for the entry exams 
could provide proof of character, and in the moral standards assumed to be 
inculcated by the public schools from which the officers were drawn. 
As then set, the required elements of the entrance exam were mathematics 
(arithmetic, Euclid, simple algebra), one of French, German or Hindustani, and 
elementary field fortification. Military history and geography (notice was given 
ahead oftime on what specific campaigns were to be studied for military history), 
military drawing, geology, chemistry, with heat, electricity and magnetism, and 
higher mathematics, were all optiona1.208 Officers who had been in India were at 
some advantage, as some Indians made money tutoring officers to pass the exams 
offered for qualification as a translator. 209 
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A number of course changes were also made in the early 1870's, based on the 
recommendations of the Education Commission of 1868. A practical mathematics 
course was made obligatory, with an exam at the end of the first year, but did not 
contribute to the final grade?1O Photography, military telegraphy and signalling 
were also added. Thus the obligatory courses were: fortification and engineering; 
artillery; topographical drawing, military surveying and sketching, road making and 
photography; reconnaissance; military art, history and geography; military 
administration and law; French, German or Hindustani; military telegraphy and 
signalling; and riding. The voluntary subjects were the other two languages not 
chosen to be the obligatory one, geology, and experimental sciences. The grades 
achieved in these latter subjects, along with modem languages, and landscape 
drawing, did not contribute to the final official grade, but were reported to the 
commander in chief if they achieved a 60% grade? I I With the resumption of money 
with which to do it, the system of extended reconnaissances was resumed, with the 
unsurprising result that they were deemed, in the next report, to have been 
successfu1.212 
The students were involved in the 1871 autumn manoeuvres to apparently 
good effect, but not in 1872. This problem continued over the next few years, as the 
manoeuvres continued to be on a smaller scale than they were in 1871, leaving fewer 
opportunities for the students to get field experience.213 As mentioned earlier, these 
exercises ended in 1873, not to be resumed until 1898, leaving students as well as all 
other officers, without the opportunity to practice large scale manoeuvres in Britain. 
Under Sir Edward Hamley, the commandant from 1870 to 1877, military art 
and history was given increased emphasis, "and if the enforced study of this subject 
merely tended to encourage a taste for such reading in after life, it must be admitted 
that the time devoted to it at the College would not be thrown away. But it may be 
hoped that far more than this is effected, in some instances at least, and that lessons 
of vital importance are thus learnt which will be applied practically when these 
officers find themselves placed in positions of responsibility in the Field,,?I4 Some 
further changes were made in course and exam requirements in 1876. Telegraphy 
and photography became optional, the probationary exam at the end of the first term 
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was given a fixed standard of a 0.55 average, and 0.4 for any subject, and the 
importance of mathematics was further degraded to merely one of the obligatory 
. h h . 215 courses, WIt t e same reqUIrements. 
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The post course cross-attachment, during the summer drill season, to either 
another branch or to the staff of a general officer at camp commanding a combined 
anny was regularised?16 By the second report, they were also, after graduation, 
attached for 3 to 4 months to the Intelligence Department "where their individual 
fitness for various duties is fully tested, and where, it may be hoped, they acquire a 
knowledge of details which will be useful to them in their after career as Staff 
Officers"? 17 
Other changes were made to the organisation of the course. Final exam 
returns were now only listed by student name and in order of corps seniority, and no 
indication of grades to be posted except for those who had achieved honours. This, 
as well as the curtailing of mathematics, and the renewed emphasis on 
reconnaissances and military art and history, was due to the influence and effort of 
Sir Edward Hamley?18 A few years later, in the late 1870's, the final exam 
weighting for reconnaissance was emphasised at the expense of military drawing and 
surveying?19 The final exams covered the entire course, and earlier final exams for 
courses taken and marks for work done during the course were discontinued so as to 
make it possible to throw open the final exam to all officers, including those who had 
not taken the course. In 1872 two took this up, of which one passed.22o In the next 
period, 1873-5, 7 officers successfully challenged the exam, of which one passed on 
his second try?21 However, the education department began to move away from 
challenge exams and the rules were changed such that any officer who failed the 
probationary exam (at the end of the first tenn) or the final exam would not be 
pennitted to either take the entrance exam for the Staff College or challenge the final 
exam.222 
Despite these early modifications based on the 1868 commission, as well as 
later changes to the entrance exams, the subjects of the course and the standards for 
the exams, there is a reliable pattern for 30 years of relatively difficult entrance 
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exams, based on the failure and non-admission rates, and very easy final exams, 
given that failures were extremely rare. This pattern duplicates that of the RMC. As 
with the other elements of officers' education, most changes occurred in the late 
1870' s and early 1880' s, though not as much as other elements of officer training. 
Further changes were made in response to a committee appointed to look into 
the Staff College, which reported in 1880. Most of its recommendations were 
approved, and revised regulations were in force as of February 1881.223 The intent 
of these changes was to make the course more practical. The other problem, as the 
committee saw it, was that the Staff College was attracting most, but not all, of the 
sort of officers it wanted, and that some officers who were not suitable were being 
admitted. More specifically: 
1. The regimental certificates were unreliable?24 
2. The competition was "deterring,,?25 
3. Too much of the coursework was devoted to theoretical [in the sense of 
"too much bookwork,,226], rather than practical work. 
4. The existing system failed to emphasise the importance ofthe course as a 
necessary training for the Staff and the need for a period of strict probation. 
5. The final examination tended to be seen as the sole test of suitability, 
"rather than to regard it as a necessary evil re~uired to ensure application to 
the regulated studies and practical exercises". 27 
Despite the statement ofthe committee that it was "indisputable that the Staff 
College has attracted many of the best officers, both as regards character and 
educational attainments, who are to be found in the British Army", they feared that 
some officers who gained entry lacked these critical attributes, particularly a suitable 
quality of character.228 "The Committee fear that entry to the Staff College has been 
sought by some officers who were more desirous of escaping regimental duty and 
disagreeable foreign stations than of qualifying for Staff service.,,229 As almost all 
officers, by definition, were home or abroad at foreign stations, agreeable or 
otherwise, almost all applicants were open to this particular charge. In all the years 
following, most candidates (of those who passed the exams; there being no record in 
the reports of the stations of candidates who failed) were from home units, rather 
than disagreeable foreign stations, with a scattering of applicants from India, Malta, 
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Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Egypt, Bunna, Ceylon, Halifax, Bennuda and the Cape.230 
These officers only escaped regimental duty for 2 years, as being a staff college 
graduate was no guarantor of moving to a staff job. Aside from concerns that 
officers were dodging none too onerous duties for 2 years of schooling, there was a 
concern that little effort was being put in at the regimental level to find and send 
suitable candidates. This suggests a number of possibilities; that the senior and field 
officers producing these certificates were not making an effort to produce quality 
assessments, that they were not taking this education system, and the Staff College in 
particular, seriously, that they didn't want to send their good officers away from their 
regiment for 2 years, or that they saw the Staff College as a means of unloading poor 
quality or socially incompatible officers. 
The solution of the committee regarding lax recommendations was to lay 
more of the burden of the recommendation on the home regiment of the candidate. 
Instead of self-nomination, subject to rejection, the commanding officer was to 
maintain a list of subalterns and captains of over 3 years service that he "certifies to 
be in every respect thoroughly good regimental officers, and whom he recommends 
for admission to the Staff College, should they desire it, because he believes that 
their services on the Staff will be valuable and creditable to the regiment to which 
they belong,,?3l The three senior officers who are to report on the candidate were to 
do so independently, rather than jointly, and more thoroughly than hitherto had been 
the case. To make the point, the fonn on which the officers were to make their 
assessments was to include "a memorandum, impressing on the officers who are 
called on to make replies the importance of the duty, and the fact that the success or 
failure of an officer on the Staff is inseparably connected with the credit of his 
. ,,232 
regIment. 
The committee was ambivalent about competition, and suggested a number 
of alternatives for the admission of some candidates, such as those who showed 
ability on staff or in the field so long as they passed the entrance exam, or allowing 
these as supernumeraries outright. They also suggested that the Commander in 
Chief continue to be pennitted to authorise a second officer from the same regiment, 
so long as the second officer was in the top half of the successful candidates. 
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However, the committee felt pressured not to relax the competitive aspect; "they [the 
Committee] do not, in view of the general feeling and practice of the present day, 
feel called upon to propose any relaxation of this principle [of competition]". 233 The 
Commander in Chief's recommendation didn't pass committee. In 1885 two officers 
ofthe 1 st Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers were 4th and 8th in the ratings, and the 
second was not permitted entry.234 This also occurred in the i h Hussars and the 2nd 
Battalion East Surrey Regiment. 235 This restriction was later modified, so this was 
avoided for 2 infantry officers ofthe 1 st Battalion West Suffolk in 1891.236 
It is also possible that the committee was resisting pressure to lower 
standards. They recommended that the standard of qualification for entrance be 
raised "so as to insure a sufficient elementary knowledge of the subjects ofthe 
course to enable the students in the college ... to derive full advantage of the 
course.,,237 One wonders just how inadequate the elementary knowledge ofthe 
candidates was perceived to be. This is also much the same argument regarding the 
need for preparation work for garrison studies classes. By the tables in each of the 
five reports on officer education, about one fifth of applicants failed the entrance 
exam in the early 1870's, 16% in later 1870's, 24% through the late 70s and early 
80s, 31 % through the mid 80' s and 30% through the early 90S.238 
The committee also added requirements to the entrance exam. They 
recommended that Military Topography be added as obligatory, that the standard for 
Field Fortifications be raised, and that the minimum grade for German and 
Hindustani be 50% as French was. The committee also expressed the hope that "the 
day is not distant when the amount of mathematical attainment which is required by 
an officer of the General Staff may fairly be demanded on entrance". 239 This meant 
they wanted arithmetic, the first 4 books of Euclid (geometry, not trigonometry), and 
algebra as far as simple equations. In fact, in 1884 the required standard for the 
entrance exam was raised, and higher mathematics as an optional exam subject was 
also dropped. A decision was also made to drop mathematics as a course as of 
1886?40 Finally, the committee recommended that tactics and military law were 
added to the entrance exam as alternatives to the optional exam topics of geology 
d . l· 241 an expenmenta SCIence. 
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Changes were recommended in the course, as well. As of 1880, the course 
included military art, history and geography, fortification and artillery, staff duties 
and administration, military topography, reconnaissance, military law, geology, 
experimental sciences, modem languages, mathematics, and riding?42 More 
practical work and exercises, and especially reconnaissance, were to be emphasised 
relative to classroom work, and recommended more money should be budgeted for 
it. Money should be set aside for students who wished to visit foreign battlefields. 
As well, the professors should (as used to be the case) be allowed to allot a limited 
number of marks for practical work, which grades would count towards the final 
exam. Cross attachments might be shifted to minimise time away from regiment. 
Tactics should be expanded and Russian encouraged by a small grant in aid 
(according to the report) by a non-resident professor, if enough students were 
interested (according to the committee).243 This may have been due to the war scare 
in 1878. By 1889, a professor of Russian had been appointed to encourage study of 
Russian, and the passing grade was lowered from 0.6 to 0.5.244 A reward of 100 had 
been offered since 1886 for proficiency in Arabic, Russian and Turkish, suggesting 
that the languages of potential adversaries were of interest.245 
Geology and experimental sciences should be restricted to their practical 
application to the military and, to that extent, be obligatory and telegraphy and 
photography dropped altogether?46 By 1889, instruction in geology and 
experimental sciences had declined to a series oflectures and were not subject to 
grading?47 Riding skills were to be inspected on entering, and students were to 
attend riding school until deemed competent. Removal of students was to be strictly 
enforced. The second summer exam could be dropped. It was pointed out that it 
would greatly assist the students if lecture notes were printed and circulated before 
class.248 
Finally, the committee suggested a tentative minimum average passing grade 
of 1500 (of which a minimum of 850 and a maximum of 1700 could be gained from 
the obligatory subjects ).249 In practice, a minimum grade of around 1200-1400 was 
needed to gain admittance in the early 1870's, dropping to around 1000 in the latter 
half of that decade, and rising abruptly to over 1500 in 1880. From 1884 to 1892 the 
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lowest successful grades moved into the range of 1600-1800, and the number of 
applicants rose from the mid 30's in the 1870's to the 50's in the 1880's. From 
1880, there were more applicants, the quality of those applicants was improving, and 
the competition was getting tougher. The lowest grades admitted were, in the 
1870's, 960, in 1879 and, in the 1880's and 1890's, 1515, in 1885. These years were 
also ones of relatively few applicants compared to other years.250 Both these dates 
correspond to wars, suggesting that the officers thought involvement in a war was a 
better advantage to career enhancement than to pass out of the Staff College. Yet 
over the same time, the Staff College was becoming an increasingly popular career 
enhancer and a contrast with the downward academic trend at the RMC. 
Changes were introduced to make the final exam reflect the greater practical 
ability and quality of graduates. These included adding a practical exam in all 
practical work, having the language element of the course completed at the end of 
first year, and, presumably in light of pressure regarding competition, the minimum 
in each subject to be raised to 0.5 from 0.4 and the average to 0.6 from 0.55. The 
Staff College certificate was not to be given to those with unsatisfactory confidential 
reports from the commandant, in consultation with the military professors. Prior 
practice had seen the certificate given prior to and without reference to the 
commandant's report. Finally, the course could no longer be challenged (that is, the 
exam taken, and, if passed, the course is deemed to have been passed), as much of 
the benefit was derived in attendance?51 
The committee also suggested that the commander in chief consider granting 
a number of perks to the graduates of the Staff College who'd later performed well: 
allow them to be retired as unattached majors rather than be compulsorily retired as 
regimental captains, and that the staff officers' first year be made probationary?52 
In 1884, 1886 and again in 1888, the number of student admissions was 
expanded. This resulted in a final quota of 18 cavalry and infantry, six from the 
Royal Engineers and the Royal Artillery, three from the Indian Army, one from the 
Royal Marines and four nominated by the Commander in Chief. The four nominated 
officers were ones who had performed well in the field, or had been Adjutant for 
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four years. These officers were required to qualify in the obligatory subjects only, 
with a passing grade of three out of eight, rather than one half.253 In practice, this 
meant that these officers jumped the queue past mostly (and many) infantry officers 
who had passed normally, but whose grades were not high enough to make the 
quota?54 
Further revisions were made in the Staff college regulations in 1886, under 
the advice of a committee under Major-General Clive, the Commandant of the Staff 
College. It was recommended yet again that the certificate of fitness of candidates 
needed to be more stringent and concise. The entrance exams were made to be 
equivalent in scope to what was required for the qualifying exam for major; natural 
sciences were dropped, and German was made, again, an alternative to French as an 
obligatory language. The required standard for mathematics was reduced, but tactics 
was upgraded to a 50% pass. Poor handwriting had to be improved. Marks for the 
final exam were distributed over both years, with 1/3 to the first year. Modem 
languages that could be taken in the final exam were restricted to those that were 
taught at the college, that is, French, German, Russian and Hindustani. Honours 
were abolished, and 'distinguished' was used in place of special mention for those 
who got over 0.9 in anyone subject.255 These recommendations came into effect 
with the officers entering in February 1887?56 
With the various changes made, the examined subjects as of 1889 were: 
military history and geography, fortification and artillery, staff duties and 
administration, military law, military topography, reconnaissances, and French, 
German or Hindustani?57 The course was being made more and more narrowly 
practical, in the sense that subjects not directly relevant to military function were 
dropped. There is, as Bond points out, little indication that the students at the Staff 
College looked at issues beyond the tactical and administrative and that broader 
issues of national or colonial defence were not touched. 
Marks were increasingly based on work done during the course; over 40% of 
the total marks were awarded in the first year (presumably by the professors), and in 
the second, nearly 30% were given by the professors?58 "The effect ofthese 
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changes has not rendered the course more difficult than it formerly was, and failures 
to pass the examinations continued to be of rare occurrence. It may be doubted 
whether this does not indicate that the standard is not sufficiently high.,,259 
As with the other elements of officer education, the powers-that-be felt they 
had the bugs ironed out and there were few changes in the 1892 report. Russian was 
made one of the permitted languages to take on for the entrance exam, principles of 
trigonometric surveying and use of theodolites was made optional, and staff duties 
were separated from military law into separate final exam subjects. 
It does not appear that the Staff College suffered, like the other two elements, 
from declining standards or student quality, as evidenced by the increasing minimum 
grade required to be accepted to the college. However, as there are no officer 
education reports after 1892, and the material on South Africa pays relatively little 
attention to staff college issues, this cannot be stated for certain. Once an officer was 
screened by his superior officers, however laxly, and passed the entrance exam, there 
was little doubt that he would pass through Staff College. The significance of, and 
the problem behind, all the numerous but often minor changes in curriculum and 
exam grades was that, in absence of regular, large scale manoeuvres that closely 
mimicked war, and because wars did not result in equal opportunities for all officers 
to either demonstrate their merit or to be seen to be doing so, exams and coursework 
were the only means to directly compare the merit of officers across the board. 
There were really three problems with officers' education. The first was that 
there was a failure at all levels to systematically monitor the educational standards or 
content, and no concerted effort to make needed changes or to enforce a standard of 
either teaching or examination. Inspections of Sandhurst appear to have been 
formalised and superficial and assumed the quality of the education could be 
determined by a day of military inspection. There appears to have been even less 
effort in the case of garrison education and the promotion exams. Another problem 
was that if an officer candidate passed the entry exams for Sandhurst, he was almost 
certainly home free. It took a very moderate effort to pass. The third problem was 
that, although the promotion exams were linked directly to whether a junior officer 
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was promoted, promotion was also equally directly linked to seniority. This made 
the study for and taking of these exams to be an obstacle in the way of rising through 
ranks that, because of seniority, required no especial effort on the part of the 
officer. And, as Bond pointed out, "zeal and ability" seemed disconnected from 
prospects for advancement.26o A Staff College education, on the other hand, gained 
in respect and prestige because it became increasingly valuable in advancing an 
officer's career faster than the rate of regimental seniority. 
The high hopes of successive directors-general for the continuing garrison 
education of officers were repeatedly damaged by failure to enforce examination 
standards by more senior ranks. Despite official efforts to discount the importance 
of exams as a necessary evil to enforce a commitment to keep officer's professional 
knowledge fresh, they were also a prerequisite to promotion. These slowly become a 
matter of rote memory, rather than the demonstration of knowledge that was initially 
intended. Both the RMC and the Staff College suffered from entrance exams more 
difficult than the course, in the former's case, to bias the admission towards public 
school candidates. The course-work, increasingly emphasised a narrow expertise 
specific to the officer's likely duties, demonstrated by a "practical" exam (i.e. out of 
doors physical demonstration) rather than a more general, academic or "theoretical" 
(i.e. classroom based) course and exam. It also confined itselfto levels of 
knowledge needed by a regimental officer, but there was no element ofthe system 
designed to teach an officer his duties as a commander beyond that level, with the 
exception of some of the coursework of the Staff College. No balance was found 
between classroom instruction and practice in the field. Education was biased 
toward the concrete and away from larger, more contentious issues. This led to the 
study of European war, with its clear examples, and away from colonial war. It is 
ironic, then that British officers have been said to be non-professional until the tum 
of the twentieth century, on the grounds that they did not have the education, as did 
the continental armies, to wage continental war.261 But the officers of the First 
World War were confronted with updating an obsolete body of knowledge, not a 
transition from the unprofessional to the professional. This argument assumes that 
only major European war is "professional" and the knowledge and organisation 
needed to fight a colonial war is not. However, unlike many other professional 
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education systems of the day, this one was intended to emphasise, and even require, 
continuing proof of competence in an officer's chosen field at the regimental level. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Pay and Pensions 
164 
By eliminating purchase and giving the officers a pension system, the 
government changed the tenns of interaction between it and the officers: the officers 
were being paid by the government for a service, rather than the government paying 
the officers an honorarium while the officers made their money by trading the equity 
of their commissions among themselves. 
The anny, as a lobbying body competing for its share of public resources, 
could influence officer's pay rates. However, during the period covered in this work, 
the best the anny was able to do was to prevent the erosion of the line officer's small 
slice of the pie. This meant that a superlative officer could not gain the kind of 
compensation a superlative physician or lawyer could. Nonetheless, the nature of his 
compensation and the debates over it were revealing as to the state of the attitudes 
towards the officer profession and officer's professionalization. 
A man entering the line anny as an officer faced high expenses, low salaries 
and in all probability a very modest pension at the end of it. An officer climbing the 
ranks at an average rate could, reasonably achieve the rank oflieutenant colonel in 
his career, but the general ranks required that he be selected, rather than be 
dependent on seniority. Refonn tended to occur in response to officers and their 
problems. Like many other refonns of this period, much of the initial work on which 
further refonn was based was done in the 1870' s. Officers did get a regular pension 
system, with remuneration biased towards the highest ranks. At the lower ranks, the 
pension system served to maintain the pre-purchase rate of advancement by offering 
captains a pension just sufficiently large to be attractive enough to take, leaving the 
field of promotion open for their fellow officers. Pay and professional expenses, 
both official and unofficial, did not become a major issue until very nearly the tum 
of the century. Then the shortage of officers finally made itself felt, as the low pay 
and high expenses were seen to be having a negative effect on recruitment from the 
professional classes. 
Corinne L. Mahaffey, 2003 Chapter 5 165 
The Cardwell refonns ended the system of purchase of officer ranks. The 
purchase system had allowed men to purchase their first commission into the officer 
ranks, and then to purchase successive promotions to the rank oflieutenant colonel. 
An officer who did not have the finances to purchase up to the next rank could wait 
for the death of a more senior officer. All officers junior to the deceased officer 
would gain a step in seniority, and the most senior officer of a rank would gain a 
rank without purchasing it. An officer had to spend 2 years in rank as a subaltern, 
and six as a captain, but beyond that minimum, he could purchase his way up the 
ranks as fast as his finances would support him. It had become common practice to 
pay an "over-regulation" sum in excess ofthe official cost of purchasing a step in 
rank (the difference in value between present rank and the one being bought), an 
abuse that had come under fire from earlier refonn commissions.! The end of 
purchase left many officers without any clear sense of the shape of their future and a 
sense of profound betrayal. The government had destroyed the system which they 
understood and within which they knew how to work, and left them without a clear 
understanding of how the new system was to be applied to their lives and careers. 
While the Cardwell refonns had ended the officers' purchase system of promotion 
and retirement, the initial programme to replace it was very limited. Retired full and 
half pay was continued, and commissions held on 1 November 1871 could still be 
sold, though only the government could purchase them. In an effort to maintain the 
average rate of promotion that existed before the end of purchase, the tenure of 
regimental lieutenant colonels and majors was limited to 5 years. 2 Concern for their 
futures and a feeling of betrayal by their government resulted in a series of 
memorials by the officers. By means of a convoluted tap dance around protocol, 
these memorials resulted in two commissions in the 1870's dedicated to creating a 
new system for ensuring the officers' financial futures. The system that resulted in 
1876, based on a pension program at all ranks, remained until 1914. 
In 1873 General Hope Grant wrote the covering letter for a collection of 
petitions by 2,245 officers of various line units, expressing the "widespread 
dissatisfaction and discontent" among the officers and their concern over their future 
pay and prospects under the new system.3 These officers represented about 40% of 
the total regimental strength of all regimental officers in the anny.4 Originally, this 
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petition was to be sent to Parliament, but the Duke of Cambridge issued a general 
order expressing his disapproval of army officers sending petitions to Parliament. 
Major General Sir Percy E. Herbert said that he then went to the Commander in 
Chief to find out how these petitions should properly be brought to Parliament's 
attention. The initial result was the commission that sat in 1873 to inquire into the 
resulting memorials.5 A further commission sat in 1876 to make recommendations 
on creating a system of army promotion and retirement under the Cardwell system 
and a functional system of transition for officers who began their careers as purchase 
officers.6 
The officers had two key grievances: first, that the purchase officers were 
debarred from selling commissions for ranks gained after 1 November, 1871, thus 
losing the expected proceeds that resulted from selling more advanced ranks, and 
second, that the commission to major or lieutenant colonel had been changed by the 
reforms to be for a limited period of five years.7 
Regarding the second grievance, the officers feared that they would not get 
sufficient time in service - 30 years - to get a full pension, or 25 for a half-pay 
pension. Because ofthe limited terms for major and lieutenant-colonel, the officers 
would have to remain in the captain and lieutenant ranks for 15 to 20 years, unless 
they could be either re-appointed to their position at the rank of major or lieutenant-
colonel or promoted further. Should they be forced on to half-pay after their five 
years as a lieutenant colonel due to lack of promotion prospects within the service, 
those years on half-pay did not count towards their retirement. This fixed maximum 
period of service in rank would also have the effect of decreasing their total pay.8 
Finally, Herbert stated to the commission, the officers did not expect to be able to 
exchange to get off half pay and back into regular service.9 
Of the two grievances that the committee noted, the first was the more 
critical. Under the purchase system, there were two ways of gaining rank. The first 
method was to purchase the next rank up within the regiment, subject to seniority.JO 
Clearly, those with sufficient means could purchase their way rapidly up the 
promotion ladder. I I Those possessing more modest means would have to wait until 
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a non-purchase rank became open in their regiment. Though this meant slower 
promotion, it also meant that when they did retire that they would gain, by sale of 
their rank upon retirement, significantly more money than they had invested in 
buying their commissions. I2 The ultimate goal was a field rank, or at least a 
lieutenant colonelcy, which was sold at a profit on retirement.13 
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In fact, of the line officers speaking on their own behalf, 4 of 24 stated they 
had borrowed money to make at least one advance in rank and 3 said they had not 
yet repaid those loans. I4 One ofthese officers testifying, Captain Galbraith of the 
85th foot, had gone quite deeply into debt, having invested all his private means, as 
well as taking out a loan, so as to secure his purchased captaincy. His expectation 
had been that he would eventually become senior captain due to the purchase efforts 
ofthe other captains in his regiment, at which point he would be in position to step 
into the first non-purchase major's vacancy available. Is Captain Campbell, of the 
30th foot, used an alternative method. "My means are small; I knew from the first 
that I should be unable to purchase any of my steps. When I entered the service I 
ran, as it were, for a prize, the value of which was 7,OOOI., that being the regulation 
and over-regulation price, of a lieutenant-colonelcy." 16 Finally, there was the 
possibility of active service. According to Major Scott, ofthe 42nd Highlanders, 
I went to India in 1857. I purchased - I knew full well that I ran two chances 
in this way - I ran the chance oflosing the purchase price of my commission 
while on active service in the field, but then again I ran the equal chance of 
increasing the value of my commission by gaining higher promotion while 
serving in the field .... Q.799. For the purpose of retirement? - For the 
purpose of retirement. 17 
Exchange was another means used by the officers to promote their career and 
fiscal advancement, which had also been ended by the new system. In an exchange, 
an officer who wished to leave his regiment would pay another officer to take his 
place in the regiment while he took the buyer's place. 15 of 24 line officers 
specifically mentioned the importance of exchanges to their career. For the buyers, 
they gave opportunity to gain the higher pay and lower expenses of India, as well as 
the exchange money, which might be used to finance the necessary travel, payoff 
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debts, or purchase a rank. For the sellers, it was a means to avoid service in India, 
return early from India or go to half-pay due to illness or other personal reasons. I8 
The commission recommended in this case the restoration of this system, as it 
benefited both participants and saw no likelihood that it would lead back to the 
abuses of the purchase system. I9 
It was the inability to sell commissions (especially senior commissions, 
which were both more lucrative to sell and easier to gain through the principal's 
death) that distressed the officers?O The regulation prices for commissions in the 
infantry, as estimated by the army purchase commission, were as follows: 
Table 1. Regulation and Over Regulation Purchase?1 
rank! cost of commission in £ regulation price over regulation 
pnce 
Lieutenant Colonel 4,500 2,000-3,500 
Major 3,200 1,200-1,925 
Captain 1,800 400-900 
Lieutenant 700 0-200 
Ensign 450 --
From these prices, it can be seen that the break point for both regulation and over 
regulation prices was from captain to major. This sudden jump in the cost of 
promotion from captain and major also shows in the percentage of commissions 
gained with purchase. This percentage dropped abruptly at the rank of major, as 
officers began to rely on more on seniority than purchase to obtain higher rank, as 
shown in the table below. 
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Table 2. Percentage of commissions held by officers of the infantry (excepting foot 
d) bt' d 'th d 'th t h f 111170 22 
_guar s 0 ame WI an WI ou purc ase as 0 
rank! % of commissions by purchase without purchase 
gained 
Lieutenant Colonel 46 54 
Major 51 49 
Captain 66 34 
Lieutenant 64 36 
Ensign 62 38 
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In effect, a purchase commission was both career and investment - to gain a 
significant return on the investment, the officer had to have a career's service with a 
modest, but increasing return (pay), intermittent purchases to increase the equity 
value of their investment, and, for poorer officers, the chance of gaining equity 
without cost. With the end of purchase service, the officers who had invested in 
purchase rank had their money at risk without hope of further return beyond the 
purchase price of their present rank.23 A purchase officer would receive whatever 
the regulation price was for whatever rank he held in 1871, no matter when he 
retired.24 The value of a captain's commission potentially contained (allowing for 
the risk of death in service) the equity (value after liabilities deducted) of a major or 
lieutenant colonel's commission. As Lieutenant Colonel Herbert put it: 
Should circumstances oblige him to retire, he ... will receive the 450!. which 
he paid on entry into the service, instead of the 1,800!', the 3,200!', or the 
4,500!. to which he would have been entitled according as he had obtained 
the rank of captain, major, or lieutenant-colonel, under the system under 
which he entered under the agreement on faith of which he paid his 4501. 
The agreement you understand is a moral agreement. 
9. (Chairman.) An understanding?--An understanding?5 
This moral 'understanding' was one of the points that Lieutenant Colonel 
Herbert, if not the committee, thought critical to present: 
No claim is or will be put forward by the officers, that the Government were 
not fully entitled to make any alteration in their terms of service, to abolish 
purchase, to alter the rules of promotion, to forbid exchanges from one corps 
to another, or to make any changes which they thought desirable for the 
efficiency of the service. But the officers do maintain that as regards their 
individual pecuniary interests, when a system under which they had been 
called upon and obliged to pay large sums of money under Government 
regulations, was suddenly changed by the authority of Government without 
any option on their part, public honour and equity alike demanded that the 
contract between them which was cancelled by the Government, so far as the 
prospective benefit of individual officers was concerned, should be cancelled 
from its beginning in its entirety; and that to all those affected by the change 
the money due to them at the time when the contract was cancelled, money 
either actually paid by them for their commissions, or to which they had 
become entitled by service upon the faith of Government regulations, should 
be forthwith made good to them.26 
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Many, including both Herbert and the officers who testified before the memorials 
commission, felt that the government was responsible for the establishment and 
maintenance of the purchase system and that the officers themselves were not 
responsible for the system's origin or continuance. They, as well as those who 
testified to explain the difficulties the end of purchase had cost them, clearly felt 
there was a moral breach of contract on the part ofthe government?7 The officer's 
memorials commission skirted by this issue, but the following commission on 
promotion and retirement was careful to deny any moral obligation on the part of the 
government with respect to the new system: 
.... we wish it to be understood that in our opinion no vested rights or moral 
claims, having the practical force of vested rights, should be created in 
respect of pensions or sums of money on retirement, inasmuch as their 
adjustment in point of amount to the needs of the service is a matter to be 
determined only by experience?8 
The 1874 committee, however, concluded, "the question of compensation 
ought not to be dissociated from that of promotion" and recommended that some 
form of pension be provided upon retirement.29 On the assumption that the flow of 
promotion would remain steady (it was not within the mandate of this committee to 
discuss promotion), it recommended that officers who reached the ranks oflieutenant 
colonel or major be given, upon retirement, the regulation and over regulation price 
of their commissions and that such officers going on half-pay after their limit of five 
years in these ranks should be allowed to count their time on half-pay towards their 
retirement. They did not propose any compensation to be given to captains in that 
rank, in the expectation that they would gain higher rank. For lieutenants, they 
recommended a lump sum payment based on their years in service.3o 
A second commission followed two years later on promotion and retirement, 
headed by Lord Penzance. This commission was a specific, directed effort to create 
a system for career advancement that could be recommended to Parliament. Since 
the abolition of purchase, the rate of promotions, being the critical issue for career 
advancement, had slowed. This was blamed on the fact that the only permanent 
sources of officer attrition were death and the five-year limit on the field ranks. 
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Because the battalion rank structure was 1 lieutenant colonel, 2 majors, 11 captains, 
and 18 subalterns, there was a real bottleneck in promotion possibilities at the 
captain to major level.3 ! In principle, the committee felt that the future rate of 
promotion in the army should be no worse than that under purchase?2 That rate of 
promotion was estimated to be as in the following table, based on those officers 
serving in January of 1840, 1846, 1852, 1858, 1864, and 1870. In fact, according to 
the commission, the average rate of promotion was slowing, and actuarial calculation 
suggested that it would become as shown in the table.33 
T bl 3 P a e t R t ( romo IOn ae t t b . nk) 34 average Ime m servIce 0 0 tam ~IVen ra 
Rank Time in service; est. in 1870 Time in service est. 1877 
(years, months) (years, months) 
Lieutenant 2,8 --
Captain 9,0 15,9 
Major 18, 11 29,3 
Lieutenant Colonel 23,6 33,6 
There is a further source that indicates the promotion rate at about this time. The 
first part is an abstract from a table submitted by Lieutenant Colonel Herbert to the 
1873 memorials commission. 
Table 4. Average service of infantry officers.35 
years in rank! Lieutenant Captain Major Lieutenant 
on attaining the rank of (years, (years, (years, Colonel 
months) months) months) (years, 
months) 
purchasing officers, 2,8 8,3 17,3 22,4 
1870 
non-purchasing officers, 2,8 9,9 19,2 25,0 
1870 
This matches reasonably well to the graphical tables of appendix N of that 
commission, which show the number of officers in each year of service in each rank: 
on 1 November, 1871. Taking the averages from these tables, the average time in 
rank: and the average time in service were as follows: 
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Table 5. Time in rank and service, 1 November, 1871.36 
I Rank Average time in rank Average time in service 
(years, months) (years, months) ~EnSign 3,4 3,4 
~ Lieutenant 4,9 7,8 
I Captain 6,5 15,2 
I Major 5,0 22, 7 
I Lieutenant Colonel 6,4 28,4 
Ensigns, lieutenants and captains show a nice linear progression on these tables; the 
more years of total service, the more years in rank, but this linear correspondence 
breaks down for majors and especially for lieutenant colonels. For them the values 
cluster: 17 to 27 years of total service and 1 to 8 years in rank for majors and 20 to 
34 years of total service and 1 to 6 years in rank for lieutenant colonels. This would 
suggest that seniority was a more significant factor in the junior ranks and less so in 
the field ranks, yet the evidence of this commission suggests that purchase was more 
likely in the lower ranks. Looking at Herbert's table above, it appears that purchase 
only shortened time in rank by one to three years, suggesting that most officers did 
not purchase their way up with any great speed, possibly due to lack of ready money, 
relatively few openings by retirement, or a personal sense of unreadiness to take on 
the higher rank too quickly. This, in fact, agrees with appendix N, which shows that 
few lieutenants had more than 14 years of total service, and few captains had more 
than 18.37 This suggests that purchase was little more significant as a factor in 
promotion before 1870 than death or resignation were. It would be interesting to 
know whether there was a faster rate of career advancement in the more lethal (due 
to disease and war) colonies than at home. Given the general improvements in 
public health, and the general lessening of access to colonial war experience and the 
attendant risk of death, it is possible that promotion would have been slowed even if 
purchase had not been ended. 
The key to maintaining a reasonable promotion rate, as the commission saw 
it, was to find a means to reduce the lower ranks so that fewer officers were 
ultimately competing for the few higher positions. Their solution was to apply the 
system of retirement to the lower ranks as well as the senior ranks. Offering 
retirement, voluntary or otherwise, to only the senior ranks would not vacate senior 
Corinne L. Mahaffey, 2003 Chapter 5 173 
positions at a fast enough rate, unless the maximum period allowed in that rank were 
to be shortened past the point of efficiency,38 Following from the previous 
commission, they also recommended linking pension to time in service.39 The 
committee considered that money given to induce voluntary retirement, or to 
accompany forced retirement, was a type of deferred pay and should be seen as an 
element, like pay, in the advantages offered in return for service.4o The 1874 
commission was referred to as stating that most officers quit in the ranks of ensigns 
to captains, meaning that purchase promotions were themselves due to attrition at 
lower ranks, rather than a high vacancy rate at the higher ranks.41 Thus a 
comprehensive pension system was instrumental to the creation of a system of career 
advancement. 
More specifically, the committee recommended that commissions of 
lieutenant and captain be held for a total maximum of 20 years; if the officer had not 
obtained further promotion by then, he should be compulsorily retired from the 
regiment, accompanied by a pension of at least £200, given that one of the key 
reasons to abolish purchase had been to open the ranks of the army to those with 
limited means.42 Compulsory retirement, it was emphasised, should be a last 
resort.43 A preferred means to remove officers from their regiments was to offer full 
pay positions in government departments to qualified regimental officers.44 
From the evidence of the minutes of the Penzance commission, it appears 
that another problem that exercised the officers was half-pay, especially just below 
the general ranks. The feeling was that it tended unnecessarily to remove good 
officers from useful work without leaving them any of the advantages of being in the 
system.45 Lieutenant-General Simmons noted that, given the rapid changes over the 
past few years, a few years in half-pay and the officer would be too out oftouch.46 
There was no consistent opinion on whether to give any lump sum or retirement 
pension to junior officers, and those who opposed it generally did so for fear that the 
best officers would leave.47 The officers questioned generally much preferred that 
the senior ranks were thinned to improve promotion prospects for the ranks below 
them.48 Some suggested age-related compulsory retirement, such as for captains 
with 25 years of service (who were presumably unlikely to gain another rank) or 
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retirement after a maximum age for senior officers, as a means to thin the ranks.49 
Compulsory retirement was opposed by most, but generally would be tolerated if 
proved necessary. 50 Given the option of compulsory retirement with a pension or 
half-pay status, they chose retirement.51 The idea of civil employment after 
retirement was received mostly with approva1.52 
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The Penzance commission made a number of specific recommendations 
regarding how the pension system should work, with further suggestions regarding a 
transitional system specific to purchase officers. For non-purchase officers and those 
who gained rank since the reforms the commission suggested a sliding scale lump 
sum payment based on the number of years in service, from 8 to 19 years inclusive. 
It was suggested that captains be given the option of retiring with half-payout of the 
regiment at 15 to 20 years service, and an eventual honorary step in rank at the age 
of 45. At 20 years service, a captain was required to take either compulsory 
retirement out of the regiment, with half pay and a chance at non-regimental 
employment, or out of the army with full pension. For higher ranks, the options 
were retirement from the regiment with a step of unattached promotion and a chance 
at non-regimental employment, or retirement from the army with a full pension.53 
The recommendations were somewhat different for purchase officers. To 
begin with, The Penzance commission disagreed with the 1874 commission that 
financial compensation be granted for those who gained a rank only, because the 
purchase officers would choose to remain in the army as long as possible in hope of 
promotion. 54 Promotions among captains had, in fact, stagnated since the abolition 
of purchase. 55 Ensigns, coronets, and lieutenants were deemed to be provided for 
under the non-purchase recommendations. The adjustments had to be made at the 
captaincy level, where the commissions' recommended pensions were lower than the 
amounts these officers might have expected to gain by sale of their commissions.56 
First, they should be ineligible for promotion after 25 years oftotal service. After 12 
to 20 years service, captains should have the option of retirement from the regiment, 
which would include brevet rank, over-regulation cost of rank, half-pay, and half 
brevet pay for brevet majors, with liability to serve on request, or retirement from the 
army, in which case they would get the sum they were entitled to under the Army 
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Regulation Act. After 20 years they were to be given the choice of either retirement 
from the army with a full pension, which included a widow's pension and a step of 
honorary rank, or retirement from the regiment with the rank: of major, and a lump 
sum payment upon retirement from the army. 57 Similar offers for retirement from 
the regiment (unattached rise in rank plus chance of non-regimental employment and 
retirement pension) or retirement from army with full pension and over-regulation 
money and honorary step in rank: were to be made to majors, and a similar offer of 
army retirement to lieutenant colonels. 58 
Unless considerable retirements are effected (in the captain's rank: especially) 
the promotion which has been promised to the Army cannot possibly be 
given. The choice therefore lies between stagnation in promotion and a 
sufficient amount of retirement obtained by some means or other. In this 
choice we have not hesitated to accept the conclusion that the general welfare 
of the whole body of officers must prevail over the desires or interests of 
individuals, subject to this condition, that a reasonably liberal provision 
should be made for the individuals who are called upon to make any sacrifice 
for the purpose. 59 
Based on the above system of pensions, the commission recommended 
seniority in the regiment to be the basis of regimental promotion, which appears to 
include the promotion to lieutenant colonel. 60 They also approved of the informal 
system that had developed since 1871 of regular confidential reports by the 
lieutenant colonel of the regiment on the conduct, abilities and military qualifications 
of his officers. These were submitted to the inspecting general for his approval and 
remarks, and forwarded to the Commander in Chief. Should a particular officer 
prove through these reports to be unfit for promotion, he was not promoted. 
However, it was also recommended that some unattached promotions should be left 
open to the discretion of the Commander in Chief, to be filled on the basis of reports 
of officers of particular merit and promise made by their commanding officers.61 
The commission felt that promotion by seniority, leavened by rejection, was the best 
system for promotion because it felt that there was no substitute for military action in 
showing the military qualifications of an officer, and that "we do not think: that any 
amount of acquired knowledge, tested by any form of examination, is a guarantee for 
the possession of those numerous and varied qualities which go to form the character 
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of military excellence".62 Unfortunately, unless there was a major war, few would 
have the chance to experience military action, and it seemed unfair that these few, 
due to luck, should have their promotions accelerated.63 From the minutes of 
evidence, it is clear that a system of promotion by seniority within the regiment, and 
selection (of officers to promote further) used to reject officers either too 
inexperienced or too incompetent to be promoted, had been in use since the Cardwell 
reforms were enacted, and most of the officers questioned on this matter approved of 
the system and wished to continue it. 64 Lord Sandhurst considered the current 
system to be a great improvement on the purchase system in which he had been 
totally unable to get rid of incompetent officers.65 Only two officers approved of 
selection as the key factor in promotion, and both of them had done this while 
commanding in India.66 Selection as a primary factor in promotion was rejected by 
most, on the grounds that it would be too difficult to determine merit in peacetime, 
or that it would cause too much discontent.67 Exams as a means of testing fitness for 
promotion were generally not favoured, and there was a general opinion that an 
officer passed over for promotion should retire, though a few felt a second chance 
ought to be given an officer. 68 The real criterion for professional expertise was 
perceived to be practical service in the field, however uncommon, which was an 
option open to no other army in Europe at that time. 
Though the Penzance commission considered the gradation of pensions to be 
a central principle of their recommendations, the govenunent did not wholly apply 
their recommendations. In particular, no British govenunent of the period ever 
implemented a fully graduated scale of pensions. By 1900, however, the Germans 
had a graduated system of pensions starting after 10 years of service.69 Graduated 
pensions were not contemplated in Britain until 1902, and then only for majors and 
colonels and above, and rejected in the case ofmajors.7o Instead Britain 
experimented with a much more limited series of step-wise cut-offs. It was intended 
that the rate of promotion that existed during purchase should be maintained. Since 
the whole point of the pension system was to convince some officers to retire so that 
others would be able to rise in rank, the pension system was, in effect, the officer 
selection system at the regimental level. Thus the decision point for an officer as to 
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whether to continue in this career or to retire out of it was the advance from captain 
to major. 
The Penzance commission's proposal for a graduated scale of retirement, for 
8 to 19 years, was converted, in the Appointment, Promotion and Retirement 
Warrant of 1877, to a stepped system of voluntary retirement, starting at 12 years of 
service. It was officially stated that this number of years was chosen because, "it has 
been considered that for sometime after his first appointment a young officer is 
learning his profession, [and] that many young Officers are willing to withdraw 
without putting the country to the charge of compensation".71 In fact, 15 years of 
service was considered. The draft warrant proposed 10 years, but the Treasury, 
having been consulted, balked at the prospective cost, and recommended 15 years as 
the minimum. 72 
Holding, as they [the Treasury Lords] do, that compulsory retirement is 
essential to the efficiency of the Army under its new conditions, they are 
nevertheless, and they have already shown, strongly of opinion that it 
involves great hardship, and should be applied as sparingly as possible. They 
are, therefore, ready to admit that if Officers do not continue to enter the 
Army intending as formerly to remain in it for a few years only, it will be 
necessary to provide some inducement to them to retire of their own accord 
before the period fixed for compulsory retirement is reached. But it appears 
to my Lords that there is no proof as yet of such a change of practice, and it is 
clear that every pound paid to an officer in easy means, who would under any 
circumstances retire, is a pound needlessly expended. 73 
This suggests that, as the Treasury understood it (and the War Office agreed), 
most officers in the purchase era did not remain with the army as a career, and did 
not see that there was, as yet, any indication that most men joining the officer ranks 
would be doing so for the long term. Following this, the Treasury felt that entrance 
to the army should be restricted to no more than that number which would keep the 
officer positions filled. However, given the army needed to lose junior officers so as 
to maintain promotion rates for the rest, the army would have to recruit more officers 
than they needed to fill the ranks (because they needed many more junior than senior 
officers). A 15 year cut-off would make the problem of maintaining promotion rates 
worse. The Treasury, on the understanding that "the main principle of the new 
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scheme is the retirement from regimental duty of un-promoted captains of twenty 
years' service", further felt that the warrant, as proposed, would fall hardest upon 
middle aged officers, (35 to 55 years), 
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... for it is difficult for men trained and inured to a special profession to find 
employment readily in other and new lines oflife, while the sum which the 
State can afford to grant them at an early age must be insufficient for their 
wants. But it falls with the least hardship on those who have reached a period 
of life at which they can retire with little if any loss of emolument, and for 
whom well-earned repose is certainly not inopportune.74 
The Treasury proposal would set the first possible date of retirement to match nearly 
that of an officer's attainment ofthe rank of captain, according to actuarial estimates 
of the rates of advancement under then current conditions.75 (see Table 5. Time in 
Service above) This would be about seven years after the average attainment of that 
rank according to the Penzance commission's estimate of promotion rates before 
1871, which they recommended should continue in the future.76 The War Office 
assured the Treasury, first, that they hoped that voluntary retirement would be 
sufficient, though they could not envision eliminating the compulsory clauses, and 
second, that the competition for entrance, and the new, higher educational 
qualifications, would tend to deter such officers as only joined for a few years. The 
War Office feared that officers would be more likely to hold on until retirement at 20 
years at greater cost to the government than to take voluntary retirements at 10 or 
more years. They expected the cost of the retirement scheme to start showing up in 
the estimates of 1881.77 In fact, the non-effective costs for officers (which included 
pensions as most of its cost) did rise by £215,200 in 1881, to £1.38M, but it had been 
rising since 1878, when that part of the estimates had nearly doubled from the 
previous year. From 1881, this vote continued to rise to £2M in 1900. Retirement 
benefits rose from £1,133,500 in 1878 to £1,591,500 in 1882. They then continued 
to rise very slowly to £ 1,948,264 in 1899. 78 As a percentage of the total estimates, 
this is a rise from 5% to 9%. 
In terms of the total army estimates, the percentage cost of pay and 
allowances peaked at 35.7% of the total estimates in 1873, and fell unevenly 
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thereafter until around 1887 at 26.8%. From 1890, this percentage remained fairly 
stable, ranging from 32% to 34.5%. (See Chart 3 - Votes as a Percentage of 
Estimates: 1870-1887 and Chart 4 - Votes as a Percentage of Estimates: 1889-1901) 
The army estimates were rising steadily from 1870 through 1887, though the 
expenditures were less stable. The charts do not include sums voted in addition, 
separately from the budget. After four separate reorganisations of the presentation of 
the estimates (1887, 1888, 1889, 1890), the total estimates and the expenditures 
remained flat, at around £20M, until the South African war. (See Chart 3 - Estimates 
and Expenditures 1870-1887 and Chart 4 - Estimates and Expenditures 1889-1902.) 
Pay and allowances took a far larger bite of the estimates than pensions, but there is 
no plain correlation with the relatively stable number of officers. The number of 
active officers at home and in the colonies had levelled off in 1882 to somewhat over 
2800, with an additional 1500 officers serving in India (See Chart 6 - Home and 
Colonies Establishment: Officers and Chart 8 - India Establishment: Officers). 
As mentioned in an earlier chapter, due to the reorganisations, the estimates 
and expenditures for 1888 and the estimates for 1889 are left out in the charts. In 
Chart 1 - Estimates and Expenditures 1870-1887, Votes 1, 2, and 3 are "General 
Staff and Regimental Pay, Allowances and Charges", "Divine Service" and 
"Administration of Martial Law" respectively. In Chart 2 - Estimates and 
Expenditures 1889-1902, Vote 1 is "Pay & c. of the Army (General Staff, 
Regiments, Reserve and Departments)". These votes are coded in blue. Vote 14, 
"Establishments for Military Education" becomes vote 11 in the second chart, and is 
coded pink. Votes 17, 18, 19,20, and 21 are "Rewards for Distinguished Services 
&c.", "Pay of General Officers", "Retired Full Pay, Retired Half-Pay, Pensions, and 
Gratuities, Payments Allowed by Army Purchase Commissioners", "Widows 
Pensions & c." and "Pensions for Wounds", respectively. In the second chart these 
are all accounted for under Vote 14, "Non-Effective charges for Officers, & c." 
They are colour coded green. "Total estimate" and "total expenditure" are coded in 
red. 
The final warrant allotted pensions for retirements as follows, though the 
option of choosing instead the Retired Full Pay List after 30 years' service and the 
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Retired Half Pay after 25 years service was retained. There were variations on this 
in the warrant, based on the exact circumstances of an officer's commission. 
SUBALTERN. 
Voluntary. 
(a.) After 15 years' service a gratuity of £1,700 
(b.) After 18 years' service, a gratuity of £2,00079 
[The actual warrant states: 
After 12 years' service a gratuity of £1,200 
After 15 years' service a gratuity of £1,600 
After 18 years' service, a gratuity of £2,0008°] 
Compulsory. 
(c.) After 20 years' service, Half Pay, or retirement on £200 a year. 
CAPTAIN. 
Voluntary. 
Ca.) The same gratuities as a Subaltern. 
(b.) At any time, transfer for service in the Militia, (ifhe can obtain an appointment 
therein) with Half Pay for 10 years. 
(c.) After 15 years' service [12 years' service if a Purchase Captain ofInfantry], but 
not after 20 years' service, permanent Half Pay. 
(d.) After 20 years' service, £200 a-year. 
Compulsory. 
(Only applicable to Post-Purchase Captains.) 
(e.) After 20 years' service in all, and 7 years as a Captain, half Pay, or retirement on 
a pension of £200 a-year. 
MAJOR. 
Voluntary. 
Ca.) The same gratuities as a Subaltern. 
(b.) After 23 years' service, a pension of £250 a-year. 
(c.) After 27 years' service, including 7 years as a Major, £300 a-year. 
Compulsory. 
(Only applicable to Post-Purchase Majors.) 
(d.) After 27 years in all, including 7 years as Major, Half Pay, or retirement on a 
pension of £300 a-year. 
LIEUTENANT -COLONEL. 
Voluntary. 
At any time, a pension of £250 a-year. 
After 27 years' service, a pension of £300 a-year. 
After 30 years' service, a pension of £365 a-year. 
Compulsory. 
After 5 years in the rank, withdrawal to half pay. 
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BREVET-COLONEL. 
Voluntary. 
At any time after completing 5 years' service as a substantive Lieutenant-Colonel, 
retirement on a pension of £420 a-year. 
Compulsory. 
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Retirement on the same pension at the age of 55 (if promoted to Colonel hereafter). 
GENERAL OFFICER. 
Compulsory. 
Retirement at the age of 70, retaining tenure of or succession to an honorary 
colone1cy.,,81 
Purchase officers could choose any of the above retirement options, where 
applicable, or choose the following, in addition to their right of sale. 
CAPTAIN. 
After 20 years' service, a pension worth £3,200, so long as it do not exceed 
£259 a-year. [This being the commuted value of £3,200] If service has already been 
25 years, this limit will not hold. 
The Purchase-Captain of Infantry promoted to Major already, or within six 
months from date of Warrant, will retain this privilege. 
MAJOR. 
After 25 years' service, a pension of £292 a-year, with bonus. 
This will be extended to a Purchase-Major promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel 
already or within six months after the Warrant issues. If promoted later and his 
health render him unable to complete five years in the rank he may nevertheless 
retire on £420 a-year. 
LIEUTENANT -COLONEL. 
At the age of 52, a pension of £600 a_year.82 
These changes in the retirement provisions are a significant shift from the 
intent ofthe Penzance commission. The commission wished to encourage the 
voluntary retirement of officers at the earliest possible point in their careers, after 
their basic education and some regimental experience. Instead the warrant put the 
burden on officers to decide whether to choose a minimum retirement lump sum 
payment at 12 years, or to hold out for 20 years either to be promoted past captain or 
to get the compulsory retirement pension at 20 years' service. The latter was 
precisely what the War Office did not want. 
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Given the net expenses of a junior officer (some £ 100 - £ 150 or more per 
year greater than his salary), the £1,200 a retiring officer received after 12 years 
would, at best, do little more than cover his expenses to date, quite aside from the 
costs of his education on or before entry, whether through Sandhurst, the Militia or a 
university. In the case of the legal profession, there was likely to be no income at all 
for the first few years after entering the profession, necessitating an estimated private 
income of £2,433 for that period.83 Joining the military was the relatively cheaper 
investment, but was also without the opportunity of getting the very high incomes 
possible for legal professionals. An officer who retired with a pension of £200 was 
in possession of a very modest middle class income, though without the expenses 
entailed by service.84 
Therefore, given the average rate of advancement, any officer could 
reasonably expect to achieve the rank of captain and at least break even with an early 
retirement after 12 years. A captain could also end a career of20 years with little to 
show for it other than a military education and a small pension that gave him an 
income at the bottom end of the middle class, with an income comparable to that of a 
legal clerk, a reporter, or upper division civil servant at the bottom of the pay scale.85 
However, that captain, after initial education costs and the positive net expenses of 
his first few years, ended his career on a solid, if very modest, financial footing. The 
risk of dying in battle was quite low, and the risk of death by disease was dropping. 
Unlike a purchase officer, he was not risking an increasingly large financial 
investment against the possibility of his death. Und~r the pension system, the 
investment of time in a career guaranteed a financial return, while each level of 
promotion in the purchase system was essentially an investment of money in 
expectation of making more money from that rank's later sale. By contrast, while 
lawyers had to make a higher initial investment and could potentially reap incomes 
of thousands of pounds per year, few did so. The military offered significantly less 
potential financial reward, but also less financial risk. Thus, financially, the army 
was the safer, and much more cautious investment, aside from the risk of injury or 
death. 
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Any of these pensions could be commuted (paid in gross rather than in yearly 
payments) to a maximum ofhalftheir total value, because, "it was decided that 
officers, many of whom had become paupers by having speculated with & lost their 
commutation money, should be protected against such foolish acts by a rule which 
placed a restriction on the amount of retired pay to be left uncommuted".86 
As the table below demonstrates, most of the retirement occurred, voluntarily 
or not, at the rank: of captain, between the point where an officer could get his first 
option of retiring with a lump sum at 12 years, and compulsory retirement at 20. 
This decision range was further enforced by the fact that there were by no means 
enough major positions for every captain, and this transition was the first significant 
narrowing of positions. This is also the rank at which an officer would most likely 
cross over to the staff, and gain promotion outside the regiment, and such officers 
could reach very senior rank:; Buller, Butler, Haig, Methuen, and Robertson being 
examples of this. 87 (See Table 7. Distribution of Officers in Home and Overseas 
Battalions, 1879 below) In 1886, there was one further return that states that 214 
cavalry and infantry captains and majors were compulsorily retired in the years 
1870-85. Subtracting out the 18 captains and majors compulsorily retired as shown 
in the table below (and 2 compulsory cavalry captain retirements) this worked out to 
15.6 compulsory retirements per year, an average double that of the 212 years shown 
in the table below.88 Unfortunately, the data does not indicate how these numbers 
were spread through these years. 
Like many other reforms of this period, there was a round of adjustments in 
the early 1880's and, in particular, to match up the appointments, promotion, 
retirement and pay scheme to the new double battalion system. Two important 
changes were made that influenced retirement. First, a ceiling was placed on the age 
of all officers depending on rank, at which age they had to retire, "for the sake of 
regimental efficiency" it was said of captains. 89 Second, the numbered line 
battalions were amalgamated into 2 battalion regiments (excepting the first 25, which 
were already two battalion regiments). 
Corinne L Mahaffey, 2003 Chapter 5 
Table 6. Retirement under the Warrant of 1877.90 
Rank October 1877 to 1879-80 
31 March 1879 
Voluntary Retirement Second Lieutenant 3* 
Sub-Lieutenant 5* 
Lieutenant 75** 
Captain 230*** 
Major 81 
Lieutenant Colonel 52 
Removal from Regiments Captain 
and Appointments 
Major 
Lieutenant Colonel 30 
Retirement on Account of Colonel 9 
Age 
*reslgnatlons 
**includes 29 resignations 
***includes 46 resignations on appointlnent to the Army Pay Department 
****includes 21 resignations 
***** includes 37 resignations on appointment to the Army Pay Department 
7* 
1* 
38**** 
129***** 
16 
24 
15 
3 
13 
1 
Table 7. Distribution of Officers in Home and Overseas Battalions 1879.91 , 
Rank Battalions at Battalions 
Home Abroad 
Colonel 1 1 
Lieutenant 1 1 
Colonel 
Majors 1 2 
Captains 8 8 
Lieutenants 8 8 
Second 4 8 
Lieutenants 
The new retirement scheme was as follows: 
Up to the rank of Major inclusive: 
Voluntary: 
After 12 years' service, on a gratuity of £1,200 
After 15 years' service, on a gratuity of £1,600 
After 18 years' service, on a gratuity of £2,000 
After 20 years' service, a pension of £200 a year. 
Compulsory: 
Total for 2 Brigade Depot 
Battalions 2 battalions/3 
battalions/Rifle 
2 --/--/--
2 1/1/1 
3 1/1/4 
16 4/6/16 
16 4/6/16 
12 --/--/--
184 
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At 40, on £200 a year, subject to a deduction of £1 0 for every years service less than 
20. 
For a Major: 
Voluntary: 
After 20 years' service, a pension of £200 a year. 
After 23 years' service, a pension of £250 a year. 
Compulsory: 
At 48, on £250 to £300 a year, depending on service. 
For a Lieutenant-Colonel: 
Voluntary: 
At any time, £250 a year. 
After 27 years' service, or after 7 years' service as a Regimental Major, or after 5 
years' service as a Major on the Staff, £300 a year. 
After 30 years' service, £365 a year. 
Compulsory: 
At 55, on £365 a year. 
For a Colonel: 
Voluntary: 
At any time, £420 a year. 
Compulsory: 
At 55, on £420 a year. 
For a Major-General: 
Voluntary: 
At 60, on £680 a year. 
At 61, on £690 a year. 
Compulsory: 
At 62, on £700 a year. 
For a Lieutenant-General: 
At 65, on £830 a year. 
At 66, on £840 a year. 
Compulsory: 
At 67, on £850 a year. 
For a General: 
At 65, on £980 a year. 
At 66, on £990 a year. 
Compulsory: 
At 67, on £1,000 a year.92 
Compulsory retirement at the earned pension rate would also occur in cases 
where the officer had been continuously unemployed for 3 years as a major, 5 years 
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as a colonel, and for a general officer, once his promotion to major-general was at 
least 5 years in the past, at any time, or less than 5 years if it had been seven years 
since his employment as a colonel. On the other hand, it was also possible for a 
captain, major or lieutenant-colonel, retiring after 40 years of age, 7 years of 
regimental or 5 years of staff service, and 5 years of service, respectively, to be 
promoted a rank at half pay, and be eligible for regimental or staff service at that 
new rank, if the opportunity was available, to a maximum age of 55 in the case of a 
half-pay colonel.93 Selection (selecting for promotion from among the qualified 
officers rather than promoting the most senior) was expanded in that seniority was 
not to be considered the main claim to promotion. This selection was in effect only 
for the promotion to major general; higher general ranks were promoted by 
seniority.94 Also, brevet majors, having served 7 years as a major, would 
automatically be promoted to brevet lieutenant colonel. After 5 years service, a 
brevet lieutenant colonel would likewise be promoted.95 
As compared to the 1877 warrant, a captain's options were simplified, 
ceilings for compulsory retirement were defined by age rather than by years of 
service, the 5 year maximum on lieutenant colonels' tenure was dropped, and the 
maximum age of compulsory retirement for general officers was dropped by 3 to 10 
years. A lieutenant colonel's retirement age rose by 5 years, to age 55, the same as a 
colonel. Assuming an officer's service began at the age of 20, then there was 
effectively no change in the time of compulsory retirement for all ranks through 
major. But because compUlsory retirement was now defined by age, any officer who 
joined the army at a later age lost the years of income that were the difference 
between his entry age and age 20, and was also penalised in his retirement pension. 
Therefore, those who joined by attending RMC Sandhurst, and therefore gained a 
commission at age 20, were, in theory, selectively favoured against those who joined 
from the militia or through university. However, it is not clear whether it was more 
cost-effective to go to RMC, the militia or the university over the long term. The 
memoirs of Major-General L. C. Dunsterville, though he is commenting on 
promotion from the ranks, are suggestive. "1 had several friends who have won their 
commissions in that way [from the ranks], and, on the whole, they seem to have 
enjoyed their experiences in the ranks; but it is a big handicap in later life when age 
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and commissioned service are balanced against each other. Then you regret the four 
years' seniority you lost by going through the ranks.,,96 
The problem for the individual officer was still the transition from captain to 
major. If an officer was captain long enough to have the seniority to become a 
major, then, assuming he did not run into the problem of other senior captains 
waiting for the same opportunity in his regiment and slowing promotion, that officer 
would likely make lieutenant colonel as well. As seen in the tables of Distribution of 
Officers below, there were about two majors for every lieutenant colonel in the line 
army as a result of the amalgamation in 1881, though that became, by 1887, four 
majors for every lieutenant colonel. (Compare Tables 8 and 10) The first retirement 
option with pension was for a captain of average seniority, given that, on average, an 
officer obtained this rank after 8-9 years service, and would not, on average, expect 
to be a major until after 18 years of service. Therefore an officer had to decide as a 
captain in his mid to late 30's whether he could expect to progress sufficiently in his 
career to command a regiment or to go on to general rank or to retire as a captain or 
major in another 5 years. Compulsory retirement at 20 years and £200 swept up 
excess captains and majors.97 
The average rate at which an officer gained the rank oflieutenant colonel in 
this period was 25 years (see Table 11. Duration of Service below), so an average 
officer who did not choose to retire early should have been able to achieve this rank, 
and would have 10 years to reach the field ranks before compulsory retirement at age 
55. As with the captain to major advance, the colonel to major-general advance also 
showed a significant improvement in the pension. In effect there were two different 
groups of officers; those who expected to become majors or, at most, lieutenant 
colonels in their careers, and who may have instead chosen to retire early, and those 
with the finances, contacts, and patronage to leave the regiment for staff and pass the 
selection to the general ranks. 98 This might explain to some degree the high 
percentage of officers from the gentry and peerage in the senior ranks. This 
predominance of the higher classes at the most senior levels of the profession was 
also true of the legal profession.99 Access to financial success was a result of 
political success within the army.lOO 
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Table 8. Distribution of officers composing an ordinary double- battalion regiment 
of infantry, 1881.101 
iRank HomeBn. 8 Foreign Bn. 8 Depot. 4 Coy. Total. Coy. Coy Including Sub-
district 
command. 
I Colonel -- -- I 1 
(present Brevet 
Colonel) 
Lieutenant 1 2 1 4 
Colonels 
Majors 4 4 -- 8 
Captains 5 5 4* 14 
(including 
Adjutants) 
Lieutenants 12 16 2 30 
" . 
* InclusIve of2 Captams to serve as Adjutants ofMIhtla battahons. In a few double-battalIon 
regiments more than 2 Captains will be required as Militia Adjutants. 
The significant change to the distribution of officers was that the new system 
raised the number of majors in 20 companies from 4 to 8 and lowered the number of 
captains by the same amount; in effect promoting some captains. It also raised 
somewhat the number of colonels from 4 to 5, and lowered the number oflieutenants 
from 30 to 28. While abolishing the rank of second lieutenant, each battalion of 
infantry also gained a second lieutenant colonel, who at home served at the brigade 
depot and abroad served in the position of second-in-command.102 
Table 9 Distribution of Officers in Home and Overseas Battalions, 1882.103 
Rank Battalions at Battalions in Battalions in Brigade Depot 
Home Colonies India 2 battalions/l 
battalions/Rifle 
Lieutenant 2 2 2 1/--/1 
Colonels 
Majors 3 4 4 1/1/4 
Captains 5 4 4 1/1/4 
Lieutenants 12 16 16 2/1/8 
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Table 10 Distribution of Officers in Home and Overseas Battalions 1887 104 , 
Rank Battalions at Battalions in Battalions in Brigade Depot 
Home Colonies India Low est.ihigh 
est/6 coy 
est/rifle depot 
Lieutenant 1 1 1 1111111 
Colonels 
Maiors 3 4 4 11112/4 
Captains 6 5 5 112/3/4 
Lieutenants 8 8 8 2/4/10/8 
Second 4 8 8 --/--/--/--
Lieutenants 
The actual distribution in later years, according to the estimates of 1882 and 
1887 (1879, 1882, and 1887 correspond to small changes in the rank structure) 
shows that the number of lieutenant -colonels dropped to one per battalion, the 
number of captains per battalion rose slightly, and the number oflieutenants was 
divided between lieutenants and second lieutenants when the latter rank was 
reinstated. 
The changes in the pension system were not large, but they made a 
significant difference in the officer corps. By decision of the Secretary of State, the 
revised warrant was to be brought in such a way as to carry out the promotions valid 
under it before the retirements. Thus officers retired under the previous warrant 
would be the first to be brought back into service, and then officers in the regiments 
on 30 June would be promoted to complete the regimental establishment. Finally, 
officers in any rank above the maximum age limits would be retired. lOS These policy 
changes, of linked battalions and age limits, were followed, in the budget years of 
1881 and 1882, by a drop in the total number of officers in the army. The number of 
officers dropped in the categories of both regimental units generally (meaning 
including cavalry, artillery, engineers, foot guards, colonial and departmental corps) 
and non-regimental units as a whole. The number of officers in the line infantry also 
dropped, but, unlike the rest of the other regimental and non-regimental officers, it 
failed to rise again. (See Chart 6 - Army Officers) This was probably due to the 
enforced retirement of officers who were older than the new maximum ages. This 
selectively targeted officers who entered the line army through the militia or the 
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universities, who were more likely to be older than those who graduated out ofRMC 
Sandhurst at the age of20. Indirectly, then, RMC graduates were favoured over 
those who transferred from the militia or the universities. The number of officers, as 
tallied for the whole army, recovered the next year, and continued its slow rise. That 
of the regimental units recovered in the budget year 1888, but that of the line army 
did not rise again until 1897, having dropped from an average of3274 officers in the 
budget years 1871 to 1881. An average of2820 was maintained for the budget years 
from 1882 to 1897, a drop from previous years of 14%. It is unclear why the line 
army failed to recover its earlier strength in officers, though it may be connected to 
the amalgamation; the line army may have become less attractive due to personal or 
political opposition to amalgamation in general, or to the regiment to which one's 
regiment was paired with in particular, or due to the new pension regulations that 
forced retirement by age rather than years of service. This drop in the number ofline 
infantry officers was magnified by the problem that the number of ranks in the line 
army was rising steadily. (See Chart 5 - Home and Colonies Establishment 1871-
1902) In other words, there was, a real and increasing shortage of line officers 
relative to the size of the line army as a whole. The army administration was slow to 
notice. It wasn't until 1898 that concern was expressed that there would soon be an 
officer shortage in the future. 106 This problem was not solved in later years. From 
an average of 1 to 22 in the 1870's, the ratio of officers to rarIks (including non-
commissioned officers) rose to 1 to 31 by the late 1890' s. The South African war 
brought this ratio to nearly 1 to 33, which was still greater than the ratio in the years 
leading up to 1914 of 1 to 34.3 officers to privates. This was a much larger ratio 
than that of the other European armies, who were less dependent on junior officers 
for leadership at the lower levels.107 Various suggestions were made after the Sought 
African war as to how to increase the voluntary recruitment of officers, which 
generally centred on greater involvement with the public schools and universities. A 
1906 committee chaired by Sir Edward Ward offered the proposal that eventually 
won out, and the Officer Training Corps came into being in 1907.108 Bringing 
military training to the schools and universities my have helped to slow the 
increasing shortage of officers, but it did not stop it. 
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A new Warrant for the promotion and retirement of combatant officers was 
put into place on 31 December, 1886, making further corrections to perceived 
imbalances in the working of the promotion and retirement system, and improving 
professional and promotional prospects and standards. Some changes in the highest 
and lowest ranks were made, staff opportunities were widened, voluntary retirement 
was limited and honorary rank was ended. The intended effects were to make 
promotion prospects more even among regiments at the lieutenant ranks, to clarify 
the command structure, to give junior officers more experience, to connect rank, 
competence and prestige more closely, and to make it less easy for captains to take 
voluntary retirement. 
The rank of second lieutenant was reinstated, as having the rank of only 
lieutenant meant that officers were spending many years in 1 battalion, which 
obstructed the intent of amalgamation and made more awkward any effort to 
minimise the variation in the rates of promotion among battalions. 109 
The presence of two lieutenant colonels in a regiment for six years of service 
each, promulgated in the 1881 version of the warrant, was not working. It created 
too much turnover in command and second in command. Therefore one lieutenant 
colonel was eliminated, leaving the other in service for 4 years, and giving the senior 
major the duty of second in command and adding a captain to the establishment to 
take up the major's duties. 110 
Changes were made in staff appointments, so as to increase the numbers of 
junior officers with staff experience. Some minor (unspecified) extra-regimental 
positions were reduced to 3 years, and adjutants were reduced to 4 from 5 years. 
And, for officers in this appointment, in an issue that comes up later in discussing 
officer expenses, "it is proposed, by simplifications in the uniform, to render the 
measure not burdensome to the Officers".]]] Some minor appointments were, in the 
future, reserved for officers of the rank of major and below. "It is probable that these 
may be made the means of advancing distinguished Majors who have served two 
years as such, and are promoted specially to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and will 
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so tend to bring up a body of relatively young officers for higher Staff 
employment." I 12 
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The War Office also ended the practice of granting a step of honorary rank to 
every officer retiring after 20 years service: "It is held to be an evil that there should 
be found throughout the country a numerous body of Officers, of nominally high 
rank, who have never exercised any of the functions of such rank. It tends to 
depreciate the ranks held by Officers to whom the nation is really indebted for great 
services performed; and it is considered that no man can justly claim a rank, the 
duties and responsibilities of which he has never had. ,,113 
Voluntary retirement turned out, in War Office opinion, to have been too 
successful, and resulted in "promotion at a needlessly rapid rate". Contrary to earlier 
War Office fears, officers did not choose to hold out for 20 years to receive the 
larger pension. According to this understanding, voluntary retirement was intended 
to thin out the captain ranks so that almost all the captains who continued to serve 
would be promoted, (contrary to the original intent of the Penzance commission, 
which was to start weeding the officers at 8 years, that is, at the rank of senior 
lieutenant).114 Selection (picking out suitable officers for promotion, rather than 
promotion by seniority), when it was mentioned here and in the previous incarnation 
ofthis warrant, applied to colonel and to the field ranks only. I 15 The maximum age 
of captains was also to be raised to 45 (and that of majors to 48, "taking into account 
the similarity of duties"). 116 This did not show in officer retention, as the reforms 
would not affect the officers until around 1909, when the officers to whom it applied 
would be retiring. I 17 The point of raising the retirement ages for captains and majors 
was to "retard promotion from Captain to Major"ll8. Given these new maximum 
ages, the option of retirement at 12 years with a lump sum payment was to be 
restricted to subalterns only. A captain in future would have to serve 15 years and 
could then retire on a pension of £120. This would be less than the commuted value 
of the lump sum of either £ 1600 at 15 years or £2000 at 18 years. The War Office 
could thus tell the Treasury that, in addition to the commutation savings, "it is 
anticipated that by reducing the inducement to retire, the average period of service 
will be sensibly increased, so that the number of retirements to be annually provided 
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for will be materially reduced". 119 Thus the best option for an officer who did not 
expect to gain further rank was to hold out for compulsory retirement. Between 
limiting pensions and retarding promotion, the War Office kept officers in service 
longer at a lower rank, and their years on a pension shorter. In the long term this 
would probably damage an officer's financial standing (and save the government 
money). This was unlikely to enhance an officer's dedication to his profession in the 
long term. 
There were other employment options for officers. Many officers wrote their 
memoirs, or wrote for the quarterly periodicals while in service as well as after 
retirement. Colonel G. F.R. Henderson, for example, while teaching at the Staff 
College, was also the military correspondent for foreign manoeuvres to the London 
Times.12o Some officers held civil appointments with the Foreign Office in the 
colonies, which counted toward military promotion and pensions. 121 Other 
regimental officers retired on their pension and moved to government positions. 
Supervising the civil service exams offered varying fees of up to £ 191.122 Regular 
work, such as clerking at the Admiralty, offered an income of £175 to a retired 
lieutenant, and a retired major held the position of Resident Magistrate in Ireland for 
£425 per annum (less 10% abatement), in addition to their pensions of 4 s. per day 
(£73) and £250 per annum, respectively. 123 Other civil service positions open to 
captains and majors included inspector (varying fees), deputy prison governor 
(starting at £250), professor at Sandhurst (£250), and Superintendent for the Poor 
(£400 less 10%).124 However, less than 90 officers had such jobs under the relevant 
act. Some officers were seconded to police duties in the colonies or to colonial 
forces, such as the Rhodesian Constabulary, the West African Frontier Force and to 
the police force in Cyprus, and many of the police officers on the Gold Coast were 
retired army officers. 125 Many of the civil administrators in British India were also 
army officers. 126 Retired and half-pay officers joined colonial forces, such as those 
of Australia, until the Superannuation Act of 1887, which cut off pensions to retired 
officers who took up a colonial military appointment. 127 There does not appear to be 
any research that looks at post-service careers, so it is not possible to say whether 
retiring officers commonly converted their military service to civil service of some 
form, or changed careers altogether. 
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By 1898 the pensions had noticeably improved, at least for officers with a 
rank of lieutenant colonel and above, reinforcing the financial distance between the 
regimental and general ranks. The financial penalty for retiring early was greater, as 
it was no longer possible to retire with a pension after only 12 years of service. The 
original recommendation ofthe Penzance commission, to favour early retirement so 
as to speed the promotion of their colleagues, was lost to the need to retain officers. 
To do this, the War Office further penalised early retirement. 
Up to the rank of Captain inclusive: 
Voluntary: 
After 15 years' service, a pension of £120 a year. 
Compulsory: 
At 45, or not actively employed for 5 years, on £200 a year. 
For a Major: 
Voluntary: 
After 15 years' service and 3 years in rank, on £120 a year. 
After 25 years' service, on £250 a year. 
Compulsory: 
At 48, or not actively employed for 5 years, on £300 a year. 
For a Lieutenant-Colonel: 
Voluntary: 
After 3 years in rank 
and 15 years' service, on £250 a year. 
and 27 years' service, on £300 a year. 
and 30 years' service, on £365 a year. 
and after resigning the command of a battalion or regiment, on £420 a year. 
Compulsory: 
At 55, or not actively employed for 5 years, on £420 a year. 
For a Colonel: 
Compulsory: 
At 57, or not actively employed for 5 years, on £500 a year. 
For a Major-General: 
Voluntary: 
£700 a year, deducting £10 for every year under 62 years of age, to a minimum of 
£600 a year. 
Compulsory: 
At 62, or not actively employed for 5 years, on £700 a year, subject to the same 
deductions. 
For a Lieutenant-General: 
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£850 a year, deducting £10 for every year under 67 years of age, to a minimum of 
£750 a year. 
Compulsory: 
67, or not actively employed for 5 years, on £850 a year, subject to the same 
deductions. 
For a General: 
195 
£1 000 a year, deducting £1 0 for every year under 67 years of age, to a minimum of 
£900 a year. 
Compulsory: 
At 67, or not actively employed for 5 years, on £1,000 a year. 128 
The results of the pension reforms can be seen in the following table. 
Officers becoming lieutenant colonels in 1886 had, on average, joined the line army 
in 1861. Similarly, the majors joined in 1870 and the captains in 1878. This table 
shows, that, whatever it had been doing in the intervening years from 1871 to 1885, 
the rate of promotion was now reasonably stable, excepting the anomaly for 
promotion from major to lieutenant colonel in 1893. The shorter time for promotion 
from lieutenant to captain after the Boer War was presumably due to the losses in the 
junior ranks in that war. Also, the number of years in service for the promotion from 
major to lieutenant colonel had lengthened slightly and the promotions to captain and 
major seem closer in line to purchase than non-purchase rates of promotion, as 
desired by the Penzance commission. 
Though the graduated pension system recommended by the Penzance 
commission was never implemented, the stepwise pension system actually put in 
place did result in about the rate of promotion that was desired by that commission. 
These pensions, until an officer reached the general ranks, were relatively low. 
Because the first pension started at 12 (and later 15) years of service, an officer had 
to make difficult decisions at that point. He had the option of retiring then, or in the 
relatively near future, with a military education and a net financial gain of zero. Ifhe 
felt he had little hope of advancement, he could hold out in the captain's rank that he 
had, and take compulsory retirement, or he could expect to become the most senior 
captain in the regiment and thereby gain the rank of major or lieutenant-colonel and 
retire in one of those ranks. 
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Table 11. Duration of Service (From First Commission) 129 
Year Lieutenant to Captain to Major to 
Captain Major Lieutenant 
(years/months) (years/months) Colonel 
(years/months) 
1886 8, 1 16,3 25,4 
1887 8, 1 18, 1 24, 10 
1888 8,3 17,4 25, 1 
1889 8,2 17, 11 26,5 
1890 8,2 17,3 26,5 
1891 8,2 17,5 26,2 
1892 8,3 17, 7 25,9 
1893 8,3 17,5 20,2 
1894 8,6 17,8 25,3 
1895 ?,6* 17, 10 25, 7 
1896 8, 10 18, 1 24, 7 
1897 8,10 18,6 25,3 
1898 8,8 18,2 24,3 
1903 6,9 18,9 ------
*number not printed in original. 
The pay grades show much the same financial and career decision problems 
for an officer as the pension system. Like pensions, pay grades were significantly 
higher for the general ranks, and, also like the pensions, did not noticeably change in 
the regimental ranks. In terms ofthe range of middle class incomes (about £160 to 
£700), regimental officers were at the lower end.130 The thought came late to the 
War Office that officers ought to have a level of pay that covered their professional 
expenses from the beginning, or that their pay might be insufficient recompense for 
their professional expertise. When the War Office compared the expenses of officers 
to their income at the tum of the century, it was found that a lieutenant had expenses, 
both directly and indirectly due to his profession, of about £ 100 to £ 150 in excess of 
his income. Yet the War Office decided £60 wasn't an unreasonable burden for a 
junior officer to carry. Allowances also remained flat, and did not, for junior 
officers, cover the expenses for which they disbursed. Again, allowances for senior 
officers were significantly better than those of more junior officers. An officer had 
to have the rank of captain before his income covered his expenses. It is perhaps 
Ct)rinne L. Mahaffey, 2003 Chapter 5 197 
fortunate that these years encompassed a long, shallow economic depression, so that 
the lack of indexing did not become another burden on the officers' finances. 
Pay was also an issue of social status. Other professions in the early years of 
a career also required large initial outlays that were expected to be met by a private 
income. The private income needed to start one's career was a social barrier based 
on personal or parental income, and therefore indirectly on social status. That the 
minimum private income needed to pass this barrier had lowered somewhat by the 
end of this period suggests a shift in the social position of the profession; not 
necessarily, or directly, downwards, but towards a more professional stance, that is, 
officers were being paid for their expertise. Part ofthe answer to what social and 
economic classes were entering a military career can be found in the appendices of 
the annual inspections of Sandhurst, which include tables of the cadets' paternal 
parentage. These give some indication of social standing. They also include tables 
of tuition rates, which indicate the financial standing of the officers who sent their 
sons to Sandhurst. Parentage was divided among princes, peer, baronets, Ministers 
of Parliament, army officers, navy officers, clergy, the legal profession (judges, 
barristers and solicitors), India Civil service, the medical profession, and finally 
private gentleman, merchants and bankers as a group. This last group is elaborated 
on in most of the reports of the 1890's, and included advocates, architects, authors, 
bank agents, bankers, brewers, a captain in the merchant service, members ofthe 
Ceylon civil service and the civil service in general, civil service engineers, a civil 
engineer, clerks, a coal factor, a colonial governor, a commissioner of the New River 
Co., a doctor of music, an Indian planter, an ironmaster, justices of the peace, land 
agents, a manufacturer, merchants, a postmaster-general, a professor, a publisher, a 
stock broker, schoolmasters, and a secretary. These are not the "gentlemen of 
leisure" postulated by Otley, but a wide variety of businessmen and public 
servants. l3l 
The total number of cadets was rising throughout this period, so it is 
unsurprising that the number of sons of officers was rising also, until it levelled off 
in the 1890's. The number of sons of private gentlemen began to rise in the 1890's, 
whereas the number of other professionals remained relatively steady. The number 
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of navy officers' sons and sons ofthe nobility was never very large. However, the 
percentage of these groups changes differently. The percentage of amlY officers' 
sons rises abruptly in the 1870' s, as the new requirements for officers are legislated 
and implemented, then levels off to a little less than 50% of the total, and then begins 
to decline again in the late 1890' s. The percentage of private gentlemen reverses 
this, dropping in the 1870' s to a little under 30%, then rising starting in the early 
1890's. The percentage of professional's sons drops through the early 1880's to 
16%, then slowly rises to 20% before dropping again in the mid 1890's. The 
percentage of nobles' and naval officers' sons varies below 5%. Which officers' 
sons are represented can be found from the tables of tuition rates. 
Tuition was subsidised for the sons of officers based on their fathers rank, at 
rates ranging from 36% for sons of general officers who were colonels of regiments 
or received Indian Colonel's allowances to 84% for the sons of deceased officers 
whose families were "left in penury distress". "Private gentlemen" paid the full 
£125. These gentlemen's sons ranged between 50% and 60% of all cadets for this 
period, so the percentage of officers' son's ranged between 30% and 40%. Queen's 
cadets remained under 3% of the total and Indian cadets no more than 10% and sons 
of deceased officers whose families were in financial difficulties were never more 
than 2% of the total. Officers who had a rank of below that of colonel or a 
regimental field command, or was an instructor at one of the military colleges, that 
is, regimental officers, never comprised more than 15%, having risen to that level in 
1886 from around 5%. However, officers' sons above the regimental ranks, that is 
colonels and general officers ranged between 23% and 33%. Obviously, some ofthe 
private gentlemen paying the full cost of tuition were retired officers, as more men 
claimed to be officers' sons than were paying subsidised rates, and could afford to do 
so. Of those officers paying subsidised rates, the percentage of regimental officers is 
much lower than that of more senior officers, suggesting that officers' families carne 
from those who achieved high rank, and that those who retired as regimental officers 
were significantly less likely to send their sons to Sandhurst. The educational 
discounts offered to officers' sons supported an "own class" recruitment pattern, that 
"own class" being the most senior officers. At the same time, sons of other 
professions and careers went to Sandhurst, in competition with the sons of senior 
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officers, hoping to reach the upper end of this profession. 132 Others have commented 
on the significant, but decreasing share of senior ranks held by the aristocracy and 
gentry.133 There was, in a sense, two officers corps, first, those mostly from 
financially and socially middle to upper middle class households, who were 
regimental officers, and did not find the military a sufficiently successful career to 
justify sending their sons into it, and secondly, the officer corps composed of officers 
who achieved high rank, and were slowly, but increasingly, composed of successful 
competitors from the households of "private gentlemen" of professional, business or 
military backgrounds. 
Neither the base rate of pay for regimental officers, nor their allowances, 
changed appreciably in 30 years. (see Table 12. Officers' Base Rates of Pay) The 
rate of pay for the various lieutenancies varied by a few pounds, as the various 
second lieutenants, sub-lieutenants, cadets and full lieutenants were created and 
replaced. Pay for majors shifted by a few shillings, and the captain's rate of pay 
shifted not at all, remaining a steady 211 I. 7 s. 11 d. for the entire period. A few 
pounds per annum were added for seniority; lieutenant colonels got command pay of 
541. 15 s., majors of3 years seniority got 441. 3 s. 9 d. extra, captains got 36Z. 10 s. 
in addition ifthe rank was brevet, and 45 I. 12 s. 6 d. additional if adjutant, 
lieutenants got an extra 22 I. 16 s. 3 d. after 3 years service, and another 18 l. 5 s. on 
top of that after 10 years service in rank. 134 In 1887, a major got that after 2 years 
seniority, and an extra 18 I. 5 s. if the senior major in the battalion. Lieutenants lost 
the seniority pay at 3 years and at 10 years and instead got an extra 18 I. 5 s. for 7 
years in rank. After this, there were no further changes. 135 Pay at levels higher than 
the regimental ranks was noticeably better. The 1871 estimates show that colonels 
made £1 000 a year. l36 By 1899 this had slipped slightly, and a colonel in command 
of a regimental district was making £730 per year and a colonel in command of a 
brigade earned 9121. 10 s. A major general received £1,095, a lieutenant general 
2,007 I. 10 s. and a full general was paid £2,920. 
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Table 12. Officers' Base Rates of Pay per annum, per budget years 1871-72 to 
1901-1902 (showing only years of change). Vote 1 App. 2] 
Budget Year Lieutenant Major Captain Lieutenants Ensigns 
Colonel (l. s. d.) (l. s. d). and Sub- (l. s. d.) 
(l. s. d.) Lieutenants 
(1. s. d.) 
1871-72 310.5.0 292.0.0 211.7.11 118.12.6 95.16.3 
1872-73 310.5.0 292.0.0 211.7.11 95.16.3 ---
1873-74 310.5.0 292.0.0 211.7.11 95.16.3 ---
Lieutenant Major Captain Lieutenants Second 
Colonel (l. s. d.) (l. s. d.) (I. s. d.) Lieutenants 
(I. s. d.) (I. s. d.) 
1877-78 310.5.0 292.0.0 211.7.11 6.6, 118.12.6 95.16.3 
1882-83 328.10.0 247.17.11 211.7.11 95.16.3 Not exist 
1887-88 328.10.0 247.17.11 211.7.11 118.12.6 95.16.3 
Allowances also remained flat over this period, varying by a pound or two. 
The point at which an officer could live within his means (given, in 1900, a 
minimum of £60 costs over a second-lieutenant's income) was an income of £155 or 
£ 195 (if £ 100 in costs), so in principle, with the additions to pay made by the 
allowances, a junior officer could meet his expenses on the lowest wage, with 
allowances, ifhe did not travel.137 However, deployments were becoming shorter 
over this period, resulting in more moves, and hence, greater expenses.138 The 
following table shows the home allowances for 1887. 
Table 13. Pay and Allowances (per annum) in 1887. 139 
Rank Mess Forage and Lodging Fuel and Total Pay 
Allowance Stabling Allowance Light (1. s. d.) 
(I. s. d.) Allowance (I. s. d.) Allowance 
(I. s. d.) (I. s. d.) 
Lieutenant -- 71.11.3 73.0.0 16.7.0 550.3.3 
Colonel 
Major 6.0.0 41.1.3 54.15.0 12.18.7 362.12.9 
Captain 6.0.0 -- 41.1.3 6.9.3 264.18.5 
Lieutenant 6.0.0 -- 36.10.0 6.9.3 167.11.9 
2nd 6.0.0 -- 36.10.0 6.9.3 144.15.6 
Lieutenant 
The officers suffered from numerous expenses, particularly mess expenses, 
which required a private income to cover, at least during an officer's years as a 
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subaltern. Few of these expenses were of any concern of the government until 
officers' out-of-pocket expenses finally became an issue after the South African 
War. The expense that was of interest to the government was travel expenses, which 
was closely related to the cost of messing and quarters. 
Under the purchase system, an officer who retired voluntarily (with less than 
25 years service) was expected to pay both his own and his successor's passage, "it 
being held that an Officer selling his commission must bear all charges, directly or 
indirectly, arising from the step he took, and that the Public must not be put to any 
expense".140 There were no immediate changes in 1871, as retiring officers initially 
received their purchase money from the state, but the policy was modified in 1881 
because new regulations that required retirement before 25 years service made this 
obligation, according to the officers, a serious hardship. Thus officers were 
obligated to pay for their own passage only, unless compulsorily retired, or had over 
20 years service, in which case the state covered their passage. 141 
The more general problem of travel expenses connects to messing and 
quarters through the issue of shipping officers equipment, furniture and other 
luggage. Officers' furniture alone was 116 ofthe total baggage of a battalion that 
was moved at government expense. 142 The furniture itself was another expense for 
officers. The committee on furnishing officers messes and quarters of 1883, headed 
by Lord Wolseley, recommended that the provision of furniture could be contracted 
out to save the cost of shipping officers' effects. The committee recommended that 
captains' and subalterns' quarters be furnished with, at government expense, two 
chair covers, a bed and palliasse, a washstand with crockery and towel rails, a small 
table, an armchair, a chest of drawers, a clothes press, a looking glass, a paraffin 
lamp (ifthere was no gas lighting), a tin bath, and a door mat. Additionally, a field 
officer would have a sitting room, for which the committee proposed the government 
supply a door mat, two tables, a sofa, 2 arm chairs, four Windsor chairs, six covers 
for the chairs, a book case, and a lamp. The officer would have to supply any further 
bedding, carpets, curtains and hearthrugs. The cost ofthe government-supplied 
items was estimated at 18l. 3 s. for the bedroom and an additional 37 l. 3 s. for the 
sitting room. 143 An officer was therefore presumably spending at least that much to 
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supply it himself, as well as whatever shipping costs for this the government would 
not cover. The Treasury, having quashed the initial proposal, finally granted, on 
pressure from the QMG, an experimental effort to furnish the GOC's houses, which 
was not successfu1. 144 
The actual amount of baggage and furniture permitted a regimental officer 
was about 18 to 20 cwt. (cwt. = one hundredweight, or 112 pounds) for a lieutenant 
colonel, about 15 cwt. for a major, and 9 to 10 cwt. for captains and lieutenants. The 
allowance was considerably more generous at the general ranks, being from 30 to 40 
CWt. 145 Additionally, an officer's wife, ifhe had one, was permitted 6 cwt. for herself 
and any children under 14, Yz cwt. for any daughter over 14 and any son age 14 to 
16.146 There was no baggage allowance for moves required for temporary duties 
such as camps or courses of instruction. 147 This fact alone would explain the 
numerous advertisements in the contemporary professional press for camp furniture 
that, for example, packed conveniently into a self-case and opened up into either a 
camp bed or a table at need. Field kit, which was also proposed to be free issue 
under the furniture scheme, was estimated to cost another £6, which, again, was yet 
another expense presumably covered by the officers. 148 
It wasn't until 1896 that the costs of travelling, as compared to the 
allowances granted to cover it, began to be looked at. The Quarter-Master General, 
then Evelyn Wood, told the Secretary of State that the regulations for travel needed 
to be simplified because they were too rigid, control was too centralised, and because 
some allowances "press hardly on officers and Non-commissioned officers".149 To 
approval in the minutes, the report of the committee for travelling expenses agreed 
with the QMG, and recommended that travel rates be significantly increased and 
expanded, and that commanding officers have greater discretion regarding the issue 
of expenses. More specifically, overnight travel rates for regimental officers were 
increased from 10 s. to 12 s. 6 d. (15 s. to 20 s. for senior officers), daily travel rates 
from 3 s. 6 d. to 6 s. (15 s. to 20 s. for senior officers), and the same for troop moves. 
In 1897 it was recommended that an officer taking up or quitting appointment to the 
personal staff of a general officer, or an officer appearing before a medical board, 
should be allowed travelling expenses because he was "on the public service", and 
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general officers specifically be allowed to extend further allowances when an 
otIicer's costs rose due to travel delays beyond the allowance provided, or when the 
officers were otherwise put to extra expense while travelling. 150 
Not all expenses may have been necessarily official or sanctioned. In 1893 
two letters in the Army and Navy Gazette complained about the burden of 
regimental charges for junior officers, including having to pay for bands. General 
Buller, offended, commented internally that these complaints were obviously false, 
as commanding officers were required to fill in a confidential report before the 
annual inspection that queried unit policy on, among other things, messing charges, 
mess and band funds, and regimental subscriptions, and that, according to 
regulations, officers below the rank of captain were not required to subscribe to or 
contribute to the band. lSI Though General Buller plainly trusted the honour of his 
commanding officers over that of a junior cavalry officer, it does not follow he was 
correct to do so, and if contributions were being extracted from junior officers in the 
cavalry against regulations, it is possible it was being done in the line infantry as 
well. It would certainly aid to filter out those who could not afford the "right" 
regiments. 
When the question of officer expenses became more general in 1900, as part 
of the wider move to a new round of reforming commissions, the army to which the 
government turned for comparison was the European army considered the most 
professional of its day - the German army. For the following numbers it should be 
noted that these papers convert 100 marks to 100 shillings (though the exchange rate 
was reckoned to be 102 to 100) and that the cost of living difference was stated to 
make a mark worth two to three times a shilling. I 52 In terms of the real cost of 
living, it was noted that an officer could live very well in Berlin on 4 s. per day and 3 
s. per day elsewhere (73 l. and 54 l. 15 s. per year, respectively).IS3 J. E. Edmonds, 
then a DAAG (deputy assistant adjutant general) and the writer of the report, further 
notes that he paid 28 s. a week for 2 rooms, all meals included, for the most 
expensive rooms in Heidelberg and that good rooms were to be had in Berlin for 10 
k 154 s. per wee . 
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Edmonds claimed that few junior officers in the German army had an 
allowance over £12 and that those second lieutenants with little or no private income 
got income supplements, and that "anyone above the rank of 2nd Lieutenant can live 
on his pay and want of private means is no bar to an officer rising to the highest 
commands". This was less than the private income mentioned in a covering note by 
Colonel H. H. Waters, the military attache in Berlin, who quoted the emperor's 
statement of a decade earlier that an infantry officer should need no more than £27 
per year in addition to their pay. 155 Perhaps the Emperor's 1891 admonitions for 
greater simplicity ofliving style had been heeded, though perhaps not to the degree 
Edmunds claimed. Just prior to the First World war, 45RM per month (£27 at 
100RM per 100 s.) was sent by parents to their subaltern sons to pay for uniforms, 
horses and lessons, and one third of pay was held back by the army for the cost of 
uniforms. 156 
According to the military attache, the German regimental pay structure was, 
in£: 
officer commanding a regiment 
" " battalion 
" " company, squadron or battery 
First Lieutenant 
Lieutenant: 
a) Infantry 
b) Cavalry & Field Artillery 
c) Foot Artillery 
390 
292 
135 to 195 
75 
45 
50 
59 
Additional allowances were made for lodging and stabling, if necessary, if the State 
was not already providing them. H. A. Laurence, another DAAG, in a covering note 
to Water's report states that there was an additional lodging allowance given, of 
unspecified amount, which was effectively part of pay.157 Extra duties, such as 
adjutant, further education, and attachments, merited extra pay ranging from £ 10 to 
£45.158 Wages for junior officers with colonial troops and abroad were significantly 
C)rinne L. Mahaft~y, 2003 Chapter 5 205 
larger. A second lieutenant earned £315 and a lieutenant £375. Second lieutenants 
and lieutenants with the China expedition earned £204 and £240 respectively, 
induding £60 for their outfit.159 
Compared with British pay scales, (£96 for ensigns, £118 for a lieutenant, 
£212 for a captain, £248 for a major and £329 for a lieutenant colonel) the pay of the 
German army was somewhat lower for subalterns, and somewhat higher for the more 
senior ranks. However, if the cost of living comparison was correct, German pay 
was significantly better than British pay. It was stated that: "Married officers can 
and do maintain their position in Germany on that sum. It would barely keep the 
unmarried subaltern in this country.,,160 German officers required permission before 
marrying, and if they did not have the rank of captain first class, they were required 
to deposit sufficient capital at the War Ministry to make their gross income 
equivalent to the salary of that rank, that is 239 l. 16 s., given an interest rate of 5%, 
or £4796. 161 Another source puts the figure for the minimum private income to be 
2500RM for a lieutenant and 1000RM for a captain in 1900. This was not the only 
hurdle. Permission also depended on whether the officer's prospective wife passed 
an investigation into her background, upbringing, education, and was of a suitable 
social class. A suitable marriage would assist an officers' quest for his majority. 162 
The following are the German allowance rates, which may be compared to 
the British ones: 
Table 14. German Pay and Allowances.163 
Rank Pay Servis Lodging 
(l. s. d.) (consolidated Money** 
allowance )* (l. s. d.) 
f--
(l. s. d.) 
Lieutenant 75.0.0 14.8.0 to 10.16.0 to 
27.0.0 21.0.0 
according to according to 
size and size and 
expense of the expense of the 
town, or 2.5.0 town 
in barracks 
2nd Lieutenant 59.8.0 same same 
*barracks preferentially assigned to jumor officers 
**real addition to pay from 1873 to compensate cost ofliving in Germany 
***cover dining in mess rather than in lodgings or cheap restaurants 
Table Stable 
Money*** Money 
(l. s. d.) (l. s. d.) 
5.0.0 5.0.0 first 
horse and 
3.0.0 any 
other horses 
same same 
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German junior officer allowances and perquisites included 2 rooms in 
barracks, with furniture and coal and wood, though no servant room or allowance for 
light. If these officers stayed out ofbarracks, they were allowed to draw for 
furniture at a rate of 1 s. 6 d. of the servis. Their messes (an innovation recently 
copied from the British) were furnished and equipped by the government. There 
were allowances for change of station, detachment, travel and mileage, and these 
covered all expenses. 164 Servants were provided with uniforms and paid £5 per 
month. 165 Additionally, there were several financial support mechanisms. There 
was an assistance fund, supported by the government and by officer subscription, 
that covered expenses for the ranks for captain and under to cover the cost of the 
change of uniform on transfer, replacement of equipment due to fire or theft, absence 
on detachment, travel when ill, and staff college attendance. There was a special 
college assistance fund, and second lieutenants whose private income was £3 or less 
were permitted to apply to the Minster of War to get an allowance to make up their 
income to £12 per year. Finally, small loans were available at a rate of2% per 
annum until shortly before 1900 and 1 % thereafter. 166 
Table 15. Comparison of Expenses (Inniskilling Fusiliers vs. Guardsman). 167 
British (I. s. d.) German il. s. d.) 
Mess and Subscription 144.0.0 58.19.0 
Tailor 40.0.0 14.8.0 
Servant 6.0.0 3.0.0 
Livery 1.0.0 Nil 
Washing 12.0.0 2.12.0 
Loss in moves and 5.0.0 Nil 
travelling claims 
Annual depreciation of 4.0.0 Nil 
furniture 
Extra expenses at 7.0.0 Nil 
manoeuvres at 10s. per day 
Total 219.0.0 78.19.0 
Expenses per month included the mess subscription at 3 s., music at 1 s. 6 d., 
the library at 4 d., the above mentioned assistance fund at 1 s., life insurance at 1 s., 
for a total of 6 s. 10 d. per month or about 4 l. 4 s. per year. 168 Extra expenses were 
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refunded. 169 All Lieutenants and Captains contributed to a uniform fund at a rate of 1 
l. 4 s. per month (14 l. 8 s. per year) and this was expected to cover the cost of all 
uniforms. The German officers' initial outlay for clothing was about 25 I. for 3 
coats, two headdresses, trousers and a paletot. 17o The issue of clothing shows up 
some of the differences in culture and hence expenses between German and British 
officers. Inclusive of swords and belts, a German officer's outfit cost 18 l. 12 s. 6 d. 
from the Waarenhaus flir Armee und Marine, and a British officer's 48 l. 12 s. from 
the Army and Navy Co-operative Society.171 This does not fully indicate the gulf in 
prices. The German officer actually obtained his uniform from the Waarenhaus, 
though he could alternatively get the fabric from the clothing depot and have the 
regimental tailors make it up, whereas the price of the British uniform was taken 
from the Army and Navy Store list, where, in fact, no British officer got his uniform, 
"for no Colonel would pass the cut and they are compelled to go to selected army 
tailors who charge from half as much again to double the Store prices". 172 However, 
if the difference in cost of living was two or three shillings to the mark (around 1 I. 
to 1 I. 10 s. per 10 RM), as claimed, then the difference in total expenses of Table 15 
is very much wider. 
These estimates of 1900 can be compared with the information from the 
Stanley commission on officer's expenses of 1902. The latter's estimates were, 
again, a minimum estimate, not an average, of a junior officer's expenses. 173 On the 
other hand, the witnesses claimed that "the supposed extravagance ofliving in the 
Army nowadays is in a great degree imaginary", and the commission was satisfied 
that ordinary regimental expenses had declined in recent years. I 74 The commission's 
estimate that a junior officer had to have a private income of £ 100 to £ 150, in 
addition to an initial outlay of £150 to £200 were probably in fact the minimum 
expenses for the period from the end of purchase to the South African war. Officers' 
expenses, and the private incomes they needed, were therefore higher throughout the 
period of this study than indicated by the commission's numbers. 175 Examples from 
memoirs support this. Major-General Dunsterville wrote, "my father gave me the 
small allowance of £ 100 a year, which just doubled my pay; but this fell far short of 
my Mess-bill, and further parental assistance was necessary at frequent intervals.,,176 
His mess bill was much enlarged when he found that the cost of learning mess 
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etiquette was to pay for mistakes with a round of port. l77 As a junior officer with the 
Gordon's, Ian Hamilton's mess bills were £270 a month. 178 Major General Sir 
George Y ounghusband, writing, as a captain in 1891, a guide for parents as to 
whether their son should consider a career in the army, wrote that a minimum of 
£120 a year more than pay was needed to live in England or the Mediterranean as a 
junior officer. A subaltern could live on his pay in India, but an extra £50 a month 
would be heipful. I79 For all the commentary that junior officers needed private 
incomes (and the landed class, or at least wealth, which such an income implied), 
what was needed was for their fathers to have an income sufficient, or at least 
stretchable enough, to supply an allowance to their sons until the latter were 
sufficiently advanced in their careers to support themselves. 
As can be seen from the tables below, the commission did not contemplate 
lowering the minimum total expenses of officers, but rather shifting the costs away 
from necessities to ordinary incidentals; a recommendation that cut the cost of 
necessities by only £10. The commission felt that "it should be possible for an 
Officer's expenses as a whole to be kept within the totals mentioned in any regiment 
of Infantry ... under ordinary conditions" .180 Either way, the minimum private 
income a junior officer would have to have to cover expenses in excess of income 
was at least £60. 
T bl 17 In" IE a e ltla xpenses. 181 
Under present conditions. Under conditions 
(1. s. d.) recommended. 
(1. s. d.) 
Necessities of Military 
Service: 
Uniform and cases 97.2.6 90.0.0 
Mess Contribution 7.17.6 0.0.0 
Requisites of Ordinary Life 
in the Army: 
Furniture 35.0.0* 0.0.0 
Plain clothes and kit 60.0.0 60.0.0 
Total 200.0.0 150.0.0 
*Furruture could be rented at a rate of 25 s. per month. 1~2 
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T bl 16 C a e urrent E xpenses. 183 
Under present conditions. Under recommended 
(I. s. d.) conditions. (I. s. d.) 
(I. s. d.) 
Necessities of Military 
Service: 
Mess subscriptions 2.2.0 2.2.0 
Mess incidentals 6.0.0 6.0.0 
Mess guests 3.0.0 3.0.0 
Messing (less 60 days 61.0.0 53.7.6 
leave) 
Furniture, quarters, and 0.0.0 3.0.10 
mess 
Moves and manoeuvres 5.0.0 0.0.0 
Unifonn and boots 10.0.0 8.0.0 
Washing and mending 12.0.0 12.0.0 
Pay 1 st servant 6.0.0 6.0.0 
Balance for contingencies 0.0.0 2.5.11 
Sub-Total 105.2.0 95.16.3 (current pay of2nc1 lt.) 
Expenses of Ordinary Life 
in the Anny: 
Tobacco and stimulants 15.5.0 22.0.0 
Regimental clubs, &c. 3.0.0 3.0.0 
Plain clothes, 1 st servant 5.0.0 5.0.0 
Ditto self and incidentals 27.9.3 30.0.0 
Sub-Total 50.14.3 60.0.0 
Total 155.16.3 155.16.3 
Even under the commission's recommendations, a junior officer was looking 
at looking at £60 of expenses in excess of his pay. Why? There seems to be little 
point in increasing the estimate of the officer's tobacco consumption except to make 
the numbers come out the same. The committee appears to have thought that 
dropping the required private income from £ 100 to £60 was sufficient to 
accommodate men of "modest" means. 
There seems to have been some difference of opinion as to what the expenses 
meant. On the one side, there were those, such as Lord Roberts and the commission, 
who felt that standard expenses were not the source of financial difficulty, whereas 
others, such as Lord Lansdowne, felt that officers' nonnal expenses should not 
exceed their income. What is actually remarkable in these papers on the financial 
status of officers is the sudden change in aesthetic, with the fin de siecle and prior 
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standards of expenditure being denounced in favour of a new standard of fiscal 
modesty. Sumptuous entertaining by officers had become passe and asceticism was 
fashionable. The man of modest personal means was a desired recruit. It is possible 
that this change in attitude towards expected professional behaviour starts with the 
government, who had noticed the shortage in officers, particularly in the recent 
South African War, or the public, who had become more aware of the army due to 
that war. However, it is more likely that there was a generation and a half of 
families who had chosen the financially modest, low risk career of army officer, who 
had either not the ambition or not the contacts, and who were therefore in modest 
financial circumstances. The officers themselves probably felt they and their fathers 
(themselves officers or other kinds of professionals) were increasingly burdened by 
the costs of their profession. The expenses of the profession, even if they had 
declined over the years, were no longer supportable on the savings accrued from 
their careers and men of now modest means were looking elsewhere for a 
professional career. In effect, the government was crippling itself by paying its 
recruiting base out of existence. The sons of professional officers could no longer 
afford to join the officer corps, or were unwilling to when there were other, more 
lucrative professions to choose, and the pay and pension was not sufficient to justify 
the investment. 
Yet the two factions may not have meant the same thing using the tenn 
'expenses'. Lord Roberts did not see his fellow officers joining the army for the 
sake of the profession. In 1901 he wrote, "I would strongly depreciate any drastic 
measures of interference with the comfort of the Messes, or with the ordinary social 
life of the British officer; such measures would tend to lower the popularity of the 
service among the class from which we at present draw our officers and whatever 
faults there may be in the training of our officer, the material is of the best. A 
voluntary anny must depend upon popularity and any falling off in that respect in the 
commissioned ranks, would inevitably be reflected on N. C. O's (sic) and men."] 84 
While he did favour allowances that would cover expenses, he felt that it was 
unforeseen expenses relating to transfers and duty at exercises, rather than regular 
expenses, that caused financial difficulties.185 In Lord Roberts' view, men joined the 
officer corps for its convivial (and costly) fraternity with other men ofthe same 
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social and financial status. Lord Roberts himself was part of the Anglo-Irish gentry 
and, not being wealthy, served in India because it was cheaper than living in 
Britain. I86 After he retired from the position of Commander in Chief of India and 
was in London lobbying for a suitable posting, he turned down the position of 
governor of Malta because his income, which derived solely from his salary, would 
not cover his expenses. I 87 Yet many junior officers were at least as conscious as 
Lord Roberts of the financial advantages of India. Captain Y ounghusband, in his 
1891 guide for prospective subalterns, claimed that, of 350 cadets, 250 requested 
placement in the Indian army. The pay and pensions were better, and the furloughs 
more generous. Professional opportunities were greater as well. Independent 
command existed at more junior ranks, offering more chances to be noticed in a 
campaign, and more campaigns in which to be noticed. Appointment to the staff in 
India was possible without going through Staff College, which, Younghusband 
advised, was no longer a realistic possibility in Britain. I 88 
Lord Roberts thought that reducing expenses in the British army to the level 
the German emperor hoped (£27 per annum for the infantry) was impossible, though 
he felt that "much may be done to discourage extravagance and assist economy". I 89 
This suggests that he had not necessarily read the information in the document 
carefully; it is possible that Roberts did not get along with Edmonds, or Roberts may 
have been too busy to read the document. The enclosed letter from the emperor was 
a decade old, and if Edmonds was correct that German career officers required an 
income of £12 (or £27 according to other sources), then the emperor had been 
successful in his intent to lower expenses. Edmonds also claimed that the social 
atmosphere did not work against those with little private income. 
A very small proportion of the junior officers of the German army have an 
allowance of more than £12 per annum, some have not even this. The 
families which have supplied officers to the army for generation after 
generation are not rich and it is thought no disgrace for an officer to be poor. 
The present Emperor has done much in order that midst the increasing wealth 
of the nation the officer without means may not only exist, but if capable and 
hardworking may have the same opportunities for self-improvement, the 
same possibility of rising as his richer comrades. It may not be out of place 
to recall that von Moltke himself was without private means, that he raised 
the money necessary for his studies at the Kriege Academie (Staff College) 
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by writing military articles and that even when he was Chief of the General 
Staffhis two maiden sisters took in boarders without derogation of his or 
h . d· . ,,190 t elr 19mty. 
"Any parade of wealth is looked upon as snobbish and simplicity is 
encouraged. "I dined," says Edmonds, "last month at the Mess of the 2nd Foot 
Guards in Berlin. The dinner consisted of Soup (sic), fish, joint, a cream tart and 
cheese. It cost 1 mark, 20 pfennig. (1 i., 2 )/2 s.). The wine was put on the table in its 
original bottles, the waiters were soldiers in uniform. There was no plate. Yet the 
officers who sat around me wore the time honoured names of Blucher Muffling, 
Moltke, Alvensleben, Herwert von Bittenfeld etc.,,191 Ifhis observations are correct, 
the emperor also succeeded, as per the exhortation of his letter, in changing the 
social attitude within the officer corps towards expenditure and incomes. 
However, most German officers were not dining at the most prestigious and 
most socially exclusive mess in Germany. Most spent their careers drilling troops in 
small provincial towns on the borders. Ifthey did not achieve the rank of major, and 
thereby access to higher commands, the only other option, aside from retirement, 
was to pass the exams to get into the War Academy. These were considered very 
difficult, and many more applied than were accepted. l92 The vast majority of officers 
were retired as captains in their mid- forties, having failed to gain their majority. 193 
Alternately, an officer might be accepted to one of the 160 places at the War 
Academy, and ifhe passed the three-year course, and was one ofthe one in ten 
accepted into the operational branches ofthe General Staff and the field divisions, 
his career was made.194 
Expenses were such that most junior officers needed to have a private 
income. 195 A parental subsidy of 45RM a month would cover uniforms, horses, 
dancing lessons, fencing instruction and suitable social activities. 196 Officers who 
did not have a private income shorted themselves food and heat and tried not to wear 
their coats to avoid wear. The stipends mentioned in the British reports could not be 
depended on and the travel allowances were lower than those for civilians, and so 
may not have covered the cost of travel, though the British understood them to do so. 
Food, drink, tobacco, lodging and regimental and widow's funds were deducted from 
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pay, again contradicting the British understanding that food and lodging were paid 
for by an allowance on top of pay, and tobacco a matter of private purchase, though 
pay, in the case of this source, may include allowances. The officers also paid for 
changes in uniform style. Debt was not uncommon, but if it became unmanageable, 
a court of honour would dismiss the officer from service. 197 Just before World War 
One, second lieutenants were paid 125 RM per month, lieutenants 200 RM and 
captains from 182 to 425 RM per month, which approximately agrees with the 
figures given by the British reports [this repeats p. 43; cut?]. 198 An anonymous 
British officer who had served in the Prussian army put the pay rates at £60 per year 
for lieutenants, rising to £85 and later £120 after some years in service, and that 
captains received £180 to £250. 199 One third of that covered the cost of uniforms, 
which were more expensive than the British reports claimed.2oo Pensions are not 
discussed in current literature, if they existed. Current literature is significantly more 
negative about the financial situation of German officers than the British reports, 
which probably reflects the writers' efforts to show British expenses in a negative 
light compared to German ones. The low pay of the officer corps, intended to be a 
barrier to applicants of unsuitable social status was, in 1911, pointed to as having 
become a barrier to suitable ones.201 The anonymous British officer estimated that a 
man would need a savings of £ 1000 to consider Prussian army a realistic career 
choice?02 
The point here regarding the wider political context following the war is that, 
while the impetus for reform was short-lived, reforms were centred on other issues 
than officers. Having established to its satisfaction that it was ok for junior officers 
to have to have expenses over pay, so long as those expenses could be excused as 
relevant to their professional needs, and that, for the most part, the junior officers 
were perceived to have done reasonably well, though much could be done with their 
education, and the staff training needed work, the gradually worsening shortage of 
officers was not enough incentive for the government to change pay rates or make 
radical changes in their education or promotion. The community from which the 
officer corps was drawn was not under question; the question was how to continue 
drawing from this pool. As Lieutenant General Kelly-Kenny said in evidence to the 
Elgin commission, "I think he [the regimental officer] is a splendid leader, and I do 
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not think we will improve our position by going to another class. There will be great 
social difficulties and ... even in the infantry I think scarcely any officer can live 
comfortably without £1 00 a year.,,203 That the cost of being an officer was causing 
recruiting difficulties and thus a shortage of officers was the opinion of several 
officers speaking in evidence before the Elgin commission, though Lord Roberts 
claimed there was no shortage of applicants.204 The failures of senior officers were 
solved by retiring them and bringing up the officers (like Haig and Kitchener) that 
were just below the level of independent command during the South African war. 
The problem of training senior officers to deal with masses of troops was dealt with 
by making the annual manoeuvres larger, more complex and more realistic?05 
At the international level, it was becoming obvious that the currents of 
European politics were shifting, as France and Russia had made an alliance 1894, 
and German government decided to double the size of its navy in 1899. 206 Worse, 
Germany, France and Russia, disapproving of this war, contemplated involving 
themselves in it.207 The need for troops was also risking Britain's security from 
invasion in favour of maintaining garrisons in the colonies and raised questions 
about Britain's ability to send a future expeditionary force while maintaining home 
and imperial security.20S 
As the South African war dragged on, it exposed numerous problems in the 
British army. The tactics of all branches came under question, as did the quality and 
effectiveness ofthe medical corps and transport and logistics and the competence of 
senior officers to hold independent command, and the need for regimental officers to 
show more initiative and more responsibility (and suffer less dampening supervision 
by more senior regimental officers)?09 
The unionist government, having survived the 1900 election, and assuming 
the war won, turned to the issue of army reform. st. John Brodrick took the position 
of Secretary for War from a Lord Landsdowne thoroughly tired of holding that 
position. Brodrick introduced his reform scheme in March of 1901, proposing an 
expansion of the regular army and its reorganisation into six corps, to not only 
protect India and cover home defence, but also to deal with the risk of European war. 
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He also planned to raise enlistment for expansion thorough short-term service, and 
increasing pay. These proposals were passed by the House despite opposition both 
from the Liberal opposition, whose leader, Campbell-Bannerman, remained 
convinced that home defence was a navy issue, and from within his own party, and 
the disapproval of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Michael Hicks Beach. 
However, recruiting was less than successful. Neither did Brodrick get the support 
of the War Office. Brodrick also implemented the recommendations ofthe Dawkins 
Committee on Administrative reform of May 1901, expanding the War Office 
Council and giving the Commander in Chief control over the Adjutant General, the 
Military Secretary and the Director of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence, but the 
Council discussed detail rather than policy and Lord Roberts thought that the powers 
of the Commander in Chief, limited in 1895, were insufficiently restored and offered 
his resignation in the fall of 1901?10 
The impetus for reform was short-lived. In the wake of a war that was both 
longer and much more expensive than expected, political, press and public 
enthusiasm for large-scale spending in aid of reform quickly waned. The Liberals, 
no longer divided by the war, felt freer to attack the government, and articles by The 
Times war correspondent, L. S. Amery, supported backbench Unionists opposed to 
military spending. Brodrick's political position deteriorated throughout 1903, and 
finally collapsed with the August publication ofthe Royal Commission on the War 
in South Africa. The report aired the many shortcomings of the army's conduct of 
the late war, including the lack of strategic planning and the poor quality of much of 
the staff work, and exposed the disagreements between the Secretary and the War 
Office. Hugh Arnold-Forster, who accepted on the condition that a committee 
consider how to reorganise the War Office, replaced Brodrick. On the advice of this 
committee, headed by Lord Esher, the Committee of Imperial Defence gained a 
permanent secretariat, an Army Council was added to the War Office, and the army 
eventually got a General Staff in 1906, though the new heads could not agree 
whether the Esher committee was correct to recommend that the General Staff 
officers be recruited form the staff college, or that they be rewarded with faster 
promotion. As a precondition, the Committee required that Lord Roberts and the 
heads of the four military departments be replaced, ending the influence of Lord 
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Roberts as the influence ofWolseley's clique effectively ended due to the reverses 
early in the war. 211 
216 
While criticisms were made about the cost of being an officer the success of 
reform efforts in dealing with these issues was limited. While the costs of becoming 
an officer had ensured that, hitherto, the members of the upper and middle classes, 
that is, the graduates of the public school system, would supply the officer corps, the 
shortage of officers that was becoming a problem before the South African war 
continued afterwards, and well past the first world war. In the face of quickly 
declining interest in costly reform, the government was not going to increase 
officers' pay rates?12 Recruitment continued to decline because being an officer was 
simply too costly, and too much work for the remuneration?13 The Akers-Douglas 
committee's suggestion, that promotion be determined by merit, foundered on fears 
of patronage and favouritism.214 A clear definition of merit, that could be measured, 
remained a problem. The end of both Lord Roberts' and Lord Wolseley's cliques 
destabilized the patronage system within the army, which left promotions to the 
whims of arms rivalry and personal favouritism, and the success of cavalry 
patronage was evident in the command of the British Expeditionary Force of 
1914.215 In the post world war one period, the army was well known to be a career 
avoided by the ambitious; the pay was low compared to the up front costs, promotion 
was still by seniority within the regiment, and officers were being compulsorily 
retired in their late 40s or early 50s (that is, at the rank of major and its attendant 
pension) when they were no doubt facing the costs of post -secondary education for 
their own sons.216 The problems that had existed before the Boer war, that risked the 
recruiting base, had not been addressed, and were becoming increasingly more 
obvious. 
One year before Roberts made his comments, Lord Lansdowne, in an internal 
response to complaints about the cost of cavalry and other expenses made in the 
Army and Navy Gazette in 1893, wrote that he had no political leverage unless 
officers visibly cut back on their spending. "It must, however, be clearly understood 
that if the public is to be asked to improve the financial position of these Officers by 
bringing their pay more nearly into line with their inevitable expenses, the Military 
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Authorities must on their side put their foot down and discourage by the strongest of 
measures if necessary, the extravagance of which some Regiments are guilty.,,2!7 
Furthennore, the commanders must be held responsible "if the tone and habits of the 
regiment become extravagant,,?!8 Someone, whose initials are an illegible scrawl, 
supported and expanded on the idea that pay should have some connection to 
professional expenses. This person points out that an officer's necessary expenses 
were about triple his income, resulting in a system where officers "are thus 
deliberately, and as a part of a recognized (sic) system, sustained in the discharge of 
public duties largely by private funds. Is there any other branch of public service 
where such a system prevails?" If there was any intention to open the officer corps 
to wider competition, then the officer's income had more closely to match reduced 
expenditure, else ''we shall still keep out, under the existing system, the man who 
does not lack brains and education, but who lacks money".2!9 
The committee on officers' expenses of 1902 tended to support Roberts' 
VIew. "In the opinion ofthe Committee there can be no doubt that the demands 
made upon an Officer's means by these customary expenses, ('those falling on a 
Regimental Officer in view ofthe style ofliving habitually adopted by the majority 
of his brother Officers, irrespective of the demands of the Service, i.e., chiefly 
expenditure incurred by Officers on pursuits and amusements quite independent of 
their professional position') rather than any incidental to his profession as such, are 
mainly responsible for the high average of private incomes regarded as requisite in 
the Anny generally, and particularly in certain units.,,22o However, those customary 
expenses were in need of reduction, because they reflected badly on the officer corps 
as a whole, being "a profession which should set an example of simplicity of 
living,,?2! Secondly, because ofthe shortage of officers due to the South African 
war, the officer corps had to be no less attractive a professional field to enter than its 
competition. The members of the committee felt "that their recommendations on 
any specific point should only be regarded as a part of a comprehensive scheme for 
reducing the necessary expenditure of a young Officer to a minimum not 
disproportionate to that involved in entering another profession, and for promoting 
throughout the Service a standard of living generally not inconsistent with that 
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existing among the classes from whom the Services and the liberal professions 
generally are in the main recruited.,,222 
218 
The expectation of "extravagant" expenditure to keep up with the other 
officers ofthe regiment was seen as detrimental to recruiting suitable young men. 
"Any action calculated to reduce the supply of candidates from existing sources, or 
to render the Army unattractive to men of good position and fortune, is to be 
deprecated. But it is obviously essential in the public interest, that the presence of 
such Officers should not be allowed so to influence the general standard of living in 
any regiment as to discourage the entrance of suitable candidates of moderate 
means." 223 The committee was trapped between the need to recruit from the right 
classes, and the realisation that the correct, professional and business, classes 
suffered from tight finances that made entry in to a profession, for which real 
financial remuneration was years into the future, a significant burden. By dividing 
the issue of officer's expenses between those defined as required due to the 
profession and the extra expenses demanded by more socially exclusive regiments, 
the latter could be decried without ever questioning the former. 
The pension system set up in the 1870s left officers with difficult financial 
and career decisions nearly a decade into their service. Pay was relatively low, and, 
after about 9 years of service and having the rank of captain, would have only just 
begun to surpass an officer's professional expenses. Moreover, the pension he could 
expect to get after 12 years of service would only just cover his costs to date. His 
promotion prospects would, at an average rate of advancement, result in the probable 
possession of a lieutenant -colonel's rank on retirement, but this was dependent on 
the prior retirement of many of his fellow officers when they were at the rank of 
captain, which event the pensions system did successfully encourage. It was also 
probably, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, dependent on the patronage that could 
speed his advance through the ranks, and out of the regiment altogether and into 
staff. The pension system probably removed many who felt they not have the social 
contacts to move up in rank. When early retirement became so popular as to speed 
up promotion to a rate faster than intended, the pension system was changed to 
enforce the retention of officers. Thus, the government used the pension system as a 
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tool to regulate the numbers and ranks of officers. For the officers, joining the army 
was a financially low risk career with a very modest return on investment. Officer's 
pay and expenses were not a matter of governmental concern until nearly the end of 
the century, by which time there was a noticeable shortage of officers. The official 
opinion was that it was the attendant social, rather than strictly professional, 
expenses, which put their recruiting base at risk of choosing another profession. 
Therefore, the government decided that promoting a more ascetic social standard and 
lowering professional expenses would attract the professional classes from which 
suitable officers would be found. Nonetheless, years oflow pay and high expenses 
and modest pensions were driving away the recruiting base. 
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Conclusion 
The thesis of this dissertation is that in the period from the end of purchase to 
the Boer war, the line officer corps was becoming more professional. Given the 
many problems enumerated, it can appear that the line officer entirely failed to 
become more professional. The anny failed to beat the navy in political infighting, 
and thus failed to acquire a general staff, and failed to see the strategic visions of its 
senior officers adopted by the government. The officers had an apparently cavalier 
attitude towards education, resisted promotion by merit, and were prone to early 
retirement due to lack of access to internal patronage, posting to wars, or staff 
positions that would advance careers. 
However, professionalization is a process, not an event. The point is that the 
line officer corps was trying to professionalize, not that they were necessarily 
always, or entirely, successful. They did not become professional overnight. 
Indeed, they did not become models of modem professionals in thirty years. This 
failure to achieve complete success, however, does not indicate complete failure of 
the project as a whole. British officers agreed on the need to professionalize, but 
disagreed on what the tenn entailed, even in the face of the Prussian model, which 
was agreed to be professional but whose applicability to the British situation 
appeared to be limited. What is critical is that elements of a consensus on the 
definition of professionalism, and the structures of a modem professional anny, 
slowly and painfully emerged in the time period covered. 
Part of the effort to professionalize, and to define professionalism, was on the 
officer's own initiative, some was by the decisions of the governments of the day, 
some fell out ofthe officers' individual decisions in the course of their careers. The 
views of the state and the officers did not always agree. However, in distinct 
contrast to the condition of the officer corps at the end of purchase in 1870, by the 
South African war the line officer corps had developed a relevant education system 
that was tested against numerous small wars, operating within the deployment 
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system established by the Cardwell reforms - which, contrary to common 
perception, largely achieved their deployment aims. These deployment patterns 
reinforced, and may indeed have created the structure of, the patronage rings that 
provided some merit-based promotions, an ad hoc system operating in lieu of a 
modem, impersonal, merit system. Officers' education was directly connected to 
their promotion within the regimental ranks, and education was likewise a 
prerequisite for passing Staff College and fast -tracking promotion into staff positions 
- though the patronage rings ensured that personal connections could also be 
exploited for rapid promotion in a manner relatively unconnected to an individual's 
professional merit or education. British officers had a pay and pension system 
which, though not generous, was likewise connected to rank, entirely replacing the 
rolling investment system of purchasing commissions. For all the condemnation of 
the British army's conduct of the South African war, the army was able to adapt its 
tactics, strategy and administration to win not once, but thrice: first in conventional 
combat, then against a guerrilla force, and third, it was able to formally assess what it 
had done wrong and make further reforms. 
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Table 1: Index of the Line Regiments! 
Senior Foot Regiments 
There were 25 senior foot regiments, of two battalions each. 
Title to 1881 Title after 1881 
The 1 st or The Royal Scots Regiment The Royal Scots (The Lothian Regiment) 
The 2nd or The Queen's Royal Regiment of The Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment 
Foot 
The 3 ra (East Kent - The Buffs) Regiment The Buffs (East Kent) Regiment of Foot 
of Foot 
The 4th, (The King's Own Royal) Regiment The King's Own (Royal Lancaster 
Regiment) 
The 5th or Northumberland Fusiliers The Northumberland Fusiliers 
The 6th (Royal Warwickshire) Regiment of The Royal Warwickshire Regiment 
Foot 
The ih (Royal Fusiliers) The Royal Fusiliers (City of London) 
Regiment 
The 8th (The King's Regiment) The King's (Liverpool Regiment) 
The 9th (East Norfolk) Regiment of Foot The Norfolk Regiment 
The 10th (North Lincoln) Regiment of Foot The Lincolnshire Regiment 
The 11 th (North Devonshire) Regiment of The Devonshire Regiment 
Foot 
The 12th (East Suffolk) Regiment of Foot The Suffolk Regiment 
The 13th (1 st Somersetshire) (Prince The Prince Albert's (Somersetshire Light 
Albert's Light Infantry) Regiment Infantry) 
The 14th (Buckingham shire - The Prince of The Prince of Wales's Own (West 
Wales's Own) Regiment of Foot Yorkshire Regiment) 
The 15th (York, East Riding) Regiment of The East Yorkshire Regiment (The Duke 
Foot of York's Own) 
The 16th (Bedfordshire) Regiment of Foot The Bedfordshire Regiment 
The 1 ih (Leicestershire) Regiment of Foot The Leicestershire Regiment 
The 18th (The Royal Irish) Regiment of The Royal Irish Regiment 
Foot 
The 19th (1 st Yorkshire, North Riding - The Princess of Wales's Own (Yorkshire) 
Princess of Wales's Own) Regiment of Regiment 
Foot 
The 20th (East Devonshire) Regiment of The Lancashire Fusiliers 
Foot 
The 21 st (Royal North British) Fusiliers The Royal Scots Fusiliers 
Regiment of Foot 
[from 1877-1881: The 21 st (Royal Scots 
Fusiliers) Regiment of Foot] 
The 22M (The Cheshire) Regiment of Foot The Cheshire Regiment 
I A Register of the Regiments and Corps of the British Army. Ed. Arthur Swinson, (London: 
Archive Press, 1972). 
,-
The 23ro (Royal Welch Fusiliers) Regiment The Royal Welsh Fusiliers 
afFoot 
The 24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment of The South Wales Borderers 
Foot 
The 25th (The King's Own Borderers) The King's Own Borderers 
Regiment of Foot [from 1887: The King's Own Scottish 
Borderers] 
Regiments of Foot numbered 26-109 and the Rifle Brigade 
Through 1881 there were 85 ofthese regiments, which had one battalion each, the 
exceptions being the 60th and the Rifle Brigade, each of which had four battalions. 
After 1881, there were 44 regiments of 2 battalions each, with the continuing 
exceptions ofthe 60th and the Rifle Brigade, and the 79th, which continued to have 
one battalion until 1897, when a second regular battalion was added to the regiment. 
These regiments are ordered in their post -1881 precedence. 
Title to 1881 Title after 1881 
The 26th Cameronian Regiment The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) 
The 90th Perthshire Light Infantry 
The 2ih (Inniskilling) Regiment of Foot The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 
The 108th (Madras Infantry) Regiment 
The 28th (North Gloucestershire) Regiment The Gloucestershire Regiment 
of Foot 
The 61 5t (South Gloucestershire) Regiment 
The 29th (W orcestershire) Regiment of The W orcestershire Regiment 
Foot 
The 36th (Herefordshire) Regiment of Foot 
The 30th (Cambridgshire) Regiment of Foot The East Lancashire Regiment 
The 59th (2nd Nottinghamshire) Regiment 
of Foot 
The 31 5t (Huntingdonshire) Regiment The East Surrey Regiment 
The 70th (Surrey) Regiment of Foot 
The 32nd (Cornwall) Light Infantry The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry 
The 46th (South Devonshire) Regiment of 
Foot 
The 33 fd (Duke of Wellington's) Regiment The Duke of Wellington's Regiment 
of Foot 
76th Regiment of Foot 
The 34th (Cumberland) Regiment of Foot The Border Regiment 
The 55th (Westmoreland) Regiment of Foot 
The 35th (Royal Sussex) Regiment of Foot The Royal Sussex Re&ment 
The loih Bengal Infantry Regiment 
The 3ih (North Hampshire) Regiment of The Hampshire Regiment 
Foot 
The 6ih (South Hampshire) Regiment of 
Foot 
The 38th (l5t Staffordshire) Regiment of The South Staffordshire Regiment 
Foot 
The 80th (Staffordshire Volunteers) 
Regiment of Foot 
The 39th (Dorsetshire) Regiment of Foot The Dorsetshire R~giment 
The 54th (West Norfolk) Regiment of Foot 
The 40th (2nd Somersetshire) Regiment of The South Lancashire Regiment (The 
Foot Prince of Wales's Volunteer~ 
The 82lld (Prince of Wales's Volunteers) 
Regiment of Foot 
The 41 st (The Welsh) Regiment of Foot The Welsh Regiment 
The 69th (South Lincolnshire) Regiment of 
Foot 
The 42lld (The Royal Highland) Regiment The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) 
of Foot (The Black Watch) 
The 73rd (Perthshire) Regiment of Foot 
The 43rd (Monmouthshire Light Infantry) The Oxfordshire Light Infantry 
Regiment 
The 52lld (Oxfordshire Light Infantry) 
Regiment 
The 44th (East Essex) Regiment of Foot The Essex Regiment 
The 56th (West Essex) Regiment of Foot 
The 45th (Nottinghamshire Regiment) The Sherwood Foresters (Derbyshire 
Sherwood Foresters Regiment) 
The 95th or Derbyshire Regiment of Foot 
The 47tl1 (Lancashire) Regiment of Foot The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment 
The 81 st (Loyal Lincoln Volunteers) 
Regiment of Foot 
The 48th (Northamptonshire) Regiment of The Northamptonshire Regiment 
Foot 
The 58tl1 (Rutlandshire) Regiment of Foot 
The 49tl1 Princess Charlotte of Wales's Princess Charlotte of Wales's Berkshire 
Hertfordshire Regiment Regiment 
(the title 'Royal' was conferred in 1885) 
The 66th (Berkshire) Regiment of Foot 
The 50th (The Queen's Own) Regiment of The Queen's Own (Royal West Kent) 
Foot Regiment 
The 9il1 (The Earl of Ulster'S) Regiment of 
Foot 
The 51 st (2lld Yorkshire, West Riding, The The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry 
King's Own 
Light Infantry) Regiment 
The 105th (Madras Light Infantry) 
Regiment 
The 53rd (Shropshire) Regiment of Foot The King's Shropshire Light Infantry 
The 85tl1 (Bucks Volunteers) (King's Light 
Infantry) Regiment 
The 57th (West Middlesex) Regiment of The Middlesex (Duke of Cambridge's 
Foot Own) 
The 77th (East Middlesex) (Duke of 
Cambridge's Own) Regiment of Foot 
The 60tl1 or The King' s R~al Rifle Corps The King's Royal Rifle Corps 
The 62lld (Wiltshire) Regiment of Foot The Wiltshire (Duke of Edinburgh's) 
The 99th (The Duke of Edinburgh's) 
Regiment of Foot 
The 63rd (West Suffolk) Regiment of Foot The Manchester Regiment 
The 96th Regiment of Foot 
The 64th (2nd Staffordshire) Regiment of The North Staffordshire Regiment (The 
Foot Prince of Wales's) 
The 98th (The Prince of Wales) Regiment 
of Foot 
The 65th (2nd Yorkshire, North Riding) The York and Lancaster Regiment 
Regiment of Foot 
The 84th (York and Lancaster) Regiment of 
Foot 
The 68th (Durham Light Infantry) Regiment The Durham Light Infantry 
of Foot 
The 106th Bombay Light Infantry Regiment 
The 71 st (Highland) Light Infantry The Highland Light Infantry 
The 74th (Highlanders) Regiment of Foot 
The 72nd (or The Duke of Albany's Own The Seaforth Highlanders (Ross-shire 
Highlanders) Regiment of Foot Buffs, the Duke of Albany's) 
The 78th (Highland) Regiment of Foot or 
The Ross-shire Buffs 
The 75th (Stirlingshire) Regiment of Foot The Gordon Highlanders 
The 92nd (Gordon Highlanders) Regiment 
of Foot 
The 79th Regiment, The Queen's Own The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders 
Cameron Highlanders 
The 83 fd (County of Dublin) Regiment of The Royal Irish Rifles 
Foot 
The 86th (Royal County Down) Regiment 
of Foot 
The 8ih (The Royal Irish Fusiliers) Princess Victoria's (The Royal Irish 
Regiment of Foot Fusiliers) 
The 89th (Princess Victoria's) Regiment of 
Foot 
The 88th (Connaught Rangers) Regiment of The Connaught Rangers 
Foot 
The 94th Regiment of Foot 
The 91 st (Princess Louise's Argyllshire) The Princess Louise's (Argyll and 
Highlanders Sutherland Highlanders) 
The 93 fd (Sutherland Highlanders) 
Regiment of Foot 
The 100th (Prince of Wales's Royal The Prince of Wales's Leinster Regiment 
Canadian) Regiment of Foot (Royal Canadians) 
The 109th (Bombay Infantry) Regiment 
The 101 st (Royal Bengal Fusiliers) The Royal Munster Fusiliers 
Regiment 
The 104th Bengal Fusiliers Regiment 
The 102n<1 (Royal Madras) Fusiliers The Royal Dublin Fusiliers 
The 103 fa Royal Bombay Fusiliers 
The Prince Consort's Own Rifle Brigade Rifle Brigade (The Prince Consort's Own) 
Table 2: Regions for Deployment Charts 
Britain 
India 
Africa 
Madras 
Bombay 
Bengal 
Punjab 
Afghanistan 
Nepal 
NW Frontier 
South Africa 
Gold Coast 
South East Asia 
Aden 
Burma 
Ceylon 
Malaya 
Mauritius 
Singapore 
Straits Settlements 
East Asia 
Hong Kong 
Japan 
Tientsin 
Americas 
Barbados 
Bermuda 
Canada 
Jamaica 
Nova Scotia 
West Indies 
Mediterranean 
Crete 
Cyprus 
Egypt 
Gibraltar 
Malta 
Chart 1 - Estimates and Expenditures 1870-1887 
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Chart 2 - Estimates and Expenditures 1889-1902 
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Chart 3 - Votes as a Percentage of Estimates: 1870-1887 
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Chart 4 - Votes as a Percentage of Estimates: 1890-1901 
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Chart 5 - Home and Colonie s Establishment 1871 -1902 
500000 
450000 
400000 
350000 -
s:::: 300000 -
Q) 
::!: 
-~ 250000 -
Q) 
.0 
E 
~ 200000 
150000 
........ 
-
.?/' 
....... ---
----' 
-- --
-
-
-
.... ------
- .. --
100000 - - -
-.--- -
-- -------- -
-- --
- ---- -
-----
- -
-- ---- - - - - - - -- -
---- ------
---.-
-
- -50000 
~ ~ 
0 , , , 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Year 
..... 
o line infantry officers 
_ non -commissioned ranks: line infantry (incL 
NCO's , drummers and trumpeters) 
all regimental officers 
_ non-commissioned ranks:regimental 
-+- all officers 
_ all non-commissioned ranks 
(/) 
... 
Q) 
(.) 
!E 
0 
-0 
... 
Q) 
.c 
E 
::::I 
Z 
Chart 6 - Home and Colonies Establishment: Officers 
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Chart 7 - India Establishment 
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Chart 8 - Indian Establishment: Officers 
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Chart 9 - Deployment of all Regiments by Region 
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Chart 10 - Deployment of Regiments 1 to 25 by Region 
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Chart 11 - Deployment of Regiments 26 to 109 and the Rifle Brigade by Region 
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Chart 12 . Deployment of all Regiments: India 
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Chart 13 - Deployment of all Regiments: India (stacked chart) 
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Chart 14 - Deployment of Regiments 1 to 25: India 
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Chart 15 - Deployment of Regiments 26 to 109 and the Rifle Brigade: India 
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Chart 16 - Number of Deployment Locations Each Year 
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Chart 18 - All Regiments: Number of Years in Location 
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Chart 19 - Regiments 1 to 25: Number of Years in Location 
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Chart 20 - Regiments 26 to 109 and the Rifle Brigade: Number of Years in Location 
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Chart 21 - Moves Per Year 
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Chart 22 - Regimental Moves as Percentage of the Number of Battalions 
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